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COLLECTIVE SECURITY
AS A MEANS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY
IN NORTHEAST ASIA

by

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This thesis evaluates the applicability of a collective security system to Northeast Asian states as a means for regional stability in the future. The current bilateral security system will not fit with the future security environment because of three coming changes in this region: Korean reunification; a conspicuous reduction of the US security role; a future confrontational power structure between China and Japan. According to the theoretical perspectives of realists, institutionalists, and constructivists, there should be five conditions for the success for collective security: positive identities, shared interests, institutions to control states' behaviors, information, and interactions between institutions and states. The case studies of the Locarno Pact and NATO confirms this. For the Northeast Asian states, it would be very difficult to form positive identities and share common security interests at present. However, as long as a future balance of power structure is not desirable for regional stability, the Northeast Asian states should set the goal of collective security for their co-prosperity in the future. They can establish a collective security system through the following steps: the settlement of historical and ideological enmities; confidence building; establishment of a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation; and institutionalization of collective security.

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY AS A MEANS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

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ABSTRACT

This thesis evaluates the applicability of a collective security system to Northeast Asian states as a means for regional stability in the future. The current bilateral security system will not fit with the future security environment because of three coming changes in this region: Korean reunification; a conspicuous reduction of the US security role; a future confrontational power structure between China and Japan. According to the theoretical perspectives of realists, institutionalists, and constructivists, there should be five conditions for the success for collective security: positive identities, shared interests, institutions to control states' behaviors, information, and interactions between institutions and states. The case studies of the Locarno Pact and NATO confirms this. For the Northeast Asian states, it would be very difficult to form positive identities and share common security interests at present. However, as long as a future balance of power structure is not desirable for regional stability, the Northeast Asian states should set the goal of collective security for their co-prosperity in the future. They can establish a collective security system through the following steps: the settlement of historical and ideological enmities; confidence building; establishment of a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation; and institutionalization of collective security.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis evaluates the applicability of a collective security system to Northeast Asian states as a means for regional stability in the future. The current bilateral security system will not fit with the future security environment because of three coming changes in this region: Korean reunification; the conspicuous reduction of a US security role after Korean reunification; a future confrontational power structure between China and Japan.

Korean reunification will cause the conspicuous reduction of US security role in terms of mission and justification of the U.S. military in Korean peninsula and possibly in Japan. The U.S. budget problem will also require a larger security role by Japan and a reunified Korea. Japan will expand its political and security role in this region. Japan already has military potential based on its economic power and high technology, and its permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council will make Japan a normal sovereign state with normal military power. The expanding political and security role of Japan will conflict with Chinese neo-nationalism which aims at anti-hegemonism and recovering its national status. As a result, there would be a rivalry between Japan and China. Korea may align with China, or Japan and the United States. In either case, there will be security instability in Northeast Asia under the balance of power system. Instead of the current balance of power structure, this thesis examines and suggests a collective security system as a future security means in Northeast Asia.

This thesis deals with two main questions; "Under what conditions, can a collective security system work or not?"; "What might a collective security system in Northeast Asia look like?"

The first argument is that for the success of collective security there should be five conditions: positive identities among member states, shared interests, institutions to control states' behaviors, institutions to facilitate information, and reiteration of interactions between institution and states. They come from the theoretical perspectives of realists, institutionalist, and constructivists. For realists, cooperation is impossible because states pursue only their own self-interests in an anarchic international system. Like a prisoner's dilemma game, they

do not trust each other. Institutionalists argue that cooperation is possible if states can get mutual benefits from cooperation. In the prisoner's dilemma, if information is possible, and the prisoner's dilemma situation occurs repeatedly, the prisoners will cooperate for their future situation. Also, they suggest the importance of institutions for cooperation in terms of transaction costs and information. Constructivists argue that cooperation among states depends on identity. For example, if the United States increased its military, the Soviet Union felt a threat from it while Great Britain did not. This is because the identity of the Soviet Union toward the United States was different from that of Great Britain. If a state identifies another state as an enemy, security cooperation will be impossible.

The five variables are examined in case studies of the Locarno Pact and NATO, and confirmed as conditions for the success of collective security. Of course NATO is not a collective security system but a collective defense organization. But, in terms of states' cooperation, collective security and collective defense have the same characteristics. That is the reason why this thesis chooses NATO as a case study of collective security.

The second argument is that collective security can be applied to Northeast Asia if those five variables are satisfied. However, the Northeast Asian states have quite negative identities and their security policies throughout modern history have conflicted with each other during the Second World War, the Cold War and even in the post-Cold War era. Their traditional relations were based on bilateralism, not multilateralism, and China's authoritarian regime can be an obstacle for establishing a collective security system.

This thesis suggests four steps to establish a collective security system in Northeast Asia. First of all, the Northeast Asian states should terminate historical enmities and recover trust toward each other. Northeast Asian states have quite negative identities because of their historical experiences throughout modern history. Japan should make its attitude toward its history in apparent, and China also should make its ideological lines clear. Without the settlement of historical and ideological matters, their identities cannot be improved. Second, CBMs should be reinforced through multilateral security approaches and economic interactions using current Asia-Pacific institutions such as the ARF and the APEC. Third, there should be a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation which facilitates direct

cooperation among Northeast Asian states. Based on positive identities through the first and second phase, this will serve to bring about convergence in their diverse and conflictive security interests into toward a single goal of regional stability. Finally, the Northeast Asian institution can be expanded to a collective security system like NATO. This will be a watershed from a balance of power system to a collective security system for regional stability.

As a current power balancer, the U.S. role will be critical for establishing collective security and maintaining stability. The United States should not contain China by strengthening current bilateral alliances after Korean reunification. Also, the United States should change its role from a protector or a balancer to a participant or a conciliator. As far as the U.S. national interests are concerned, it would be better for the US not to be an off-shore balancer or an isolationist. Instead, the United States can undertake a role to guide regional states to establish a new cooperative security system. Most of all, U.S. participation in a collective security system will justify the presence of the U.S. military in Northeast Asia.

Consequently, considering a future unstable security environment under a balance of power structure, the future security system in Northeast Asia should be changed from a balance of power structure to a collective security system. This is because only a collective security system will be a desirable security means for regional stability in Northeast Asia after Korean reunification. Of course, this does not mean that current bilateral security arrangements are not important for current and future regional security. As long as Northeast Asian states have negative identities, collective security cannot be applied as a security mechanism in this region.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS

Even if the end of the Cold War has dominated and transformed the security agenda in Europe and the Atlantic, its effect on the Northeast Asia region has been somewhat equivocal.[1] The security environment in Northeast Asia remains a remnant of the Cold War with the military confrontation around the Korean peninsula. Bilateral security arrangements between the United States and Japan, the United States and South Korea, and the PRC and North Korea are the nucleus of regional security. Under the balance of power structure, Northeast Asian states are full of historical enmities and distrust and still face security uncertainty even in the post-Cold War era. Despite the aggravated economic situation, North Korea has threatened neighboring states with its nuclear program and intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) development. China has continued its nuclear tests and showed its hard line policy toward domestic and regional issues such as Taiwan and the Spratly Islands. Japan's move toward a greater security role in the Asia-Pacific region, especially after the Japan-U.S. joint declaration on their security alliance in April 1996, also raised the concerns of neighboring states about the future possibility of Japan's rearmament. Coupled with unsolved territorial disputes concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island, Tokto/Takeshima Island, the Taiwan issue, and the divided Korea, Northeast Asia has a strong possibility of regional conflicts.

What will the future security environment in Northeast Asia be? So far, the current balance of power in Northeast Asia has been stable due to the commitment of the U.S. military. However, the question of whether the United States will take the role of balancer of power continuously even after the Korean reunification lies at the heart of future security stability in this region. The U.S. military withdrawal from Subic Bay and the suspended three-phased plan to withdraw its troops from Northeast Asia in 1990 raised doubts over its

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[1]Colin McInnes and Mark G. Rolls, "Post-Cold War Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Trends and issues," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 15, no. 2, August 1994, p. 1.

ongoing commitment in the future. Without the U.S. commitment, can the Northeast Asian states maintain regional stability? There can be several answers to this question according to different views and interpretations of the current situation. As an answer to these series of questions about the future security environment in Northeast Asia, this thesis suggests the following three assumptions:

- **Assumption 1: Korean reunification**

This thesis begins on the assumption that the two Koreas will be reunified in the (near) future.[2] Unless the threat of North Korea disappears, the current balance of power structure based on bilateral security arrangements will continue. As long as animosities around the Korean peninsula exist, collective security cannot be considered as an alternative to the current balance of power structure. This does not mean that Korean reunification is the necessary condition for collective security in Northeast Asia. The current balance of power system may continue after Korean reunification, or another balance of power order can appear. Or, another security system, such as collective security, can be established. In this manner, Korean reunification can raise the possibility of change of security environment in Northeast Asia.

- **Assumption 2: The conspicuous reduction of US security roles**

Korean reunification will bring about the conspicuous reduction of US security roles in Northeast Asia. As long as U.S. national interests are concerned, an entire military withdrawal would be difficult to be come true. However, three factors will influence the reduction of the U.S. troops in this region: the lack of justification for the U.S. military presence in this region, the budget problem, and reunified Korea's reluctance to be confronted with China which may be a result of the U.S. military presence in Korea. As a result, Korea and Japan will expand their independent security roles more as the U.S. security role decreases.

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[2]This thesis does not suggest "how" and "when" Korean reunification will come because what this thesis aims at is not Korean reunification, but the applicability of collective security in Northeast Asia.

- **Assumption 3: Rivalry between Japan and China**

Japan will expand its political and security role in this region, assuming more of the role of the United States. It already has military potential based on economic power and high technology, and its membership in the U.N. Security Council will make Japan a "normal sovereign state" with "normal" military power. Such moves by Japan will conflict with China's national interests. Traditionally, China's security policy has focused on its nationalism, which has been aimed at anti-hegemonism and recovering national status as a "great nation" as in its past history. As a result, there will be a rivalry between Japan and China after Korean reunification in Northeast Asia. If the current balance of power structure continues, Korea may align with either China or Japan and the United States. In either case, there will be security instability as a result of another confrontational structure.

With these three assumptions, the current balance of power structure based on bilateral security arrangements will not fit in with the future security environment. The conspicuous reduction of the U.S. security role as a balancer of power will cause a "power vacuum". With negative identities and conflictive security interests, there will be a power competition among the Northeast Asian states. If Japan rearms, it will be an apparent threat to neighboring states as a strong military power. Coupled with territorial disputes and historical enmities, an arms race among the Northeast Asian states is foreseen. Even though there will appear a new form of a balance of power structure, the balancing will not be desirable for regional stability because the future balance of power system means another confrontation between Japan and China.

Instead of the balance of power structure, this thesis examines and suggests a collective security system as a future security system in Northeast Asia after Korean reunification. Collective security in this thesis is different from recent multilateral security cooperation, such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Collective security is an alternative concept to balance of power, and under a collective security system there is no balance of power structure, such as an alliance. Multilateral security cooperation is the supplement concept of balance of power and it is practiced in an existing balance of power structure. Compared to collective security, a multilateral security framework has a weaker institutional

structure and lacks a legally binding force and institutional capability. As a result, while collective security can be a system that manages power in international relations, a multilateral security framework cannot be an ultimate security measure as an alternative to balance of power. Rather it is a process to cooperate and coordinate their different and conflictive security interests.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis is divided into two major parts based on two main research questions. The first question, "Under what conditions can collective security work or fail?" will be dealt with in Chapters II and III. The second question, "What might a collective security system in Northeast Asia look like?" will be dealt with in Chapters IV and V. Also, there are subquestions as follows:

- What are the theoretical perspectives of balance of power and collective security?
- What conditions are required for the success of collective security?
- What were the interactions and functions of those conditions in the Locarno Pact and NATO?
- How have the security policies and relationships been among the Northeast Asian states, and how will they be after Korean reunification?
- What will the future security environment in Northeast Asia look like after Korean reunification?
- What are the limitations and possibilities in applying collective security to Northeast Asia as a future security means?
- How can a collective security system be applied to the Northeast Asian states?

To answer those research questions, the remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II examines theoretical perspectives of balance of power and collective security and suggests five variables required for the success of collective security. First, definitions are provided to unify different terminology related to "collective security family" among scholars. As an alternative to the balance of power concept, collective security has

superb logic to maintain peace based on states' cooperation. However, it has been criticized because of its ideal concept in a real world. Realists argue that collective security is impossible because cooperation among states is rare in an anarchic international system. According to them, states are self-helpers who pursue their own national interests. Like in a prisoner's dilemma game, states will not cooperate with each other. Institutionalist assert that cooperation is possible if states can get mutual benefits from their cooperation. If information is available to the prisoners and they know the game will be repeated again and again in the future, the prisoners will cooperate with each other for their mutual interests. Moreover, institutions tend to facilitate cooperation by reducing transaction costs and providing information to states. Constructivists argue that cooperation among states will depend on their identities and interests. Identities are critical in defining interests. For example, if the United States increased its military level, the Soviet Union felt threatened from it while Great Britain did not. This is because the identity of the Soviet Union toward the United States was different from that of Great Britain. If a state identifies another state as an enemy, security cooperation will be impossible. From those theoretical perspectives, this thesis will find five variables for the success of collective security: positive identities among member states, shared interests, institutions to control states' behaviors, institutions to facilitate information, and reiteration of interactions between institutions and states.

Chapter III examines the interactions and functions of five variables in the case studies of the Locarno Pact and NATO. Of course, NATO is not a collective security mechanism, but a collective defense organization during the Cold War era. However, in terms of states' cooperation, collective security and collective defense have the same characteristics. That is the reason why this thesis chooses NATO as a case study. As a failed case, the Locarno Pact does not satisfy the five variables. As a successful case, NATO will show the importance of the five variables. Through the case studies, the five variables will be confirmed as the conditions required for the success of collective security.

Chapter IV reviews security policies of the United States, Japan, China and Korea, and assesses the prospects for the future regional security environment. This chapter will argue that the Northeast Asian states have had quite negative identities and conflictive

security interests with each other throughout modern history. Focusing on Japan's expanding political and security roles and Chinese neo-nationalism, this chapter will also argue that the future security environment will be more conflictive because of the rising rivalry between Japan and China under the balance of power system. Finally, this chapter will suggest the possibility of collective security as a future alternative to the current bilateral security system.

Chapter V examines the applicability of collective security to Northeast Asia in terms of the five conditions for the success of collective security. The current security environment does not satisfy the five conditions. The Northeast Asian states have quite negative identities because of historical and ideological reasons, and their security policies have conflicted with each other during the two world wars, the Cold War era and even in the post-Cold War era. With traditional international relations based on bilateral relations, they have no experience with institutional interactions. In fact, those are the reasons why collective security cannot be applied to Northeast Asia at this time. On the other hand, they imply the importance of creating positive identities among the Northeast Asian states. Coupled with some of the benign phenomena such as multilateral approaches to security and economy, if the Northeast Asian states can improve their political relations with each other and converge their diverse security interests to a common goal toward regional stability, collective security will become closer to being a reality.

C. METHODOLOGY

This paper deals with four states as main actors: the United States, Japan, China, and reunified Korea. These states are current components of the balance of power structure in this region. As the purpose of this paper is to find out the applicability of regional collective security system in Northeast Asia, not to suggest a specific form of collective security, the exclusion of Russia and the Southeast Asian states would not influence an outcome of this paper. Of course, if they satisfy the conditions for collective security, Russia and the Southeast Asian states can be included in a collective security mechanism at any time. To estimate the applicability of collective security, however, this thesis will simplify research by restricting actors to the four states which commit themselves to the current balance of power

structure.

This thesis will use a comparative method to evaluate the historical cases of collective security mechanisms -- the Locarno Pact and NATO -- and to prospect the future security policy of the United States, Japan, China, and Korea. In the case studies, the dependent variable is the success of collective security, and independent variables are positive identities, shared security interests, institutional capability, information, and interactions between institutions and states. Because these variables cannot be measured by accurate numbers or data, this thesis will use a qualitative method, not a quantitative method. For example, measuring identities among states would be impossible. Instead, we can estimate the variable by closely reviewing historical background and political relations between them.

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Inis Claude states that, "The theory of international relations contains three basic concepts which may be regarded as relevant to the problem of the management of power: balance of power, collective security, and world government."[3] As this thesis deals with the regional level of the management of power, the third one is beyond its concern. While the balance of power concept has many meanings,[4] this thesis will deal with it as a *system* which manages power in international relations. Based on the realists' view of the international system, balance of power can be considered as the most decentralized, but natural and inevitable system for power management in the real world. By its nature, which necessarily required power competition and military confrontation among states, however, the balance of power system has the limits to prevent war as in the case of the First World War. In fact, when anarchy is not controlled, there would be chaos rather than order. Even though order is possible, there would always exist the peril of war when the balance of power is broken.

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[3]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 8. His view of the 'problem of power' in international relations is not a problem to be eliminated but a problem to be managed. "Even if all existing weapons were destroyed and production of armaments were totally suspended, the capacity to devise instruments of terrible power would remain; man cannot unlearn what he knows about the means of creating power." See p. 6-8.

[4]Because the term "balance of power" has been used in various levels and dimensions, it has different meanings according to viewpoints. First, the balance of power can be mentioned just to describe a situation: sometimes equilibrium in which the power relationship between states is roughly or precisely equal; sometimes disequilibrium which results from states' objective toward a margin of power. For example, journalists are not telling us whether the present pattern of power relationships is characterized by equilibrium or disequilibrium, but they are merely commenting on issues relating to the power situation. In this sense, the balance of power as a situation means the *distribution of power*, whether it is balanced or unbalanced. Second, the balance of power can be identified as a policy of promoting the creation or the preservation of equilibrium, or a policy of creating or maintaining a 'favorable' balance, that is, an imbalance. In this case, the balance of power means a struggle for power. If a state has two options of balancing against, or bandwagoning with a stronger state, in this case, the balancing means the balance of power as a policy. Third, in most cases, the balance of power is used as a system which means a certain kind of arrangement for the operation of international relations in a world of many states. See Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 13-25. Also, Martin Wight shows nine different meanings of the balance of power in his article, "The Balance of Power," ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

Whenever human beings were disappointed with the disastrous wars under the balance of power system, such as the First World War, the Second World War, and even after the Cold War, the concept of collective security prevailed as an alternative to the defective system. For the purpose of this thesis, to estimate the adaptability of the collective security system in Northeast Asia, this chapter will examine the theoretical perspectives of collective security. In this chapter, some definitions about collective security concepts will be presented. Firstly, the realists' criticism of the collective security concept will focus on three problems. They are trust, institutional capability, and consensus for collective action. They provide a basis to estimate the conditions of collective security. Second, the institutionalist', or Wilsonian, view will suggest the possibility of a collective security system based on increasing cooperation among states in the international system, providing the opposite view of the realists. Third, the constructivists' view of states' actions will explain states' acts in terms of their identity and interests, and supplement the institutionalist' view of cooperation among states. Also, changes in the international system in the post-war era will show the increasing cooperation and mutual understanding among states, thus providing more possibility of collective security in the real world. Finally, this chapter will conclude by answering the question, *under what conditions would collective security succeed or fail*? For that answer, this thesis will suggest five variables needed for case study analysis in the next chapter.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Collective Security

Even though there are many definitions of collective security, they all contain the dominant concept of *all for one*. Tom Farer defines collective security as "a collective institutionalized commitment not to balance but to gang up on any state that acts in defiance of collective judgments about permissible behavior."[5] Seyom Brown asserts that "it [collective security] comes close to de-legitimizing the unilateral initiation of war ..., and backed this up

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[5]Tom J. Farer, "The Role of Regional Collective Security Arrangements," ed. Tomas G. Weiss, *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 154-155.

by mechanisms to assure that the aggressor will be countered not only by the direct victim and its political allies but by the combined sanctions of all the countries in the collective security system."[6] Inis Claude insists, "A collective security system involved the establishment and operation of a complex of national commitments and international organizational arrangements designed to prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other state, by posing the highly reliable threat or producing the actuality of effective collective sanctions, ranging from diplomatic boycott to military measures."[7] Using these definitions, this thesis defines the term collective security as a security arrangement in which states make automatic and legally binding commitments to maintain the security of each member by cooperating in measures to prevent a member state's aggression or frustrate it wherever and whenever it occurs.[8]

In this concept, there should be neither a dominant power nor an enemy state (threat), and all members are to accept the rules or norms based on international law. If there is an enemy or threat, it would be an internal one, not an external one. Also, there would be an appropriate institution to control and adjust the member states' behaviors. In this context, the Locarno Pact (1925) and the Organization of African Unity (1963) can be considered as a collective security arrangement and a collective security system respectively.

2. Collective Defense

As a transformed type, collective defense, like NATO, is a kind of collective security which is to counter a specific external threat, not an internal threat. In one aspect, it does not seem to be different from the concept of alliance in a balance of power system. Claude states that, "NATO is not a collective security system added as an afterthought to the United

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[6]Seyom Brown, *International Relations in a Changing Global System* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), p. 153-154.

[7]Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The United Nations and Collective Security," ed. Richard B. Gray, *International Security Systems* (Itasca: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1969), p. 109.

[8]*Encyclopedia Americana, 1990.*

Nations, but a new type of alliance."[9] This view focuses on the equality of power distribution between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In other aspects, however, it has more characteristics of collective security than balance of power: first, it is directed not just against a specific threat, but also against any aggression[10]; second, it follows the principles of the United Nations, thus is based on international law; third, as a regional level of security system, it has the concept of *some for some* (i.e., a minimized *all for one*).[11] Consequently, at a world-wide level, it cannot help being included in a balance of power system. However, in the regional level of Europe, it is also considered to be a kind of collective security. In this context, this thesis will deal with collective defense as being in the same family of collective security.

On the other hand, NATO was a collective defense system in the cold war era to counter an attack by the Warsaw pact, and the Warsaw pact was a parallel collective defense arrangement. But now the former is considered to be collective security rather than collective defense because of the demise of the specific threat. Also, in the Southeast Asian region, the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) could be classified as a collective defense system against the threat of the spread of communism.

3. Collective Security Organization

While collective security concepts were defined earlier, a true collective security system could not have been established under *realpolitik*, as shown by the failure of the League of Nations and the limits of the United Nations. In particular, the veto rights of strong powers in the two organizations are the most problematic defect as a collective security

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[9]Inis L. Claude, Jr. *Swords into Plowshares* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 266.

[10]There can be a lot of debate about this, because even alliances rarely name the countries at which they were aimed. Even though there was no mention of a specific threat in the text of the treaty, in reality, NATO was to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. Then, what is the difference between NATO and a normal alliance? Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that, "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all ..." That is, if there is an aggression of even a member state to another state, it would be countered by other members. This would be the most different characteristic as compared to an alliance.

[11]Inis L. Claude, Jr. *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 266.

system, because collective action against an aggressor might be impeded by the national interests of any powerful country. Philip Zelikow mentions that "any system under which the dominant powers can regularly muster overwhelming power against weaker powers could come to be defined as a collective organization."[12] To categorize collective security concepts, this thesis defines collective security and collective defense approaches which use either 'all for one' or 'all for none' rules (according to the will of powers) as a collective security organization. In this context, the United Nations and the League of Nations will be considered in this thesis as collective security organizations, not collective security systems.

Of course, these definitions differ among many scholars, as the terms used regarding collective security have been neither defined exactly nor used in the same way. For example, James E. Goodby considers collective defense as a category of collective security, and he looks at NATO in the Cold War era as a collective security system, not a collective defense system.[13] Inis Claude considers NATO as selective security, not collective security, from the viewpoint that NATO is the concept of some for some, not all for all.[14] Also, Nelson's definition of a collective security organization is different from the one that I previously defined in that he uses the term generally regardless of the presence or absence of dominant powers in a system.[15] Among the diversities of definitions, Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan suggest a broader concept of collective security, insisting that, "any institution that is predicated upon the principles of regulated balancing and all against one falls into the

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[12]Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 1, Summer 1992, p. 27-28. Quoted from Richard Russell, "The Chimera of Collective Security in Europe," *European Security*, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 1995, p.249.

[13]James E. Goodby, "Collective Security in Europe After the Cold War," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 2, Winter 1993, p.299.

[14]Inis L. Claude, Jr. *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 266. The term "selective defense" can be considered to have the same meaning of collective defense.

[15]See Daniel N. Nelson, "Great Powers and World Peace," ed. Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, *World Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press) p. 38.

collective security family."[16]

4. Defining the Regional Level of a Collective Security System

At a regional level, it is difficult to separate the characteristics of a collective security system from that of a collective defense system. Let's suppose that there is a regional collective security system, which agreed to limit the level of military power by all member states so that any member state cannot have aggressive power. Then, each state might have less military capability only compared to other nonmember states. If a nonmember state threatens one of the member states, would the other member states act collectively against the aggressor? If there is no guarantee of collective assistance to the member state, then it would increase its military level regardless of the restrictions of that system. Then, the state's military buildup would violate the arrangement in the system, thus decreasing their trust in the system.[17] Therefore, a regional collective security system should necessarily guarantee mutual assistance in the case of an external threat or aggression, which includes the characteristics of a collective defense system. Conversely, in collective defense, it automatically includes the characteristics of collective security as in the case of NATO. (See Footnote 10)

Throughout history, there are no cases of a pure regional collective security system or a pure collective defense system. The two systems have shared each other's characteristics. For example, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954) and the Organization of American States (OAS, 1948) were collective defense to counter an external threat, the expansion of communism. However, SEATO stipulated mutual assistance in response to subversive activities, and the OAS suspended and sanctioned Cuba, a member state, in 1962 and intervened in Nicaragua's civil war, also a member state, in 1979. Thus, these two regional collective defense systems had the characteristics of collective security, responding to internal threats.

Therefore, my approach to regional collective security in this thesis will include both

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[16]Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," *International Security*, vol 20, no. 1, Summer 1995, p. 53.

[17]Even though there would be no restriction of military level, one state's military buildup against a nonmember state's threat would produce the same result.

concepts of collective security as well as collective defense. It will include the collective security concept because it does not require any specific threat, not only in the document, but also in real circumstances. It will also include the collective defense concept because when a member state might face an unexpected external threat, there should be a guarantee of collective action against it.

The interchangeable characteristics between collective security and collective defense provide justification for selecting NATO as a case for a regional collective security system. However, there still may be a problem with NATO as the case study mainly because NATO apparently had an existing external threat, which might be a major variable for the success of regional collective security or collective defense. This thesis will deal with this problem in the latter part of the Chapter III.

B. BALANCE OF POWER VS. COLLECTIVE SECURITY

1. Balance of Power as a System for Stability

As the oldest of all strategic concepts, the balance of power approach has been both a common practical policy and a major theoretical concept in international relations. The basic assumptions of balance of power are summarized as follows: states are not to be trusted in command of power which might be used to the detriment of other states; unrestrained power anywhere in the system is a threat to the security of all its units; the effective antidote to power is power, and stability in international relations requires equilibrium; the power of some states is counterbalanced by an approximately equal power of others to deter an aggressive action.[18] Based on these assumptions, a general principle of states' action in the balance of power is that, "When any state or bloc becomes, or threatens to become, inordinately powerful, other states should recognize this as a threat to their security and respond by taking

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[18]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 42. States may choose bandwagoning with an ally on the dominant side rather than the weaker side. In fact, however, states facing an external threat overwhelmingly prefer to balance against the threat rather than bandwagon with it. This is primarily because an alignment that preserves most of a state's freedom of action is preferable to accepting subordination under a potential hegemon. See Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," *International Security*, vol. 45, no. 1, 1991, p. 6-15.

equivalent measures, individually or jointly, to enhance their power."[19] The actors can choose either individual measures focusing on internal efforts such as increasing economic capability, military strength, and developing clever strategies, or joint measures through external efforts such as joining an alliance.[20]

The balance of power theory reflects the realists' view of international politics as it applies to anarchic realms which are formally unorganized, and in which units have to worry about their survival. Kenneth N. Waltz asserts that all the states of the world are in anarchic orders and the international system is a self-help one, in which each state spends a portion of its effort in providing the means of protecting itself against others.[21] Morgenthau and other members of the realists' school of international relations see the pursuit of power by states as the defining characteristic of the international system.[22] That is, "because international politics is anarchic, there is no superior governing authority, then the independent sovereign states basically have to struggle to secure their own interests."[23] As a unitary actor, all the states basically seek their own preservation avoiding other's domination, and further, they drive for universal domination to achieve their ends. These views of realists on international politics can be summarized as follows: first, the international system is a self-help one, and both central authority and collective security are absent[24]; second, therefore, international

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[19]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 43.

[20]Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power," ed. Robert O. Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Guildford, 1986), p. 117.

[21]Ibid., p. 99-100. Waltz explains the difference between a national system and international system in terms of the legitimate use of force. In effective government in a national system, public agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private use of force, and the legitimate use of force is possible. In international system, it is impossible. Therefore, the international system is self-help, while a national system is not.

[22]Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power* (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 78.

[23]Ibid., p. 8.

[24]Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," ed James Der Derian, *International Theory* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), P. 130. A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so

relations are competitive and conflictive; third, then, force is a means of achieving national interests because "there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interests that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy."[25]

The balance of power which is based on competitive relationships under the anarchic international environment, however, contributes to stability and order, instead of chaos. Power competitions are natural and lead states to deter the appearance of a dominant power which becomes a threat to other states, thus "allowing them to preserve their identity, integrity and independence, perhaps deterring aggression or war."[26] Faced with a dominant power, states, in a common method, ally with each other to balance against it. Without a dominant threat, they would try to become predominant. Even in the latter case, equilibrium would be an outcome because they have to prevent any other nation from accomplishing that objective, thus producing stability.

Naturally, there can never be trust. One's neighbor might become one's enemy, so the 'power' in one's enemy's rear might become one's natural ally. Even the relationship between allies is not bound to one another in a sincere friendship; they watch each other's movements assiduously.[27] However, as a result of that vigilance, the balance of power enables natural stability in international relations. The alternative to a stable and ordered balance would be a condition of unbalance and disorder with general insecurity and danger, and a universal empire with general loss of freedom.[28]

In summary, the balance of power in principle is directed toward equilibrium in a

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less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, and will suffer. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power," p. 117.

[25]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 238.

[26]Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power*, p. 8.

[27]Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," ed. Alan James, *The Bases of International Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 88.

[28]Ibid., p. 101.

system, which is evenly distributed power among nations.[29] Under the anarchic international system, states exist as self-helpers and compete for dominance of power. The outcome of power struggles is not disorder, but a natural order based on balancing through states' policies, such as alliances which aim to prevent any state's predomination. Any alternative to the balance of power, such as collective security or world government, would be universal anarchy, because international politics have never revealed a habitual recognition among states of a community of interest overriding their separate interests, comparable to that which normally binds individuals within the state.[30]

2. Evaluation of the Balance of Power

As "a fundamental law of politics," the balance of power has prevailed through European history. Ferrero indicates that, "During the century between 1815 and 1914, Europe suffered less than in any other period of its history from the fears which cause mankind to tremble and become frantic, and had more confidence than ever before..."[31] Organski asserts two beneficial results from the successful maintenance of the balance of power. First, under an equilibrium, the balance of power "preserves the independence of small nations that would probably be swallowed up if one ambitious state were allowed to achieve a tremendous preponderance of power."[32] Second, "it produces peace, for when power is equally distributed among various nations and coalitions of states, no one side can achieve a great enough superiority to be sure that aggressive action would be crowned with success."[33]

Despite the merits of the balance of power, however, it could not have become an ultimate solution for international security. Even Morgenthau indicates the limits of the balance of power system. First, the uncertainty of power calculation would lead states to a

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[29]Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," p. 153.

[30]Ibid., p. 174.

[31]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 71.

[32]A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 279.

[33]Ibid., p. 280.

misjudgement.[34] If a state which has a will to fight fails to estimate the status quo and thus considers it to be favorable to the state, the balance of power cannot work even though it maintains equilibrium. How can we calculate the power of a state or an alliance exactly, or even approximately? Germany made a mistake in estimating the opposing power before the First World War by assuming that Great Britain would remain neutral and would not come into the war. Also, Germany could not predict the possibility of U.S. participation in the war, and failed to estimate the balance of power situation. Such unclear, sometimes secret, power relations among states, which seems to be inevitable under an anarchic international environment, makes the power calculation more difficult.

Second, the balance of power cannot maintain equality of power, despite the fact that the principle of equilibrium has central importance as an operational rule within a balance of power system.[35] A balance of power system can be considered as a mechanism for the limitation of excessive power. However, because of the problem of calculation of power, states would try to have at least a margin of safety which will allow it to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of power.[36] Then, "all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance -- that is, equality -- of power, but at superiority of power in their own behalf."[37] History shows instances of this. France's security policy toward Germany after the First World War was not for equilibrium, but for preponderance. Great Britain, the traditional balancer in Europe, directed its efforts toward predomination which was unassailable. Organski indicates the tendency of preponderance rather than balance of power by mentioning, "Those nations that industrialized first gained a

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[34]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 203-207. Also, Inis Claude asserts, "The elements constituting national power should be simple enough to permit reasonable accurate estimates of the relative strength of states ..." and accentuates the importance of effective power diffusion among a substantial number of major states. Also see Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 90.

[35]Ibid., p. 207-208.

[36]Ibid., p. 208.

[37]Ibid., p. 208.

tremendous power advantage over other nations, and although it might be possible to arrange these giants and their smaller friends in such combinations that groups of nations would balance off each other in equal strength, this is not the kind of arrangement that nations actually formed."[38]

Third, with only the balance of power itself, the system cannot work. Morgenthau accentuates "the consensus of states based on moral and intellectual elements"[39] for the success of the balance of power system, which means the will of states to maintain a stable power relationship. Like the case of the Concert of Europe, there should be a consensus that "whatever changes nations might seek in the status quo, they all had at least to recognize as unchangeable one factor, the existence of a pair of scales, the 'status quo' of the balance of power itself."[40] The consensus would keep in check the limitless desire for power in all imperialists.

With those limits that Morgenthau indicates, the balance of power does not seem to be the only and finest system for power management as much as the realists believe. Herz considers the balance of power in Europe to be a "limited success" indicating that the European system remained undisturbed for centuries, but only with the prevention of the threat of hegemony, not with the prevention of war and injustice, exploitation and imperialism.[41] Even during the Concert of Europe, which seems to have been the most successful period of the balance of power, the portion that the balance of power system contributed to European peace would be reduced when we consider the fact that European

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[38]A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, p. 290.

[39]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 213-220. This argument seems to be beyond the realists view. According to realists, as this thesis reviewed already, the international system can be characterized by an anarchic environment, a self-help system, and competition for power, and the balance of power as a system shall be formed naturally in the process of power competition. Under these assumptions, it would be impossible to make any "moral consensus" among states.

[40]Ibid., p. 219.

[41]John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). Quote from Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 67.

states could not concentrate their efforts on regional matters because of their imperial expansion toward the rest of the world. Also, Henry Kissinger indicates:

> The balance of power system did not purport to avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and moderation. By definition, a balance of power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order. ... In fact, balance of power systems have existed only rarely in human history.[42]

Actually, the balance of power cannot necessarily work anywhere and anytime because it is a system, not a solution. Even though realists insist on the inevitability of the balance of power in world politics, its better outcome might count on cooperation of states for peace rather than competition for power. Morton Kaplan indicates some changes in conditions that may make the balance of power system unstable: the existence of an actor who does not play by the rules of the game; failures of information; and inflexibility of the 'balancing' mechanism.[43] These conditions require some "manipulation" of states' policies among skillful diplomats with a degree of cooperation, other than natural order formed in an anarchic international system. As Morgenthau mentioned earlier, morality is an important factor for the workability of the balance of power. Conforming to the rules of the game, making information available, and appealing to states' morals seem to be more possible under cooperation than under competition. The imperfection of the balance of power concept, then, suggests collective security as an alternative to balance of power.

3. Collective Security as an Alternative to Balance of Power

If the outbreak of the First World War resulted from the failure of the balance of power system in Europe, the end of the war resulted in the birth of the collective security concept. Woodrow Wilson thought that the international system should be based not on a balance of powers but on ethnic self-determination and that their security should depend not

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[42]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). P. 21.

[43]Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance of Power and Other International System," ed. Richard B. Gary, *International Security System* (Itasca: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1969), p. 39.

on military alliances but on collective security.[44] He addressed the United States Senate in 1917:

> The question upon which the whole peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.[45]

Then, he stressed the need for a new system in which states would cooperate in the common cause of guaranteeing security, rather than engaging in competitive alliance, and in which coercion would serve the common peace and order, rather than functioning in the interest of political ambition and selfish hostility.[46] As a result of Wilson's endeavor, the League of Nations became the first collective security mechanism, even though imperfect, after the First World War.

While the collective security system has characteristics similar to the balance of power in terms of power management for the prevention of war and international peace, it has its own intrinsic nature which can be differentiated from the latter. Most of all, the essence of collective security lies in the preponderance which represents a deterrence to any aggression.[47] "Collective security postulates that the use of violence or other threats to the peace would result in the mobilization of force so great that no reasonable policymaker would undertake such threats."[48] Here, for further argument, it is necessary to examine some differences

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[44]Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance of Power and Other International System," p. 19.

[45]Woodrow Wilson, *Address to the United States Senate*, January 22, 1917. From Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 51.

[46]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 111.

[47]Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 239. Also, see Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 113.

[48]Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics," ed. Thomas G. Weiss, *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner

between balance of power and collective security.

First, "The balance of power system involves alliances which are essentially *externally-oriented* groupings, designed to organize cooperative action among their members for the purpose of dealing with conflict situations posed by states or groups of states on the outside. By contrast the collective security system looks *inward*, seeking to provide security for all its members against any of their number who might contemplate aggression."[49] That is to say, whereas balance of power is characterized by the maintenance of equilibrium through competitive alliances, collective security pursues preponderance over a future aggressor through 'universal' alliance. A different view of the world system between them makes this difference. Inis Claude mentions that, "Balance of power postulates two or more worlds in jealous confrontation, while collective security postulates one world, organized for the cooperative maintenance of order within its bounds. ... Collective security decrees a set response in support of any victim of aggression; balance of power confirms the freedom of the state to pick and choose."[50] For example, the League of Nations was not an alliance against other specific nations but against any aggressor, not a pattern of competition for power but that of cooperation to hold conflict in check.

Second, contrasted with the principle of power competition in balance of power, "the organizing principle of collective security is the respect for the moral and legal obligation to consider an attack by any nation upon any member of the alliance as an attack upon all members."[51] A collective security system calls for a moral transformation: "it offends the most pacific and the most bellicose of men; it challenges neutralism and isolationism as well as militarism and imperialism; ... it demands alike the dissolution of ancient national hatreds and

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Publishers, 1993), p. 6.

[49]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 145-146.

[50]Ibid., p. 145-146.

[51]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 193.

the willingness to abandon traditional national friendships."[52] Moral transformation for collective security is based on the norm that states must subordinate their own immediate interests to general or remote ones'.[53] Without each state's cooperation and conformity with the norm, the system would not work because there is no 'government' to control the behaviors of the unitary actor. On the other hand, collective security envisages the enforcement of the rules of international law by all the members of the community of nations.[54] "Without a legal structure, it would constitute "hardly more than an idealized balance of power."[55] Actually, Morgenthau indicates that one of the critical factors in the failure of the League of Nations was the lack of legal obligation within that system.[56]

Third, while balance of power is by no means systemic because of the reflection of an anarchic realm in international relations, collective security represents the urge for systematization, the institutionalization of international relations.[57] Institutionalist insist that

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[52]Inis L. Claude, Jr. *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 256.

[53]Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power*, p. 157.

[54]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 293. As opponents of this view, Gordenker and Weiss claim that a collective security system does not aim at the general enforcement of law but rather at the maintenance of international peace, and that if there are rules, they develop from explicit or implicit individual consent and usage, not from deliberate legislation. See Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics," ed. Thomas G. Weiss, *Collective Security in a Changing World*, p. 4-5.

[55]Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics," p. 9. Also, Farer insists that, "Collective security arrangements are designed for law enforcement." See Tom J. Farer, "Regional Collective Security," p. 155.

[56]The Resolutions, in contrast to the apparent purport of Article 16 which includes the contents to counter a violator, establish the individualized, decentralized character of the League sanctions by declaring it to be the duty of each individual member nation to decide for itself whether a violation of international law has been committed and whether, therefore, Article 16 ought to apply at all. Furthermore, as interpreted by the Resolutions, point (1) authorizes the members of the League to resort to war with the lawbreaking state, but does not create, as the literal meaning would indicate, a legal obligation in this respect. As regards points (2) and (4), the Resolutions leave to the individual nations the decision as to what measures they want to take against the lawbreaker and in support of each other. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 293-297.

[57]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 147-148.

as a regulated and institutionalized form of balancing, the collective security system can provide more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for its own.[58] This contrast makes another difference: more predictability of states' policies in the collective security system than in the balance of power system in which diverse calculations dominate.

With those characteristics, this thesis summarizes the logic of collective security as follows. First, there is no present and direct enemy or threat in a group of states, even though there might be a future or potential threat. A collective security system does not specify any specific threat. Also, in terms of the fact that collective security absolutely requires trust among states, a collective security system should not include any current enemy or threat. Second, there is a consensus from each state to renounce the use of military force for aggression against other participating states.[59] The system depends on nonmilitary measures such as economic sanctions, and military sanctions will be the last measure. Third, an institution can be established under the agreement based on international law or a similar level of norms.[60] The institution can not only force the states not to use their military forces for aggression other than for self defense, but also create some forces to be used when needed for collective security purposes. Fourth, a preponderance of collective power deters any violation of their arrangement, forcing each state to try to avoid military action for aggression. Fifth, if there is a country which would break the peace, then other states punish it automatically by the principle of all against one, thus contributing to the peace and order in international relations.

Despite the superb logic, however, the collective security concept has been criticized as too ideal, coupled with the failure of the League of Nations. The problems of moral factors, applicability of international law, and *realpolitik* in a real world have made the

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[58]Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," p. 52.

[59]John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter 1994 / 95, p. 28.

[60]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 173.

concept difficult to bring into operation. First of all, the realists' critique of the collective security concept should be examined.

C. REALISTS' CRITIQUE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

To understand the realists' critique of collective security, their view of international politics should be examined more specifically. John Mearsheimer summarizes realism's five assumptions.[61] First, the international system is anarchic, which does not mean chaos or disorder, but security competition and war. Second, states inherently possess some offensive military capability. Third, states can never be certain about the intentions of other states, especially in terms of the latter's offensive military capability. Fourth, the most basic motive driving states is survival. Fifth, states, which are rational but may openly miscalculate because of imperfect information, think strategically about how to survive in the international system. With these assumptions, he indicates three main patterns of states' behavior: first, fearing other's offensive capability, states regard each other with suspicion and there is little room for trust among them; second, states aim to guarantee their own survival because there is no rescuer in a self-help system; third, states aim to maximize their relative power position because of the fact that the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more security there is.[62]

Realists' pessimistic view of international relations is portrayed as a brutal arena in which states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other with little reason to trust

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[61]John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 10. Joseph Grieco mentions five propositions that realism encompasses. "First, states are the major actors in world affairs. Second, the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail to protect their vital interests, or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; hence, states are 'sensitive to costs' and behave as unitary-rational agents. Third, international anarchy is the principle force shaping the motives actions of states. Fourth, states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests. Finally, international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation only marginally." See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 488.

[62]John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 11-12.

each other.[63] Each state pursues its own interest under competition, and does not consider others' interests. There exists always the possibility of war resulting from the conflict of interests among nations. Sometimes states cooperate with each other, but this has its limits because cooperation is possible only when their interests are foreseen. Even if an agreement for cooperation is established, each state will break it whenever its benefit is over. Consequently, cooperation among states is only a passing phenomenon in the permanent competition for national interests, ultimately for dominant power. Under such an international system, states naturally tend to balance their powers.

For realists, therefore, the idea of collective security is deceptive if not delusional because the imperative of survival in a competitive political system without central authority induces among states an obsession with power and hence with the interstate allocation of its constituents.[64] Even though collective security assumes "the self-help world of realism," its approach to "the management of power" is quite opposite to the realists; not with natural competition for power but with more rational cooperation among states and even with morality. Realists indicate that the most difficult problem for collective security is forming trust among states. As long as fear of others' military capability exists and even cooperation cannot last beyond narrow national interest, there cannot be formed such a thing as trust. If trust does not exist, then the logic of collective security which is mentioned earlier is contradicted. The arrangement becomes meaningless and the institution will not work. It would be impossible to implement their promise of collective action against an aggressor. Consequently, a collective security system will become less than a balance of power system.

1. Trust Problem

The trust problem can be examined from two aspects: trust between individual states and among a collective security system. As for trust toward other member states, the problem comes from concern about cheating.[65] Even though collective security assumes that states

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[63]John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 9.

[64]Tom J. Farer, "Regional Collective Security," p. 155.

[65]John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions,"p. 12.

must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo, according to realists, they cannot overcome the fears of other's military capabilities and the distrust of others' intentions.[66] States have to reject power-maximizing behavior that might weaken their relative power position, believing others' promise not to use force. This is not the case, however, as the prisoner's dilemma game shows. There are two options for states: cooperation and cheating. A state knows well that mutual cooperation would be the best. But because of the other's threat of cheating, it chooses cheating instead of cooperation, hoping other states pursue cooperation. As a result, the outcome becomes not the best, but the third best for a state, which results from mutual defection not mutual cooperation.[67] Especially if there exists historical enmity between states, the room for cheating becomes larger.[68] Thus, it is impossible for an actor to trust others' intention under an anarchic international order which is dominated by states' calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power.[69] Without trust, states cannot follow the rule or norm of collective security such as the reduction of military levels or renouncing the use of force; rather they would continue to act on their own.

On the other hand, while a collective security system fails to form trust among nations,

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[66]John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 30.

[67]In the prisoner's dilemma game, "each state prefers mutual cooperation to mutual noncooperation (CC>DD), but also successful cheating to mutual cooperation (DC>CC) and mutual defection to victimization by another's cheating (DD>CD); overall, then, DC>CC>DD>CD. In this circumstance, and in the absence of a centralized authority or some other countervailing force to bind states to their promises, each defects regardless of what it expects the other to do." Therefore, the outcome of the game becomes the third best one. (C: cooperation, D: defection) See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 493.

[68]John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions,"p. 31. "Consider that a European collective security system would have to depend heavily on Germany and Russia, the two most powerful states on the continent, to maintain order. However, the idea of Germany, which wrought murder and destruction across Europe in 1939-45, and Russia, which was the core of the Soviet empire, maintaining order in Europe is sure to meet significant resistance from other European states."

[69]John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995, p. 82.

a balance of power system can make it through an alliance. Trust in an alliance is a result of thorough calculations of power and national interests. It is not a vague and unconditional trust such as renouncing war in a collective security system. Even though an alliance represents a "temporary marriage of convenience" and "transient instrumental adjustments to a changing international environment,"[70] it is directed toward equilibrium against an apparent dominant power. States know well that they are bound together with the same national interests, especially survival, and believe that an aggression toward an ally is the same as toward the entire alliance. Thus, in a balance of power system, states can have trust to others as well as the system, which is a calculated one based on self-interest. As a result, the trust in a balance of power system is more realistic and safe than that in a collective security system.

Even though states establish a collective security system with high expectations about its workability, still many problems impede states from forming trust in the system. The most critical factor for a system, as well as for states, would be the guarantee of collective action in the case of an aggression toward them. Members are to participate in the counter-action to equate their national interest with the broader interests of the international community, rejecting narrow self-interest. Their beliefs in the guarantee, however, do not rely on the system, but on trust in other states, because there cannot exist any authority that can control each soverign state in the real world. In the worst case, in a collective security system, a state's destiny will be decided not by its own capability, but by the system which would not provide an absolute guarantee, but just a possibility. Therefore, states cannot trust the system. Even though the system works, the difficulty of a rapid response to aggression becomes more problematic as the speed of ultra-modern warfare is likely to be such that a victim of aggression may be utterly destroyed before a collective security system can deal with it.[71] Therefore, states will have to maintain their military capabilities needed for their survival, and

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[70]Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 152.

[71]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 194. It took more than six months for the United States to put together a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein. Also, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions,"p. 12.

they will count more on their power than the collective security system.

Consequently, a collective security system cannot be established with trust because of the fear of others' cheating and the limits of the system. The lack of trust makes it difficult for states to cooperate with each other. Cooperation is just an outcome of the calculation of narrow national interests and is transient. The national interests in a collective security system, unlike a balance of power system, are too vague to give states incentives. Coupled with no guarantee, states would not believe in the system. After the First World War, France's distrust of the League of Nations as well as of Germany and Russia resulted in not only other arrangements such as the Locarno Pact and the Pact of Paris, thus weakening the workability of the League, but also the exclusion of those states from the League, thus reducing the effectiveness of the system. As a result, when the collective security system was demolished, another disastrous war broke out.

2. Lack of Institutional Capability

A collective security system requires a proper institution to control and adjust its member states' behaviors effectively, and all the states should recognize the legitimacy of the institution which has the legal power based on international law.[72] In the viewpoint of realists, however, even if an institution is established under the agreement of all states, it has limited effect in terms of the lack of law enforcement. Each state has its own regime of governance whose supreme authority over what happened in its jurisdiction would be recognized and

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[72]Carr indicates the difference between international law and the municipal law of modern states. As the law of an undeveloped and not fully integrated community, it lacks three institutions. First, it recognizes no court competent to give on any issue of law or fact decisions recognized as binding by the community as a whole. Second, it has no agents competent to enforce observance of the law. Third, like the law of primitive communities, international law is based on custom, not legislation. International agreements such as the Briand-Kellogg Pact are contracts concluded by states with one another in their capacity as subjects of international law, and not laws created by states in the capacity of international legislators. International legislation does not yet exist. The defects of the international law are due, not to any technical shortcomings, but to the embryonic character of the community. Just as international morality is weaker than national morality, so international law is necessarily weaker and poorer in content than the municipal law of a highly organized modern state. See Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (London: McMillian & Co. Ltd., 1949), p. 170-172, 178.

respected by other states.[73] International law is, however, relatively weak compared to its domestic counterpart. "If there are rules, therefore, they develop from explicit or implicit individual consent and usage, not from deliberate legislation."[74] Without a legal structure and, therefore, the lack of law enforcement, "a collective security system would have to be based on the vague assumption that every government is committed to repressing disturbers."[75] Coupled with the importance of sovereignty of states, no institution can intervene or influence others' jurisdiction and behavior.

Without an authority like government in a state, it is difficult for an international institution to get power to punish or take sanctions against a sovereign state. "Obedience to the law in any situation is a voluntary act on the part of the state."[76] Voluntary membership makes it possible for a state to leave the institution anytime it feels 'no more gain' from its participation. If a state withdraws itself from a collective security system, it becomes free from the legal obligations that are agreed upon within that system. As the collective security system is to counter an internal aggressor, then it cannot control or punish the secessionist. If the state is a strong power, its withdrawal may influence the workability of the system, as in the case of the U.S. withdrawal from NATO or the United Nations. Thus, the institution does not have any power. Instead, it is empowered by the agreement of sovereign states. As the agreement is fragile, however, the institution in a collective security system lacks law enforcement of its member states. Even though a small state is coerced by a larger one into obeying the law, the former's obedience is not to the law, but to the pressure of the latter.

The lack of law enforcement becomes more serious with strong powers. Even though collective security postulates preponderance against an aggressor, a strong power can

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[73]Seyom Brown, *International Relations in a Changing Global System*, p. 116.

[74]Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics," p. 4.

[75]Ibid., p. 9.

[76]Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *Principles of International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 212.

challenge it. As in the case of Germany in the Second World War, one powerful state can come close to success in aggression, while maximizing others' costs to resist it.[77] Can a collective security system have absolute predominance over a strong power? When a weak state faces the threat or aggression of a strong power, such as the United States or Russia, can the victim expect any sanction or collective action of member states against it? Is it desirable that the small or regional conflict, should be expanded to world wide conflict? Yet, there has never existed such a system which can dare to take sanctions against the behavior of such strong powers. To speak more precisely, it cannot. Thus, the institutional capability in a collective security system lacks law enforcement of all its members.

As Inis Claude mentions, "While the League organization was dedicated to the principle of collective security, its legal and organizational arrangements for giving effect to that principle were exceedingly meager. Neither in theory nor in practice did the League possess a reliable means for bringing coercive power to bear upon an aggressor."[78] The withdrawal of the United States from the establishment of the League of Nations proved the proposition, "no national interest, no participation." There was no measure other than nonrecognition of the territorial changes that had occurred, when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931. The lack of collective action, except inefficient economic sanctions for the Italian attack on Ethiopia, showed the limits of law enforcement by the international institution. Also, the United Nations failed to get institutional capability to control all its members, because it acknowledged the veto rights of strong powers, thus revealing its limits as a collective security system.

An institution or an organization is just a coordinator, not a governmental instrument. It can have law, but it cannot use the law fully to restrict and control states' national interests. For example, although states agree to reduce their military level and renounce the use of force, if there are more security requirements, then the state will increase its military level or use its force. Consequently, without legal binding force, an institution in a collective security

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[77]A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, p. 383.

[78]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 174.

system cannot control member states' behaviors except when there exists overlapping national interests among them.

3. Difficulty of Consensus for Collective Action

For realists, there are many reasons why states cannot keep the promise of collective action. First of all, it is difficult to determine who the guilty and innocent parties are in international conflicts, as Organski explains:

> Unfortunately for the operation of collective security, there is rarely unanimous agreement on which nation is the aggressor in an international squabble. The accused nation, itself, almost invariably denies the charge, claiming that it was provoked by the aggressive action of others. Friends of the aggressor agree. Friends of the victim protest. The final verdict of history is liable to depend upon who writes the account of the event.[79]

For example, in Israel's attack on Egypt in 1956, even though the former was certainly the first to launch a major attack, before that attack there had been almost nightly raids across the Israeli border by Egyptian commandos and a series of retaliatory raids by the Israelis.[80] Then, what was aggression, Egyptian raids by small force or Israel's attack by large army?

When the self-interest of each state differs, consensus would be difficult. Some states may want stability by joining a collective security system, but others may want to just enjoy free-riding, economic benefits, political initiatives or bandwagoning. In the case of the aggression of a state, the former would like to punish it by the collective action, but the latter would decide their behavior by counting their different national interests. The fact that many acts of aggression in history threaten no one but the immediate victim[81] may lead states to be more flexible in calculating their diverse national interests. "A small nation bordering on a potential aggressor will think twice before joining any move against its more powerful neighbor, for battles "to stop the aggressor" are quite likely to be fought upon its territory,

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[79]A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, p. 373.

[80]Ibid., p. 374.

[81]Ibid., p. 378.

destroying its industries and its homes as well as those of the aggressor."[82] Especially if the aggressor has had a friendly state that shares the same ideology or the economic benefits, then the friend is probably reluctant to participate in the collective action.[83] Coupled with the development of the most modernized weapons including the atomic bomb, "the ultimate issue of national life or death cannot be left to the decision of any international organ."[84] Therefore, the consensus for collective action against an aggressor depends not on the arrangement of collective security, but on the matters of self-interest including national survival.

As a factor that influences the estimation of self-interest, imperfect information in the process of decision-making may impede the collective action because it can cause miscalculation of states' interests. Even when information is available and reliable, misconception also may lead them to miscalculation. As Robert Jervis indicates, people tend to "ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not contradict, our beliefs, and deny its validity."[85] States have different experiences, culture, beliefs and ideology, and historical background. The same information can result in quite different results in the calculation of their self-interests. Then, the diverse interpretation and expectation of a situation that requires a collective action makes the consensus difficult.

In summary, the realists' critique of collective security culminates in the trust problem. The concerns about others' cheating in an anarchic international environment raises the difficulty of trust among states. With the lack of a guarantee, just a possibility, of collective action, states do not trust the system. Cooperation for collective security is just an outcome of the calculation of self-interest and not based on such trust. On the other hand, the

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[82]A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, p. 379.

[83]John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 31.

[84]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 194.

[85]Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 143. He gives an example: "John Foster Dulles readily accepted any information about the U.S.S.R. that conformed to his image (e.g. evidence of economic failings) but required overwhelming evidence before he would take seriously information that contradicted his view."

collective security system cannot have any legal binding force to control its members' behaviors. Due to the lack of central authority, the international institution is merely a "fragile" coordinator. Even though a collective security system can be established, it will face the difficulty of achieving consensus for collective action because of ambiguity about the definition of aggression, divergent self-interests, and imperfect information and misperceptions. As a result, collective security is too ideal to implement its goal of peace in a real world. "That would constitute hardly more than an idealized balance of power."[86]

D. INSTITUTIONALIST' PERSPECTIVES ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY

As proponents of collective security, institutionalist share some views of international relations with realists: states are rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced; interstate cooperation occurs only if states have significant common interests.[87] They differ, however, from each other in the view of institutional function based on states' cooperation. Realists see cooperation as to be unusual, fleeting, and temporary, and thus insisting that international institutions do not exist or are irrelevant.[88] For them, cooperation might be possible, but it is rare and merely transient. Institutionalist assert that even though international actors are selfish, there is room for cooperation as long as mutual benefits exist, and that the interactions between an institution and its outcomes make commitments more credible and facilitate the operation of reciprocity.[89] Institutionalist are different from Wilsonians in that while the latter is somewhat idealistic, the former is more

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[86]Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics," p. 9.

[87]Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security*, vol. 20, p. 39.

[88]Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, p. 7. "This reflection of a role for international institutions has been a major component of modern realism ever since it emerged in the late 1930s as a self-conscious assault on the failure of the West to meet German aggression." See p. 6.

[89]Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," p. 42.

"utilitarian and rationalistic."[90] In this section, institutionalist' perspectives on collective security will provide the opposite view of realists, but a more realistic one than Wilsonians'.

1. Trust Formation: Sharing National Interests and Cooperation

Even though institutionalist admit some of the realists' view of the anarchic and self-help nature of international relations, they go further than realists: despite such characteristics of an international system, cooperation is possible. Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin mention that "when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, we do not expect cooperation to occur, nor the institutions that facilitate cooperation to develop. When states can jointly benefit from cooperation, on the other hand, we expect governments to attempt to construct such institutions."[91] As rational actors, institutionalist assume, states are centralized organizations that have certain policy goals and act to implement them in response to particular external conditions or events.[92] Unless states see any conflict with common interests in their policies, and if they expect benefits from their interactions, states cooperate. In the process of cooperation, "Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity."[93] That is the reason why states have made and concentrated their efforts on so many institutions, such as the UN, NATO, EU, and GATT, not only for their own benefit, but also for the common interests. Consequently, cooperation in an international system is available, and when the cooperation becomes reinforced by the interactions of mutual benefits through 'proper' institutions, trust among states can be formed.

Institutionalist reject the cheating problem in cooperation among states, in terms of institutional functions which facilitate information to states and give them more opportunities

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[90] Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," p. 39.

[91] Ibid., p. 41-42.

[92] Mark W. Zacher, *International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 7.

[93] Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," p. 41-42.

to contact and coordinate each other's interests. In the prisoner's dilemma game, if coordination between the two people is available, the outcome might become the most favorable one to both. By the same token, if information is available among states in a group of states, or in a collective security system, there is a much stronger possibility of states choosing cooperation rather than cheating, thus resulting in better outcomes. In the case of a disagreement among states which would be a principle barrier to cooperation, states may fail to capture the potential gains from cooperation unless some coordinating mechanism exists.[94] Even in complex situations involving many states, though international institutions do not provide the only possible coordinating mechanism, institutions can step in to provide "constructed focal points" that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent.[95] Therefore, cheating is not the only option of states. Rather, according to circumstances, cooperation especially through institutions can be more beneficial.

As cooperation among states is possible, institutionalist insist, the collective security system can be a regulated and institutionalized form of a balancing mechanism, and provide more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for its own.[96] In the balance of power system, there exists no consensus of security cooperation. Instead, a hostile international environment is formed as all the states seek their own survival from others. However, because states are rational actors who do not want to be co-destructive, they would promote security cooperation if it is possible to share mutual benefits within the boundary of collective security. At least, "institutions are better than no institutions and offer an improvement upon the self-help world of balancing under anarchy."[97]

While the premise of a collective security system is trust among states, the system would contribute to building trust among states because the institution can provide

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[94]Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," p. 45.

[95]Ibid., p. 45.

[96]Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," p. 52.

[97]Ibid., p. 54.

information, which is needed to overcome an uncertain and anarchic world environment. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan assert that "institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time, for example by disclosing information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members."[98] Every state wants its own benefit even when it joins a collective security system. If states think that the distribution of benefits is uncertain or unequal, then they would not trust other states and, of course, the system as well. However, the collective security system can have information which would confirm the equal distribution and the mutual benefits in the system, such as others' military level and capability. Then it would be conducive to building trust among states. As a result, "It promotes a more benign international environment in which states can devote less attention and fewer resources to ensuring their survival and more to improving their welfare -- unless and until an aggressor emerges."[99]

2. Institutional Capability based on Legal Principles

An international institution has legal principles, not laws, which are comprised of treaties, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. As states make it for the sake of their self-interest, the institution does not have any legal binding force unless there exists a common national interest. Even though it does not have law enforcement, states' commitment to cooperation enables the institution to have the capability to control and adjust their behaviors. It can reduce transaction costs, disseminate information, create transparent

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[98]Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," p. 45-46.

[99]Ibid., p. 58. He also gives an illustration of institutional evolution toward deepening cooperation, using the case of Germany's participation in NATO: "The Federal Republic became part of NATO because of the strategic objectives it shared with other members. But the current closeness of Germany's relations with its West European neighbors and with the United States is a function not just of shared interests but also of its steady participation in the web of Western institutions. It is hard to imagine that Germany's relations with other established democracies would be as close as they are today had these states been interacting with each other only as like-minded powers in an international environment without institutions."

situations, and thus increase cooperation among participants.[100] For example, in the case that the members of NATO shared a mutual interest in limiting flow of militarily useful goods and technology to the Soviet Union, the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group of NATO (CoCom) facilitated their agreement on defining the scope of defection or the necessity of retaliation against defectors.[101] As long as their self-interests converged within the institution, it provided payoffs to member states, by reducing transaction costs. Therefore, as long as the participants require it, the institution can have the capability based on legal principles.

While the need of cooperation among states results in the establishment of an institution, conversely, the institution strengthens their cooperation rather than defection. Transparency is another element for cooperation that the institution endows, as Duncan Snidal indicates that:

> Cooperation is made more likely not only by changes in payoffs, but also by increases in the states' ability to recognize what others are doing -- called "transparency" in the literature on regimes. Coupled with the ability to act on the information, transparency can produce a situation in which, in effect, the choices of CD and DC are effectively ruled out. Short periods of defection or exploitation may occur; but if they can be detected and countered, the only real alternatives are CC and DD.[102]

If transparency is guaranteed, the probability of cheating -- that is, defection or exploitation -- becomes lower because states expect the current cheating to impede the future gains. Kenneth Oye explains the relations between "the shadow of the future" and cooperation using the prisoner's dilemma: "If the prisoners expect to be placed in similar situations in the future, the prospects for cooperation improve."[103] In a single-play game, states defect from each other.

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[100]Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, October 1985, p. 250.

[101]See Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, October 1985, p. 20.

[102]Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theory of International Politics," *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, October 1985, p. 73.

[103]Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," p. 13.

If they anticipate other games in the future, however, a potential defector compares the immediate gain from squealing with the possible sacrifice of future gains that may result from squealing.[104] "The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less the incentive to defect today -- since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow."[105] As defection in the present decreases a reputation for reliability in the future, states will more likely cooperate than defect. Consequently, the institution strengthens cooperation among states by making their expectation of the future gains more clear.

By the same token, for institutionalist, even though it is not at the level of domestic law, an institution in a collective security system can have legal binding force. Within the norm and rule that members promise to follow, the institution has the power to control and adjust member states' behaviors. Its capability based on legal principles results from the interactions of two factors: states' cooperation and benefits from the institution. While the former based on common interests endows authority to the institution, the latter facilitates and strengthens the former by bestowing mutual interests and giving more incentives for the future gains. As states expect the future gains, cooperation is more likely. Then, the more cooperation among states there is, the more legal binding force the institution has.

In the real world, many cases exist showing institutional capability. The stable norms and rules of NATO contributed to the peace in Europe in the post-war era by making its members credible and facilitating the augmentation of allies' military capabilities.[106] In the Falklands War, the institution, the European Community, facilitated the cooperation of states to impose multilateral economic sanctions; states supported the sanction in the name of the EC, not of each country, thus reducing fears of the other's cheating in the future.[107] Actually, the sanction problem in a collective security system depends on "maturity" of the system, not on the lack of central authority in an international system. On the other hand, the inability of

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[104]Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy," p. 13.

[105]Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," p. 232.

[106]Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," p. 49.

[107]Ibid., p. 49.

the League of Nations to function was not due to the nature of collective security, but to the defects of the system -- it had no teeth. The League Covenant did not express as a legal commitment the promise of armed assistance against aggression, thus leaving the members free to determine for themselves whether they should contribute to military action.[108]

3. Consensus for Collective Action

Collective security assumes that any war can be prevented by predominance of the future non-aggressor members. This assumption premises a collective security system to be well organized and works effectively, which can solve the problems that it may encounter: how to provide incentives for cooperation; how to monitor behavior so that cooperators and defectors could be identified; how to focus rewards on cooperators and retaliation on defectors; how to link issues with one another in productive rather than self-defeating ways.[109] Under such a system, defection would be difficult. If there are minor problems, the institution can solve them with the capability based on legal principle and states' cooperation, as mentioned earlier, to take sanctions against violators. Even if there is an aggression, the consensus for collective action against it would be possible as long as members have conviction that the consensus provides mutual benefits in the long term.

Collective action necessarily depends on trust among states and institutional capability. As reviewed in the previous subsection, the future expectation of long term self-interests for states will lead them to cooperation, rather than defection. Not to participate in the collective action may be a favorable choice for states, but the incentives for future gains forces them to make collective action despite the current losses. For future deals, states have to get a reputation for reliability. Even strong powers in this context cannot help obeying the rules of the game to a degree. Even though the United Nations is not considered as a collective

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[108]Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, p. 174. While the League of Nations was dedicated to the principle of collective security, its legal and organizational arrangements for giving effect to that principle, especially collective action against an aggressor, were exceedingly meager. Comparing Article 16 of the Covenant to Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter of the United Nations, there is found a basic distinction of "how to do it."

[109]Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," p. 249.

security system here, it has proven the possibility of the application of a collective security concept to the real world by responding to the Korean War, the Gulf War, and peacekeeping operations. Especially, the Korean War showed that "collective enforcement of some sort might be organized even against aggressors supported by a great power."[110]

The problem of "who is the aggressor," which realists indicated earlier, can be solved more easily when a system monitors and conciliates the issues between the aggressor and the victim. Even in the case of the Israel-Egypt conflict, for institutionalist, if there was a proper institution, other than the United Nations, which could monitor and control their self-interest, the conflict might have been prevented. Or, at least, the institution could have contributed to setting up a new order between them after the outbreak of the conflict. Actually, an aggression is not a starting point of a new conflicting issue, but a continuation of a previous issue. Monitoring states' behaviors is required to estimate an aggressor and a victim. Coupled with the development of information, a technological monitoring system, and communication system, it would never be a difficult job for an institution to find out who is the aggressor.

Friendly relationships cannot be a factor that impedes the consensus for collective action. As realists and institutionalist assume, international order is anarchy with no central authority. There is no friend, nor enemy, in the long run. States follow their self-interests, not injustice. To support an aggressor to help a friend will also hurt their reputation for reliability in international society. Therefore, though there might be a difference of assistance to a degree, states will tend to agree with the collective action against even a friendly state.

In summary, institutionalist' perspectives of collective security focus on cooperation and institutional capability. Contrary to the realists' critique of the cheating problem, they insist, states can cooperate with each other because of the expectation of the future gains in the "repeated games." An institution cannot only provide information and reduce transaction costs, but also provide transparency of the situation, thus facilitating cooperation among states. As states have more confidence in the institution, the latter can get more capability to control states' behaviors, such as economic sanctions or even collective military action.

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[110]Inis L. Claude, Jr. *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 268.

Realists' critique of the consensus for collective action, such as the difficulty of identification of an aggressor, divergent self-interests, and the case of friendly aggressor, will fall into the realm of cooperation and institutional capability. If states cooperate for the same security interests in a collective security system, and they empower the system, collective security can be real. Coupled with the changes in international environment for cooperation, hopes for collective security are rising.

E. STATES' ACTIONS: CONSTRUCTIVISTS' VIEW

As long as cooperation among states is being considered, it would be worthwhile to review the constructivists view of states' actions, not only because it will supplement the previous theoretical perspectives of realists and institutionalists, but because it will suggest other variables for the conditions of collective security.

As the constructivists' view of international relations is based on social theory, it seems to be practical rather than "theoretical." A fundamental principle of their theory is that "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them."[111] While realists and institutionalists seek the answer to the question about "states' behaviors" in the view of anarchy and self-help system, and in the view of institution and cooperation respectively, constructivists are focusing their view on "the intersubjective understanding and expectations."[112] For example, let's suppose that North Korea is developing a nuclear weapon. Realists will explain it in terms of anarchy, and institutionalists the lack of institutional function and that of cooperation. Constructivists, however, do not use any fixed frame. Instead, their framework of international relations is "social construction" based on "the intersubjective understanding and expectations," which is much more flexible than that of realists and institutionalists. That is, they will consider another factor that influenced the behavior of North Korea, such as the U.S. military increase on the Korean peninsula. Then, by their view, it is the perception of the threat of the U.S.

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[111]Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it," p. 135.

[112]Ibid., p. 135.

military increase that causes the action of North Korea. On the other hand, Japan, a U.S. ally, does not respond to the U.S. behavior because its understanding and expectation of the U.S. action is not a threat, but a kind of protection for Japan. Thus, states' acts depend on their understanding and expectation of others' behaviors.

It is identity and interest that form those understanding and expectations. As a person has many identities in a society such as a father, a teacher and a citizen, a state can have identities, such as "a state in confrontation," "a small state," and "a member of the UN." Once identification is formed in a certain situation, it becomes the basis of interests. As the commitment to and salience of particular identities differ, each interest that states define varies. However, "actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situation."[113] Again, in the supposition of North Korea's nuclear development, the identity of North Korea is as an enemy of the United States and South Korea. Before the U.S. military buildup on the Korean peninsula, its security interests were to counter them with conventional weapons. As the situation changes by the U.S. military increase, North Korea defines its interests as the development of a nuclear weapon.

The constructivists' view of states' behaviors is based on the principle of relativity. For them, anarchy is not the necessary condition for a self-help international system full of "power conflicts." Even though states' identities under anarchy necessarily cause them to be concerned about their survival, the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with others is different: "An anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies."[114] That is the reason why there exist various kinds of security systems: the competitive security system like in the Hobbesian war of all against all; the individualistic security system in which states are indifferent to the relationship between their own and others' security; the cooperative security

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[113]Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it," p. 136.

[114]Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, Summer 1995, p. 78.

system like concert or collective security arrangements.[115] Therefore, realists' logic that uses anarchy to explain states' behavior, such as power competition or the lack of cooperation, does not seem to be appropriate. Rather, identification and interest influence states' behaviors as well as the characteristics of a system. That is, if a state identifies its relations with another state as a friend, and if it expects more interests through cooperation with the friend, then their relations will not be a competitive one even under anarchy.

Constructivists are favorable to institutional functions. By their view, "An institution is a relatively stable set or 'structure' of identity and interests," and "institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests."[116] Coupled with the growing importance of the sovereignty of states, which depends on mutual recognition, "they can afford to rely more on the institutional fabric of international society and less on individual national means -- especially military power -- to protect their territory."[117] An institution has rules and norms, and it facilitates states' ability to define identity and interests. However, this does not necessarily mean that an institution enables cooperation. It may be cooperative or conflictual according to the identity and interests that actors define.

For constructivists, cooperation is iteration of identification and interest. In order to transform competitive identities to cooperative ones, there should be "rewards" for the change. The "rewards" makes states define a new identity and interests, and, once they change, there is formed a collective identity. Over time, as long as interests continue, the collective identity becomes reinforced. Alexander Wendt asserts:

> ... the process by which egoists learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms. Over time, this will tend to transform a positive interdependence of *outcomes* into a positive interdependence of *utilities* or collective interest organized around the norms in question.[118]

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[115]Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it," p. 137-138.

[116]Ibid., p. 136-137 .

[117]Ibid., p. 153.

[118]Ibid., p. 155.

For example, a collective European identity was an outcome of reconstituting identities and interests through the continuously repeated intersubjective understanding and commitments.

Consequently, the constructivists' view of states' behaviors -- here, concerning collective security -- focuses on identity and interests. Then, the workability of collective security will depend on the two questions, "how do states define and understand their identities in a certain security environment?" and "what are the expectations of interests through a collective security?" If states see the necessity of collective security in such security environments as the needs of security cooperation, no current enemy state, and no reason to buildup the military, and if states expect their security interests to benefit from their cooperation, then collective security will meet the requirements for its workability. While institutionalists consider cooperation and institutional functions to be the nucleus of the system, constructivists focus on identification and interests for cooperation. Both concede that iteration of cooperative behavior would ultimately be conducive to form trust among states by, for institutionalists, strengthening institutional capability, and, for constructivists, forming collective identity.

F. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Theory develops along with the change in world politics. At the end of the First World War, Wilsonians prevailed. When the League of Nations failed, realism gained predominance among international theories. The end of the Cold War brought about many critiques of realism and empowered the theory of liberal institutionalist. In this context, the review of changes in the international system in the post-war era will give the clues to conclude this chapter.[119] As, so far, the condition of cooperation among states was the focus of arguments,

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[119] Gilpin asserts, "Contemporary changes in technology, economics, and human consciousness are said to have transformed the very nature of international relations." He mentions three such changes: the advent of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; the high level of economic interdependence among national economics; the advent of a global society. With these changes, "the nation-state has receded in importance, ... [and] welfare goals have displaced security goals as the highest priority of societies." See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton University, 1987), p. 57.

this section will examine the relationship between changes in the international system and the condition of cooperation. However, all the changes in the international system in the post-war era seem to converge to facilitate cooperation, rather than strengthen the anarchic international environment.

1. Appearance of Nation-States

One of the most conspicuous phenomena in twentieth century international politics is characterized by the appearance of nation-states, especially since the end of the First World War. Influenced by European colonial rule, colonial nations formed a feeling of common identity. Having learned from Europeans, they formed a national economy, modern political structure, and their ideals such as freedom, democracy and plenty. Nationalism was in flamed to get independence, and the two World Wars which made the European colonial rules weak enabled the appearance of many new nation-states. As a result, the contemporary world can be characterized by the following: "a great standardization and unification of the people within the nation; a sharpening of dividing lines between nations; and a new kind of total involvement in the nation on the part of the entire population."[120]

The appearance of nation states made "conquest" or "colonialization" of a weaker state meaningless. Acknowledgment of the sovereignty of a nation state causes censure for such behavior in international society. Even if that succeeds, the conqueror cannot legitimize its rule over the people of a victim's country. Even though there exists a big disparity in terms of political, economic, and military power, at least under international law (even though weak) all states become equal as unitary actors in international affairs. Even in East Asia, where the Chinese empire had dominantly maintained a "Sino-centric" idea far more than a thousand years, the traditional relations such as suzerainty would never happen again.

2. Development of Mass Destruction Weapons

Weapons proliferation is closely related to the development of the modern nation state. If we define the term 'state building' as the process of "the creation of a governmental

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[120]A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, p. 45.

monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,"[121] a nation-state should have military force which is required for not only domestic prestige but also sovereign status in the modern world system.[122]

With rapidly improving technology, however, the development of mass destruction weapons, especially a nuclear arsenal, made new conditions for the use of force.[123] The dominant powers cannot use force indiscriminately for fear of the disastrous results of nuclear war which would lead to mutual destruction. Since any war can escalate into a nuclear holocaust, war itself has become too risky as a solution for international conflicts.[124] One problem is that "the acquisition of nuclear weapons has become an important objective for an increasing numbers of contemporary states."[125] Even the lesser powers, if they get a nuclear bomb, can have a "punch" against the superpowers. Even though the former does not get it, if they use the "situation" well, they can get the initiative in the negotiation table over the latter, as in the case of the long nuclear negotiation between the United States and North

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[121]James W. White, "State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 14, p. 1.

[122]Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, *Culture and Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, Forthcoming), p. 81. They insist, "Nation-states do not buy particular weapons exclusively to enhance their prestige. Rather, the creation of a military and the acquisition of the basic 'tool of the trade' both confer and confirm the central cultural construct of 'statehood' within the modern world system. The more a nation interacts with this larger cultural environment, the more it tends to assert and authenticate its sovereign status with the ultimate symbol of nationhood, a military." p. 113.

[123]Stanley Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System,"ed. Goodrich, Leland M. & Kay, David A., International Organization: Politics & Process (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973) p. 55. Also, Gilpin indicates three general effects of mass destruction weapons on international relations: first, the primary purpose of military power has become the deterrence of another great war; second, nuclear weapons provide the nuclear state with an infrangible guarantee of its independence and physical integrity; third, the possession of nuclear weapons largely determines a nation's rank in the hierarchy of international prestige. See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 215.

[124]Dietrich Fischer, Wilhelm Nolte and Jan Oberg, *Winning Peace* (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), p. 15.

[125]Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 216.

Korea in the early 1990s. Strong powers, then, cannot help being concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear states and being cooperative with weaker powers.

With the development of mass destruction weapons, growing concerns are: "well-equipped 'state of the art' militaries are no longer restricted to a few industrialized 'core' powers; military development and economic development, it seems, have become decoupled."[126] Many third world countries have developed and procured long-range missiles, some of which can be used for delivering nuclear bombs, and chemical and biological weapons. The destructiveness of those weapons results in the abhorrence of war among people. Coupled with the growing democratization of world politics, "it is becoming increasingly difficult to develop and sustain a substantial majority of the voting public that will support a war, except for cases when the adversary is viewed as evil and the opposing elites as very different from themselves."[127] Then, states have tended to become increasingly cooperative in bargaining and compromising with each other in international affairs.

3. Growing Economic Interdependency

Growing economic relations in the post-war era have caused states to become interdependent with each other. Most scholars view this as a benign phenomenon rather than pessimistic one.[128] Klaus Knorr argues that, "The new world economic order was also

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[126]Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Convential Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," p. 80.

[127]Charles F. Hermann, "Democracies and War: One of Many Security Issues," *American Defense Annual* (New York: Lexington Books, 1994), p. 4.

[128]Gilpin indicates the three factors which might negatively affect the political consequences of trade; the existence or absence of a dominant liberal power, the inequality of economic growth in a system, and the degree of homogeneity of industrial structure. In each case, political conflict will occur from the economic interdependency respectively when a dominant economic power is waned or challenged by a new rising power, when the slowdown of a country in the rate of economic growth such as unequal trade makes adjustment difficult, or when there is extreme homogeneity of industrial structure. Coupled with growing economic interdependency and cooperation, this thesis considers that those factors can be solved, because current economic order seems to converge to free trade based on mutual benefits. See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, p. 57.

perceived as a potent source of political benefit. ... a system producing continuous, massive, and pervasive improvements in the material foundations of human life would make possible a politically peaceful and stable world in which nations would be capable of solving disputes by judicious bargaining and compromise."[129] In addition to its basic contribution to economic mutual benefits based on the principle of "comparative advantage," economic interdependency results in increasingly close people-to-people contacts.

Coupled with mutually beneficial economic relations, close people-to-people contacts can remove much of the fear and the danger of war.[130] Dietrich Fischer shows the case of the improved relations between the United States and China.[131] After "ping pong diplomacy," the interaction of businessmen as well as common people -- "Today about 27,000 Chinese students are in the United States, and about a quarter-million Americans visit China each year" -- has made them closer than ever before. China is interested in buying U.S. technology, and American consumers benefit from low-priced products made in China. Even though there have been political constraints such as the Taiwan issue and the human rights issue, at least economic relations between the two countries have contributed to improving their overall relations, increasing mutual understanding.

4. Information

The development of modern high technology has enabled states to obtain more varied and accurate information through multiple channels. Advances in communications and transportation can bring people anywhere directly or indirectly, thus increasing their contacts and mutual understanding beyond nationalities. The development of mass media, coupled with the spreading "freedom of speech" based on globalizing democratization, supplies all kind of fresh news and information. Various international institutions provide information and data about other countries, thus contributing to the transparency of their relations. States can

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[129]Klaus Knorr, "Economic Interdependency and National Security," ed. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, *Economic Issues and National Security* (Kansas: Allen Press, 1977), p. 2.

[130]Dietrich Fischer, Wilhelm Nolte and Jan Oberg, *Winning Peace*, p. 21.

[131]Ibid., p. 21.

collect information using ultramodern intelligence satellites. They also can use more accurate information from domestic institutions that analyzes outer information. Compared to the pre-war era, far more political, economic, security, and even non-governmental international organizations facilitate the flow of information.

5. Wither Cooperation?

The appearance of nation-states and the development of mass destruction weapons not only strengthened the sovereignty of states, even small ones, but also contributed to cooperation among them. Coupled with the realization of the disastrous results of the two great wars, at least indiscriminate total war aimed at conquest was rejected. The growing economic interdependency and information have certainly brought about more international contacts and mutual understanding. At least economic cooperation seems to be real, when we consider so many economic cooperative organizations and activities. Even though economic relations cannot solve security conflicts between states, it can improve political relations to a degree.[132] Thus, those changes in the international system after the two world wars can be considered to be auspicious for international cooperation, rather than conflicts.[133]

G. SUMMARY: CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Both theory, balance of power and collective security, have their own limits not only with regard to logic, but also in practice. No perfect theory can exist in the real world, rather it has been, and will be, corrected and evolved continuously.[134] Arthur Stein asserts

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[132]For example, China and South Korea relations are improved by economic trade in the post-Cold War era. In the Cold War era, security constraints impeded economic relations between them. Once, economic trade started and explosively expanded, there has been a great deal of improvement in political relations. For the first time in history, Chinese Prime Minister Zang Zemin visited South Korea for a summit talk on December 13, 1995.

[133]Contemporary international security environments which would cause conflicts among states are characterized by the rise of nationalism, terrorism, and religious conflicts. For the purpose of this thesis, the last two are beyond its concern, and the first one will be reviewed in Chapter IV.

[134]Kenneth Waltz asserts that " Laws are "facts of observation"; theories are "speculative processes introduced to explain them." Experimental results are permanent; theories, however well supported, may not last." See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York:

"international relations involve both cooperation and conflict, evincing more cooperation than realists admit and more conflict than liberals [institutionalists] recognized."[135] In the previous sections, however, we could see the possibility of cooperation among states even in an anarchic international environment, rather than power conflicts. Coupled with the benign changes in the post war era, international relations have evolved on the basis of cooperation through numerous political, economic, and security institutions and arrangements. Then, as long as cooperation is possible beyond just "calculation of power," it would be worth while to examine the workability of collective security in the real world.

Whereas the balance of power system is formed naturally under an "uncontrolled anarchy," the collective security system is artificial under a "controlled anarchy" which requires cooperation among members. Without cooperation -- that is, negative identities and conflictive security interests among states -- the balance of power system will naturally be formed. Without cooperation, collective security will only cause a disaster as in the case of the League of Nations. However, only if such cooperation among nations is possible, and if a collective security system is established successfully, will the system provide the benefits of security stability with less costs to its member states. If so, the collective security system would be the best option for achieving peace in the international system, as well as an alternative to balance of power approaches.

However, it is questionable whether to believe the institutionalists' perspectives on collective security, because their view is more or less unilateral. Constructivists' view of the international system, which seems to correspond with the institutionalists' view to a degree, does not provide an explicit explanation of whether collective security can work in practice, by arguing that its success depends on identity and interests of states. The fact that there has been no real collective security system in the real world increases the doubt about the workability of that system. Growing cooperation in international relations, however, provides a clue for the realization of collective security. Even though they are transformed collective

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Random House, 1979), p. 6.

[135]Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, p. 12.

security systems, the United Nations and NATO have been operated since the end of the Second World War, with "general" success in dealing with international security affairs. Coupled with the increasing opportunities for security cooperation and multilateral security talks, especially in Asia, the possibility for collective security tends to be intensified, not weakened.

The question is not "whether the collective security system can work?" but of "under what conditions can the collective security system work?" A system is not a solution, but a possibility which depends on the interactions between actors and security environments in the system. To summarize the conditions for workability of collective security that are reviewed in this chapter, five factors need to be mentioned.

Shared security interests. States' behaviors -- that is, whether they cooperate or not -- absolutely depend on their national interests. As the most important factor, there should be overlapping security interests in the collective security system. Without national interests, states would not cooperate, as realists, institutionalists, and constructivists assert. Also, if their security interests are not shared, but conflictive, a collective security system cannot work properly. This case will be examined in the Locarno Pact in Chapter III.

Identity. States should identify and understand themselves as a member of the collective group. Like people in a society or a nation, they should have a will to follow the rules and norms given to them, believing that others will obey. This identification is similar to "the shadow of the future" in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Both expedite cooperation under the assumption that current cooperation is necessary for future interests. Of course, as the system develops, their identities will evolve as a collective identity. For the purpose of further description of identity in next chapters, this thesis will use the terms "positive identity" and "negative identity." The positive identity is the situation in which a state defines another as a friend or an ally, and the negative one means the identification of another as an enemy or a threat.

Institutional capability to control states' behaviors. According to institutionalists and constructivists, proper institutions can strengthen cooperation by facilitating mutual gains and promoting the formation of positive identity and further collective identity among member

states. Even though the rules and norms in a collective security system are weaker than domestic laws in a state, states would respect and observe them as long as they have the will to cooperate. Therefore, institutional capability inevitably depends on states' cooperation in a system. Institutional capability does not mean an authority to govern its member states, but the capability to control and adjust states' behaviors through making contacts and conciliation of their policies. If the institutional function promotes states' interests, states will be more cooperative, thus reinforcing institutional capability.

Institutions to provide information. As realists, institutionalists, and possibly even constructivists concede, information provides transparency of each state's policy and prevents any miscalculation of others' intention or power in the system. It helps a state to define its identity to others positively, and facilitates cooperation among states. Coupled with global democratization and the development of technology, information to the public became more available and important for states to make their national policies. Therefore, a collective security system can not only get more support from its member states as well as their people by providing information, but also strengthen its institutional capability from the support.

Reiteration of interaction between actors and the system. Actors' cooperation with the collective security system contributes to the reinforcement of institutional capability. Thus, they will be rewarded with less transaction costs, security stability, favorable economic environment, and so on. If the interaction between actors and the system proceeds positively, and reiterates, the identity of each state would be developed into a collective identity and the collective security system will be more stable.

These five factors provide the clues for the workability of collective security. This thesis considers them as variables for the success or failure of collective security, and assumes that if a collective security system is satisfied with these factors, then it can be a successful system to maintain security stability. Most of all, shared security interests and positive identities, which are the factors for cooperation, would be foremost for the best results of collective security, because institutional capability depends on them. To verify the functions and interactions of those variables in real collective security systems, the next chapter will deal with the two cases of the Locarno Pact and NATO.

III. COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN HISTORY

This chapter comparatively studies two cases of collective security in history: the Locarno Pact and NATO. The case studies will show the functions and interactions of the five variables -- mutual security gains, identity, institutional capability to control states' behaviors, institutions to provide information, and reiteration of interaction between actors and the system -- in a collective security system. Then, it will illustrate the conditions under which collective security can work.

The cases were selected under the following three considerations. First, by selecting those cases in the same region, it would be possible to prevent the variation of the difference of regional culture. For example, even though we may apply a security system to both the Middle East and Europe at the same time, the outcome may be different because of their different cultures and historical background. Second, to compare the conditions that would influence the workability of a collective security system, both a failed and a successful case were chosen. Third, the backgrounds of those cases are matched with the future security environment of Northeast Asia which would seek a new security measure for regional stability. Of course, for this thesis I would rather select them from Asian history, but there has been no successful case in this region's history. Also, other regional collective security systems such as the OAU (Organization of African Union) or the AL (Arab League) were based on pan-nationalism which would have no relation to Northeast Asian states. On the other hand, by considering the different problems of Asian culture in applying the system, in Chapter V, this thesis will be able to overcome the gap between the European cases and the applicability to the Northeast Asian states.

Examining all the details of the cases is not what this Chapter intends to do because of its inefficiency and the restricted volume of this thesis. Rather, this Chapter will focus on the functions and interactions of those five variables to ensure the relations between the variables and the success or failure of collective security. In addition to those five variables, the existing external threat, as another variable which might influence the outcome of the collective security system, will be examined at the end of the Chapter.

A. THE LOCARNO PACT

"The Locarno agreements consisted of five related treaties: the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, restricted to western German borders and guaranteed by Britain and Italy; and four arbitration treaties between Germany on the one side, and France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland on the other."[136] As the latter cannot be considered to be collective security, however, this chapter will deal with only the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and mainly focus on the interactions among France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the United States.

As a failed case, the Locarno Pact could not satisfy the five variables required for the success of collective security. In fact, its failure seems to have been destined from the beginning. Most of all, cooperation among participants was impossible without positive identity and shared security interests. Before the Pact, the Treaty of Versailles was aimed at the creation of a new world order through the adjustment of each state's claim about territory, reparations, and disarmament after the First World War. The result was not a conciliation, but hostility full of distrust and resentment among the people of each state. Then, the participants of the Locarno Pact could not form a positive identity regarding each other, even at the moment of the conclusion of the Pact. As far as the Rhineland was concerned, which was the focus of the Pact, France and Germany could never share any interests from the Pact. Coupled with the lack of proper institutions which could adjust and conciliate each state's policy, the Locarno system showed no effectiveness or workability in maintaining the status quo around the Rhineland.

The failure of the Locarno Pact was mainly due to the lack of cooperation among participants -- that is, the negative identity of each state and the conflictive self-interest. As the negative identity and the conflictive interests around the Rhineland were closely related to the Versailles Treaty and the political relations among France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, this section will first examine the background of the Locarno Pact. Then,

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[136]Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925* (Minneapolis: The Lund Press, 1962), p. 361.

after reviewing the development of the Pact, which will illustrate the lack of institutional function, this section will evaluate the functions of the five variables in the Locarno system.

1. Background: Formation of Negative Identity and Conflictive Interests

a. Peace Settlement after the First World War

The background of the Locarno Pact is linked to the "failed peace settlement" after the First World War. Woodrow Wilson's "new diplomacy" in the Paris Peace Conference, which "aimed at overcoming old conflicts and tensions by building a supranational organization and strengthening international law," could not work because of "the variety of views and approaches" to the Conference.[137] Far from "the spirit of conciliation," the "new diplomacy" was merely a compromise based on power politics and national interests. The principle of equality among sovereign states dissolved in the decision-making process such as the "Council of Ten," or the "Council of Four," and in the Covenant of the League of Nations.[138] Even though Wilson believed that the practice of secret diplomacy should give way to free and open discussion, 'the Council of Four' conducted its deliberations in the utmost secrecy.[139] When it comes to the right of national self-determination, non-European populations of the colonial world were beyond their concerns. Thus, the principles for world peace through the "new diplomacy" crashed on the shoals of political reality in Paris.

There were basic discrepancies in each state's national interests throughout the Paris Peace Conference. Great Britain was chiefly concerned with the reestablishment of a balance

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[137]Felix Gibert with David Clay Large, *The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present* (New York: Norton, 1991), P. 158

[138]Five states of all twenty seven victorious nations, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, consisted the "Council of Ten," which preempted for themselves the right to adjudicate the important issues before the conference. When it was felt to be unwieldy, four great powers -- minus Japan -- began to meet as the "Council of Four." See William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World* (New York: Oxford, 1996), p. 74.

[139]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World* (New York: Oxford, 1996), p. 75. Wilson considered three principle causes of the First World War to be the practice of secret diplomacy, the tendency of politically dominant nationality groups to oppress the ethnic minorities under their control, and the political system of autocracy. See p. 73.

of power. France's main concern was to make a resumption of the Franco-German compatibility impossible. Italy demanded the South Tirol and the Dalmatian coast which were promised by the Treaty of London as a reward for its participation in the war. Also, new nations which had emerged from the war, such as Greece and Serbia, were full of nationalism, and made demands for their own national goals. The problem was that the European powers could not find any solution to solve their conflictive interests without violating the principles that Wilson suggested, settlement by conciliation. Most of all, the policies of Great Britain and France, and the impact of the peace settlement on Germany should be mentioned.

For Great Britain, Wilson's Fourteen Points prescribed a moderate settlement of reparation claims, which confined Germany's obligation to the reparation of civilian damages. This was not acceptable. "Since the damage to civilian property in Great Britain had been minimal, Lloyd George persuaded Wilson to include the cost of veterans' pensions and separation allowances in the total bill to be submitted to Germany in order to maximize Britain's share of reparation payments."[140] When it came to territorial settlement, however, Great Britain opposed harsh territorial penalties for Germany that had been sought by France, which included the independence of the Rhineland and the small and medium-sized states in the eastern frontier. Even though its opposition was on the grounds that Germany was likely to incite perpetual dissatisfaction with the peace settlement, Great Britain had a clear reason for the moderate policy toward territorial matters: to revert to "its traditional policy of promoting continental equilibrium in order to free her to play a global role."[141] That is, under the condition of Germany having lost its naval power, Great Britain considered it as a counterweight to French power on the continent, not necessarily as an enemy -- like in the late nineteenth century and during the First World War.

France had two critical national goals: first, the definitive removal of the menace of German military aggression in Europe; second, the acquisition of financial assistance to defray

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[140]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 81. By Wilson's suggestion, France would have received 70 percent of Germany's total payment. For Germany, it was a possible solution to be discharged without a drastic reduction in the German standard of living.

[141]Ibid., p. 83.

the costs of restoring the territory in northeastern France that had been devastated by the German army during the war.[142] Coupled with the loss of Russia as an eastern counterweight to German power, French sense of vulnerability was high. Without natural impediments, France was susceptible to German attack. By comparative statistics at that time, France was inferior to Germany in terms of population and industry. For its future security, France wanted either a weakening of Germany or an assurance of the two strong powers' support in case of war.[143] As the latter was rejected because of the two powers' abhorrence to get involved in a Continental war, the other option for France was to weaken Germany by territorial amputation and disarmament. On the other hand, France hoped that its national reconstruction would be financed not by the defeated enemy, but rather by France's two English-speaking associates.[144] It hoped the participation of the United States in the inter-Allied economic machinery in the last year of the war to be extended for the Allies' economic recovery. Moreover, the restriction of supplies to Germany within the inter-Allied economic structure would limit German potential for aggression. However, France's expectation was ill-founded. Once the war was over, the United States did not see any interests in economic aid to its Allies and returned to economic nationalism. Then France had to seek relief from its economic distress in the form of reparation payments from Germany.[145]

As far as the security from the threat of Germany was concerned, the Rhineland could not be overlooked by France. As the historian Aulard acknowledged that "Either we annex the left bank of the Rhine and violate principle, or we do not annex it and France remains in

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[142]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 76.

[143]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.233.

[144]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 79. Alan Sharp mentions that "although France needed German assistance to restore her devastated regions, she preferred to ruin Germany rather than adjust her claims to a level at which Germany could make at least some contribution. Reparations policy is thus seen as an extension of security policy since a drained and destitute Germany could not threaten France." See Alan Sharp, *"The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 83.

[145]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 81.

perpetual danger of invasion,"[146] the Rhineland lay in the heart of France's security. Strategically, "it was only on the Rhine that an offensive from the east could be stopped without too great risks and excessive sacrifices."[147] Coupled with the independent movement of the separatist group in the Rhineland, then, France's policy was to form one or several independent states there. As the movement failed, there was a confrontation between France and Great Britain on the matter of the forcible separation. "The forcible separation of the Rhineland from Germany would not only violate the principle of national self-determination; it would also, particularly in the eyes of British Prime Minister Lloyd George, have created another Alsace-Lorraine, that is a perpetual source of friction between Germany and the victorious powers responsible for depriving her of her 'lost province.'"[148] After severe debates, with a reluctant guarantee of the United States and Great Britain that they would commit themselves to defend France in the event of unprovoked German aggression, there was a compromise arrangement on the Rhine as follows:

> The Allies would occupy the left bank and the appropriate bridgeheads for 15 years, but their troops would be withdrawn in three stages. Subject to satisfactory Germany treaty execution, the first zone would be evacuated after five years and the second after ten. If the Germans executed the entire treaty before 15 years were up, then the occupation would cease at once. On the other hand, if the Germans did not fulfil their reparations obligations, then all, or part of the area could be reoccupied. The left bank, and a 50 kilometer strip paralleling the river on its right bank, were to be permanently demilitarized. Any German infraction would be deemed a 'hostile act', but would not automatically trigger the Anglo-American guarantee.[149]

This was an outcome of Wilson's offer to give France an American guarantee, followed by a British offer that an American guarantee would be accompanied by a British one. However, the U.S. isolation from European security matters brought about the invalidity of its

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[146]Alan Sharp, *"The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 106. The Rhineland was situated between the French frontier and the Rhine river.

[147]J. Nere, *The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 14.

[148]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 78.

[149]Alan Sharp, *"The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919*, p. 111.

guarantee, therefore it became Great Britain's problem.

For Germany, its people resented the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles: they lost all colonies; Alsace-Lorraine was yielded to France, Eupen-Malmedy to Belgium, Posen and West Prussia to Poland; the Saar with its coal field was to be under international administration for 15 years; the Rhineland was to be demilitarized and occupied by the Allies for 15 years at German cost; heavy reparations were imposed; and they had to reduce the army to 100,000. The last two issues were the most problematic to implement. "Public opinion within Germany fulminated against the 'blank check' that the Allies had issued on that country's capacity to resume its prewar prosperity."[150] Career officers vehemently opposed the disarmament and army reduction. German public opinion was divided into two groups, obstruction of the rightist parties and fulfillment of republican parties. The assassination of Walter Rathenau, the leading figure of the latter, however, showed the radical flow of the atmosphere in German society toward resistance of the Treaty.

b. French entry into Ruhr and the Locarno Pact

"On 14 November 1922 Germany claimed a complete moratorium of three or four years, with the exception of deliveries in kind intended for the reconstruction of the devastated regions."[151] While Great Britain showed generosity in suggesting the postponement for two years,[152] France rejected Germany's request because it "would lose any real guarantee of being even partially paid by Germany, while its debt to the United States would still stand in full."[153] Actually, unlike Great Britain, France's interests lay on the weakened Germany for its security. "In December 1922 the majority of the Reparations

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[150]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 82.

[151]J. Nere, *The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945*, p. 52.

[152]The priority of Great Britain's policy for reparation lay on the reconstruction of European economy, and it wanted other states to consider the capability of Germany to pay. Also, Great Britain was concerned about the total destruction of German economy which might cause another "Bolshevik revolution" in Germany. See Back Kyoung-Nam, Kugjekwangyesa (Seoul: Beobjisa, 1990), p. 141, 149.

[153]J. Nere, *The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945*, p. 53.

Commission, led by France and opposed by Britain, declared Germany in default in her deliveries in kind,"[154] and insisted on sanctions. On January 11, 1923, without consulting with the other Allies, France and Belgium sent the "Interallied Mission of Control of Factories and Mines" into Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland, which consisted of a group of engineers protected by troops. It was designed to guarantee the fulfilment of the pledges of production, but in fact the operation very quickly resulted in an extension of the military occupation of this region of the right bank of the Rhine.[155]

France's occupation of the Ruhr brought about not only disastrous results in the German economy and politics, but also a massive French failure. Germany responded with "passive resistance": it suspended all payments to France and Belgium; it forbade railway officials and employees to obey the orders of the occupying authorities.[156] The passive resistance bankrupted the German government which issued currency with accelerated speed to pay the workers, and sparked hyperinflation, which resulted in overall economic inability. A separatist movement in the Rhineland and the radical leftist and rightist organizations drove Germany into political instability. Chancellor Cuno resigned and was replaced by Gustav Stresemann on August 1923. France could not achieve its economic goal in such a chaotic situation. Moreover, France's sole unilateral military action made her thoroughly isolated. The United States expressed its displeasure by withdrawing its own army of occupation from the Rhineland. With doubts over the legality of the French action,[157] Great Britain broke away from the operation in Rhineland. There was a diplomatic split between France and the other two countries.

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[154]Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*, p. 269.

[155]J. Nere, *The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945*, p. 53.

[156]J. Nere, *The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945*, p. 54.

[157]In the text of the Treaty of Versailles, there was no explicit Act to estimate the legitimacy of France's entry into the Ruhr. However, because there was a great latitude for powers, that action could not be opposed formally by Great Britain or the United States. Instead, the latter expressed their discontent by the withdrawal of their troops in Rhineland. See J. Nere, p. 54.

It was Gustav Stresemann, the new German Foreign Minister, who saw an opportunity to strengthen his country in this delicate situation. His policy was "fulfillment," which amounted to a total reversal of the previous German policy of "resistance." He believed that Germany could get more political and economic gain through cooperation rather than intransigence. He proposed international arbitration for a new schedule of reparations, expecting an international forum to prove less exacting than France alone was likely to be. As a result, the Dawes Plan which was a reduced schedule of payments accepted in April 1924 helped to rebuild Germany's economic and, ultimately, its military power.[158] In this manner, in return for a German effort to fulfill its obligation of reparation and disarmament, even though it was a kind of 'political show' without practical implications, "Stresemann strove to be released from the most onerous political and military provisions of Versailles by the Allies themselves."[159]

While the policy of "fulfillment" was welcomed by the Western states, it produced an insoluble quandary for both France and the entire European order, as Kissinger describes:

> French security required a certain amount of discrimination against Germany in the military field; otherwise, Germany's superior potential in manpower and resources would prevail. But without equality - the right to build armaments like any other European country - Germany would never accept the Versailles system, and fulfillment would come to a halt. Fulfillment placed British diplomats in a difficult position as well. If Great Britain did not grant Germany military equality as a *quid pro quo* for Germany's meeting its reparations payments, Germany could well revert to its earlier intransigence. But military equality for Germany would imperil France. Great Britain might have made an alliance with France to counterbalance Germany, but it did not wish to become entangled in France's alliances in Eastern Europe or to find itself at war with Germany over some piece of Polish or Czech territory.[160]

On February 9, 1925, Stresemann made one of the boldest and most imaginative moves: a security pact confirming the *status quo* on the Franco-German borders, entailing

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[158]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.272. "Over the next five years, Germany paid out about $1 billion in reparations and received loans of about $2 billion, much of it from the United States. In effect, America was paying Germany's reparations, while Germany used the surplus from American loans to modernize its industry."

[159]Ibid., p.269.

[160]Ibid., p.273.

a promise on the part of both states not to wage war against each other, and submitting all common disputes to arbitration or conciliation.[161] There were two reasons for Stresemann to make such a proposal: first, the Allied determination to link German disarmament with evacuation of the Rhineland had to be broken; second, French security needs seemed to be met by an Anglo-French military alliance in a manner unfavorable to Germany.[162] Even though, by accepting the Dawes Plan, France and Great Britain promised the withdrawal of their troops from the Rhineland, the inspection of German disarmament in Autumn 1924 revealed numerous problems and prevented the withdrawal. Coupled with the growing separatism in the Rhineland, Germany desperately required the evacuation of foreign troops in that region for its economic and political stability. Also, the protraction of their military occupation seemed to be developing into an Anglo-Franco military alliance. Actually, "Austen Chamberlain in 1925 developed an idea for a limited alliance among Great Britain, France, and Belgium which would guarantee only their borders with Germany - in essence a military alliance to resist German aggression in the West."[163] By utilizing the security pact, then, he expected not only to eliminate those concerns, but also to rebuild the German economy, rearm and resume her place among the great powers, without western intervention.[164]

For Great Britain, the proposal of Stresemann was quite acceptable in terms of German-Russian relations and Franco-British relations. First, Great Britain worried about German-Russian ties since the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 which was suspected as a partial military alliance. If Germany became pro-Britain by Stresemann's proposal, then it could be detached from the Soviet Union. Second, with the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, Great

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[161]Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*, p. 325.

[162]Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), P. 9-10.

[163]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.273. At that time, however, because Germany became cooperative in fulfilling its obligations, Chamberlain thought that kind of alliance would be impractical. Declaring that a pact without Germany would be a pact against Germany, he renounced the plan. Instead, when Stresemann proposed a pact for securing the border between France and Germany, he changed the original plan into the notion of collective security: the Locarno Pact.

[164]Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*, p. 326.

Britain was considering a certain type of security guarantee for France. Chamberlain's idea, however, which was a security agreement among Great Britain, France, and Belgium, did not seem to be desirable. Instead, Stresemann's idea was more acceptable. More importantly, it would make Britain a dominant factor in European politics by arbitrating between France and Germany.[165]

France was hesitant between the opposition of its eastern allies and its national interests. France wanted to include eastern allies, especially Poland, but it was non-sense in terms of the security of Germany. At the beginning, its stance was that German initiative could be examined only in close accord with its allies. Coupled with British pressure, however, France felt that acceptance would be more profitable for its security. The security pact with Germany would prevent "a German-Russian combination with which France and her eastern allies could not cope without British support."[166] Most of all, France could obtain what it wanted: "from Germany, freely tendered assurances that the Franco-German frontier as well as the demilitarized condition of the Rhineland were inviolate; from Great Britain (as well as Italy), the precious guarantee that had eluded French statesmen ever since the end of the Paris Peace Conference."[167]

The Locarno Pact was signed at Locarno, Switzerland on 1 Dec. 1925.[168] With this Pact, first, the borders between France, Belgium, and Germany were guaranteed against any aggression.[169] Second, the five countries -- France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Belgium

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[165]Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*, p. 327.

[166]Ibid., p. 367.

[167]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 117.

[168]"The Locarno agreements consisted of five related treaties: the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, restricted to western German borders and guaranteed by Britain and Italy; and four arbitration treaties between Germany on the one side, and France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland on the other." See Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925* (Minneapolis: The Lund Press, 1962), p. 361.

[169]The treaty provided for maintenance of the territorial status quo in the west (Art. 1) and for solemn promises by German, France, Belgium not to resort to war against each other, except in case of legitimate defense or in pursuance of Article 15, paragraph 7, or Article 16 of the Covenant

-- agreed with the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland. And, third, Great Britain and Italy guaranteed this agreement, pledging assistance to repel invasions across the frontiers or into the demilitarized Rhineland from any direction. "True to the principle of collective security, the draft presumed neither aggressor nor victim but promised resistance against aggression from whatever quarter in either direction."[170]

Though the Locarno Pact was hailed as a "victory for peace and security," in fact, it was only a tool for pursuing each state's different national goal. For France, it was a tool for gaining the guarantee of Britain's commitment against German's aggression toward her. "Ever since the end of the First World War, France had been insisting that its security demanded a firm alliance with the United States and Great Britain against Germany."[171] Now it could get assurances of aid from Great Britain. For Germany, it was a new tool for the revision of the Versailles Treaty to strengthen her political and military power.[172] Germany could be recognized as an equal of other nations with the acquisition of a permanent seat on the Council. Also, she could escape from the fear of an incipient Franco-English Alliance. For Great Britain, it was a tool for maintaining her political position as a traditional balancer of power. The Locarno Pact gave Great Britain the position of arbiter between France and Germany, as a dominating factor in European politics. As for Italy, she could enjoy her political initiative with Britain. Only Belgium could be considered as a true participant for collective security because she could have nothing from the Pact except her territorial security. Under these differing motivations of participants, the Locarno Pact was not a

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of the League (Art. 2). All disputes were to be submitted to arbitration or conciliation (Art. 3). In case of an alleged violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, the injured party would appeal to the Council of the League and to the remaining signatories of the Treaty who engaged themselves to come promptly to its assistance (Art. 4). The other six articles dealt with procedure in case of a refusal to arbitrate, with the relationship of the Treaty to the Covenant, and other technical matters. See Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*, p. 361-362.

[170]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 274.

[171]Felix Gibert with David Clay Large, *The End of the European Era*, P. 209.

[172]After the Pact, Stresemann argued that Germany was too weak to participate in the sanctions when there was an aggressor, insisting on more military buildup.

purpose, but a tool for their uses: not a means for security, but a tool for other works.

2. Development and Failure of the Locarno Pact

The post-Locarno period was characterized by France's step-by-step decline in her foreign policy, Germany's skillful resurrection, especially in terms of its military, and then German violation of the Pact. The mismanagement of the system was mainly due to the lack of institutional function and, of course the lack of cooperation. Without proper institutions, the Locarno system could not have any function in monitoring and controlling the states' behaviors. Also, the lack of information of others' military levels led them to a miscalculation of power, and thus to no military preparedness for the counter-action against a violation of the Pact.

France was gradually losing her military power by the Locarno Pact itself. Disarmament was a critical issue in this period. Before the Locarno Pact, France could have maintained its military superiority to Germany on the pretext of Germany's then existing military threat. However, the fact that the Locarno Pact pursued conciliation, and that Germany requested the same level of her military as others after its joining the League of Nations, pushed France to disarm respectively. Facing this unstable pressure, Briand suggested to Kellogg, the American Secretary of State, a draft treaty for the purpose of consolidating the relationship between the two countries.[173] But Kellogg expanded the draft treaty to the Pact of Paris in August 1928, which included fifteen countries. Then, contrary to Briand's idea, this pact became a new means of putting pressure on France because "it was widely argued that, with war outlawed, France had an obligation to accelerate its own disarmament."[174] In addition, her attempts at Franco-Italian agreement and the Franco-Soviet negotiation in 1935 came from the same motivation: "the weakening of the French position, a more and more definite threat presented by Hitler's Germany."[175]

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[173]Kellogg did not want the United States to be bound to the European security matters at that time. Actually, the Pact of Paris, which was just a formal announcement without any legal binding force, did nothing for security.

[174]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.281.

[175]J. Nere, *The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945*, p. 155.

For Germany, as Stresemann expected, the Locarno Pact contributed to strengthening German political and military power. The membership in the League of Nations made Germany equal to others, thus providing a basis for a German claim to maintain the disparity of military level with others, especially with France. Also, partially with its inefficiency and partially with the "spirit of the Locarno", the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, which had been created to supervise German disarmament, was abolished in 1927, and its functions were turned over to the League of Nations, which had no means of verifying compliance.[176] Without any interference, it was a matter of time for Germany to propel her rearmament. Being in sympathy with Germany's fulfillment policy, moreover, the United States gave Germany loans, which was efficiently used to both pay reparations and modernize her industry. Needless to say, the loans contributed to accelerating her military buildup.

Before Locarno, while France considered Germany as a potential threat in the near future and so eagerly tried to get a security guarantee from Great Britain, Great Britain thought France was more dangerous than a destroyed Germany and rejected any guarantee, partly for balancing purposes and partly not to be involved in any disastrous war again. After Locarno, while France tried to weaken Germany and maintain military disparity, Great Britain pursued a conciliation policy and pressured France to reduce her military. In fact, Great Britain had no idea of the impact of Germany's fulfillment policy. She simply considered it as a peaceful settlement measure for stability and dealt with Germany's demands for military parity and the revision of the Versailles Treaty based on conciliation, without the assessment of a balance of power. She declared that only disarmament could prevent another war, and, hoping France would conciliate Germany, she relentlessly pressed France to accede to

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[176]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.274. Also, see Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances*, 1926-1936 (New Jersey: Princeton, 1988), p.74. Even though Stresemann got the promise of evacuation from Rhineland instead of the German disarmament in that region, he would not have agreed to permanent inspection. He insisted to Briand and Chamberlain that "It would degrade the work of Locarno, ..., to establish a commission in order to ascertain if one country was going to attack another in spite of having signed the Rhineland Pact." Under the realization that nothing or no power could keep Germany disarmed forever, France and Great Britain agreed to accept Stresemann's proposal in exchange for destroying the fortifications in Konigsberg. See Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy*, P. 94.

German parity in armaments.[177] This conciliatory atmosphere ultimately facilitated Hitler, who came to power in January 1933, to go on to frantic Nazism without any trouble. Even when Hitler decided to leave the Disarmament Conference forever and announced German rearmament in 1934, Great Britain had an illusion that disarmament had become more important than ever and continued her unilateral disarmament in the belief that Germany would have to negotiate disarmament in the end. Thus, the effectiveness of the Locarno Pact as collective security was lost as France and Great Britain differed in their opinions in assessing German military power.

In the end, the Locarno Pact was violated by Germany's reoccupation of Rhineland. On March 7, 1936, Hitler ordered his army into the demilitarized Rhineland. According to the Versailles Treaty, German military forces were barred from the Rhineland and a zone of fifty kilometers to the east of it. The absence of any collective action against the violation meant the failure of the Locarno Pact. France was not able to take action against it by herself, because the overwhelming psychological dependence on Great Britain allowed her no military preparation, even when the French Ambassador in Berlin warned a month earlier that a German move on the Rhineland was imminent.[178] Faced with the pressure for disarmament, France already had committed herself to a defensive strategy. The Maginot Line, which France had constructed at huge cost over a period of ten years, was a sign of her mentality. Great Britain hesitated because of "its desire to avoid at all costs the European war that it believed would inevitably result from a French or Anglo-French advance into Rhineland."[179] Then, the British government did not view the remilitarization of the Rhineland as a "flagrant" violation of the treaty of Locarno in the pretext that it was not accompanied by menacing

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[177]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.285.

[178]Ibid., p.303.

[179]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 153. There was a discussion about the possibility of a joint Anglo-French countermove. But it was meaningless because of British reluctance to discuss detailed plans of operations.

German moves toward the French frontier.[180] Consequently, the response of France and Great Britain was confined to the issuance of stern protests, the sponsorship of a pro forma condemnation of the action by the League of Nations, and meaningless military conversations.

3. Evaluation of the Locarno Pact

The Locarno Pact was a regional collective security system for securing the border line between France and Germany, under the guarantee of three other nations. At the same time, it was a compromise for peace settlement in the western front submitting all disputes to arbitration and conciliation. If managed well, it might have contributed to the improvement of relations among member states and possibly prevented another disastrous war. However, it was too deficient and imperfect to make the arrangement successful for the peace settlement.

a. Cooperation without mutual security gains and positive identity

Even though the Locarno Pact was agreed upon by all participants, it was characterized by the absence of a collective identity and by the lack of mutual security gains among member states. A series of agreements, such as the withdrawal from the Rhineland, the demilitarization of it, the assurance of the Franco-German frontier, and the guarantee of Great Britain for its commitment to any violation, seemed to be a perfect settlement for peace among them. However, those arrangements were only a means to achieve individual states' own national interests, and the participants failed to make their conflictive goals converge to common security interests. Mainly, it was due to the lack of each state's identity as a member of the collective security arrangement. Coupled with the hatred formed during the First World War, each state understood that others' security meant its insecurity. Then, cooperation among states in the Locarno Pact was only a deception wearing "the mask of cooperation."

Most of all, the interests from the Pact among France, Germany, and Great Britain were totally conflictive. First, between France and Germany, their security relations were a zero-sum game. French withdrawal from the Rhineland conflicted with the German disarmament: Germany insisted on the same level of its military maintenance as others,

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[180]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 153.

pressing the disarmament of France.[181] After the long debates over the problem, it was on November 1929 that the French Army of the Rhine eventually evacuated Coblenz -- four years after the Locarno Pact -- which showed the lack of common interests in the Pact. In fact, their main security gain lay outside the Pact: for France, it was a British guarantee; for Germany, it was an opportunity to escape from the restraints of the Versailles Treaty. Then, the nucleus of the Pact, the withdrawal and the disarmament, was contradictory to their interests, and was not be implemented.

The failure of the Thoiry talks between Briand and Stresemann on September 27, 1926 showed that the Locarno Pact was not agreed upon at the national level, but just among the statesmen. In the quaint village of Thoiry, the two men met and agreed to settle the problems including the returning of the Saar to Germany, the withdrawal of French troops from the Rhineland, and Germany's prompt reparation payment to France - a package deal. However, this agreement was criticized by their people in both countries. "German nationalists violently opposed any form of cooperation with Versailles, however advantageous the specific terms, and Briand was accused of throwing away the Rhineland buffer."[182] Then, Briand broke off the talks, and their attempt was failed. Actually, unless trust was based on the Locarno system, it was impossible to share any security interests between the two nations.

Second, while France absolutely required the British guarantee and support in dealing with Germany, the British interests were to give "not too much" to France to maintain the balance of power between France and Germany. In fact, their alliance relations changed into 'checkmate relations' after the First World War: "France, by insisting on weakening Germany by unilateral action and thereby forfeiting British support; Great Britain, by insisting on conciliation without considering its impact on the balance of power, thereby forfeiting French

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[181]"Berlin had consistently objected to the principle of unilateral disarmament on the ground that it left the German people perpetually exposed to invasion from a vindictive France armed to the teeth." Especially after the conclusion of the Locarno Pact, which accompanied the German entry into the League of Nations, German demands for French disarmament became high. See William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 118.

[182]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.278.

security."[183] Contrary to France's intention to maintain military superiority to Germany, she, as an impartial guarantor, forced France into more disarmament after the Locarno Pact. Actually, British interests did not lie on the Locarno Pact itself, rather they were Continental -- balancing France and Germany, separating the Soviet Union from them.

Ultimately, their different interests were based on their negative identity to each other in the collective security system, which originated from the bitter experiences during the First World War. The failure of the Thoiry talks showed this. Even though the two leading statesmen agreed to the package deal, the lack of trust and negative identity between French and German people led the agreement to be broken off. Let's examine their identities more specifically. First of all, French understanding of Germany was as a potential threat even after the Pact. She could not give up the Rhineland because the occupation of it afforded her an essential measure of military security against a German attack. France had made alliances with eastern allies and agreed to conclude the Locarno Pact only after the estimation that the Pact would be more efficient to deter Germany. Faced with the reduction of its army and the pending termination of the occupation, France started to construct the Maginot Line.[184] As long as her identity toward Germany was so negative, France had to be wary of German rearmament and could not share any of her security interests with Germany.

Second, Germany had been full of hatred toward the Allies, especially France, after the Treaty of Versailles. She had to escape the status quo, and for that purpose it tried to achieve dominance over France by the Pact. As a letter of Stresemann to Ambassador von Maltzan showed, German identity toward the Allies was hostile. Stresemann gave the following reasons for making the security offer to France: "it would secure the Rhineland, split the Allies, and open new possibilities in the east"[185] In fact, Germany was interested in fulfilling the Pact only insofar as was necessary for Germany's interest, not all.[186] Third, Great

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[183]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 268.

[184]Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy*, P. 106.

[185]Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*, p. 327.

[186]Ibid., p. 325.

Britain saw an opportunity to return to old diplomacy of the balance of power and wanted to maintain the status quo. Within the Locarno system, France and Germany were neither allies nor enemy, but objectives for balancing. Then, French military had to be reduced while Germany was not to be too weakened.

Consequently, even though the Locarno Pact was aimed at peace in the border area between France and Germany, it could not make a common achievement for regional stability. Each state's negative understanding and expectations of others impeded forming a collective identity within the Pact. Full of hatred and distrust, then, the participants could not share any security interests. Without common security gains and collective identity, cooperation among member states was impossible. The Locarno Pact was not an arrangement for regional stability but a means for each country's own self-interest.

b. Lack of a proper institution

According to institutionalist' view, the Locarno Pact was an imperfect collective security system without a proper institution to provide information and to control states' behavior. Information through the Locarno period was totally unavailable. States' behaviors were not controlled by the Treaty, but driven by their self-interests. Without cooperation, which should have been directed toward common security gains, the Locarno system could not have any institutional capability. The lack of interaction between states' cooperation and benefits from the strengthened institutional capability weakened the system.

The Locarno system did not have any institution that facilitated the flow of information among the member states, most critically about German disarmament. With the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, the only institution for inspecting German disarmament, "the Allies had effectively entrusted to Germany itself the responsibility of self-supervision without requiring even an innocuous verbal commitment to the principle of unilateral disarmament."[187] Therefore, "The clandestine rearmament initiated in the early twenties proceeded thereafter without even the threat of detection by Allied military

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[187]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 118.

observers."[188] Great Britain could not see the opportunity to form extensive Anglo-French military preparation to assist France against unprovoked German aggression, mainly because of the lack of information.[189] Also, facing Hitler's decision to leave the Disarmament Conference in 1934 and German introduction of conscription which meant public rearmament, Great Britain still had an illusion that Germany would have to negotiate disarmament in the end. Thus, the lack of information resulted in weakening the system, leading the member states to miscalculation and misunderstanding of the security environment.

As examined in Chapter II, the efficiency of a collective security system -- in terms of institutional capability -- depends on states' cooperation based on common security gains and identity. Due to the lack of cooperation as well as information, the member states could not count their security on the Locarno system. The case of France showed this. Despite the Franco-German rapprochement through the Locarno Pact, France could not help taking steps to enhance her diplomatic and military position vis-a-vis Germany.[190] In addition to the conclusion of mutual assistance pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia before the Locarno Pact, she made a treaty of friendship with Romania in 1926 and Yugoslavia in 1927. Even though it failed, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was aimed at getting the U.S. commitment to bolster her security. In the League Assembly on September 1929, she issued an appeal for the creation of some kind of supranational confederation linking the sovereign states of Europe, mainly for the purpose of the containment of Germany. She also tried to reinforce her diplomatic and security position with the Stresa Front, the Franco-Italian rapprochement, and the Franco-Soviet Treaty from 1933 to 1935.Needless to say, such bids for her security which were sought outside the system, not within the Locarno Pact, resulted from the inability of

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[188]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 118.

[189]There were other factors for the failure of that military preparation with France. First, in terms of the Locarno Treaty, Great Britain should keep her position as an impartial guarantor: "the British guarantee could be invoked by Germany against France in the event of a future French military operation in the Ruhr Valley." Second, in terms of her national interests, she wanted the military balancing between France and Germany. However, these factors premised the lack of information about the German rearmament.

[190]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 119-121.

the system, and also they resulted in more inefficiency of the system.

The lack of a proper institution made Great Britain an "honest broker" to conciliate states' behaviors, thus taking on the role of an institution in a system. However, the role of Great Britain in the Locarno system had two important shortcomings compared to the function of a normal institution in a collective security system. First, the former had limits in collecting and analyzing information. While an institution can probe and collect any necessary information such as military level or military expenditure "in the name of the institution," a state, even though it is an honest broker, cannot do it because "in the name of the state" means the violation of sovereignty of the objective states. Second, an institution in a system better facilitates the interaction among states to form new identities than when there is no institution. Various levels of institutions from inter-governmental ones to civilian ones enable states to "meet often," and, if not, promote cooperation to be more stable and get it going.[191] When one state conciliates a system, like Great Britain in the Locarno system, it tends to be partial toward its self-interest. Of course those two benign functions of an institution premise the cooperation of the participants. Even if there had been an institution in the Locarno system, without cooperation of states, the system would have failed. Actually, proper institutions are not a necessary condition, but a sufficient condition for the success of collective security.

c. Lack of collective action

The failure of collective action against German remilitarization of the Rhineland seemed to have already been scheduled. Great Britain already concluded a bilateral naval agreement with Germany secretly, which would acknowledge a further violation by Germany of its treaty obligations. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia, which was an apparent violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, detracted the authority of collective action against German violation.[192] Without cooperation among member states as well as

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[191]Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic Books: A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1984), p. 125.

[192]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 149-154.

proper institutions, states became disunited and out of control. The different self-interests between France and Great Britain made their military preparation inefficient. Facing German reoccupation of Rhineland, they could not make a decision to take military sanctions, because of not only the reluctance to commit themselves to the risk of total war, but also the poor military preparation. Coupled with the lack of interaction between the actors and the Locarno system, they could not see the future gain: prevention of greater war. Instead, they just feared the development of collective action into armed conflict and refused to implement their duty to counter German violation of the Pact.

Most of all, while collective security premises the preponderance of power against an aggressor, the Locarno system failed to get its teeth to bite the violator. When France examined the possibility of naval operations, such as seizure of the German island of Heligoland, blockade of a German port, or seizure of German ships, to force Germany to negotiate, the navy hastened to prevent these demonstrations because they were reckless and ineffectual without the support of the British fleet.[193] Ground operation was out of the question too, because "France did not have an expeditionary force available which would be ready at any time to act."[194] For Great Britain, without any urgent self-interest, she had no intention of providing military support against Germany: she already concluded a bilateral naval agreement with Germany, which weakened the punishment power as a guarantor. "Even the advent of British rearmament in the aftermath of the Rhineland crisis gave little comfort to France since it concentrated on upgrading naval and air forces for home and imperial defense instead of on establishing a land army that could be dispatched to the continent."[195] Also, Italy lost her justification for participating in collective sanction against a violator, due to her invasion of Ethiopia. Thus, the lack of capability to take counter-action in the Locarno system could not prevent the advent of German remilitarization of the Rhineland, and it also failed to take military sanction against the violation, thus making future security more

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[193]J. Nere, *The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945*, p. 188.

[194]Ibid., p. 189.

[195]William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, p. 153.

doomed.

In summary, the Locarno Pact did not satisfy the five conditions for collective security. First, the member states could not form mutual security gains. Self-interest in the Rhineland between France and Germany conflicted with each other. Great Britain's interest did not lie on the Pact itself; rather it was her position of balancing the powers. As long as the balance of power was maintained, the German militarization of the Rhineland was not a matter of consequence and she rejected collective action against German violation of the Treaty. Second, historical enmity and hatred among states impeded efforts to form a collective identity. Their negative identities resulted in the difficulty of cooperation and more conflictive security interests among members. Even Franco-British alliance relations changed into checkmate relations by the British balance of power politics. Third, with the lack of proper institutions, information was not available. Even though Great Britain pursued the balancing between France and Germany, her miscalculation of power caused seriously unbalanced power between them. Fourth, without cooperation of its member states, the Locarno system could not have any capability to control states' behaviors. Ultimately, without mutual security gains and collective identity, the system could not have incentives to stimulate states' cooperation. Finally, the absence of interaction between states' cooperation and rewards, that is, actors and system, failed to make the Locarno system stable.

B. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 under the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which permitted members to participate in collective measures of self-defense whenever assistance from the United Nations itself would be inadequate.[196] According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an

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[196]The first member states were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

armed attack occurs, each of them, ..., will assist the Party or Parties so attacked..."[197] In terms of its characteristics, even though there was no mention about an enemy state, NATO was a collective defense system to counter the threat of the Soviet Union: at the same time, however, it was also a collective security system, which could counter any internal enemy there may be.

As a regional collective defense system during the Cold War era countering the threat of the former Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) succeeded in achieving that goal. Even after the disappearance of the threat, it has been maintained with the strong support of its member states seeking a new role fitting in the new world order as a collective security mechanism rather than collective defense. Only with its long age of nearly fifty years, can NATO be considered to have been a successful regional security system in spite of some disputes.

The case of NATO satisfies the five variables for collective security in terms of both the background of its establishment and its development process. Mainly due to the cooperation of member states, which was based on their collective identities and mutual security gains, its well-organized institutions functioned properly. Institutions from the NATO Council to the many subcommittees had information available and had the institutional capability to control the behavior of member states. Reiterated interactions between states' needs for security and their interests from the system have made NATO a more efficient system by strengthening collective identities as time passed.

1. Cooperation Based on Collective Identity and Mutual Interests

The nucleus of NATO's success rests with the cooperation among the member states. First of all, NATO was established by a stronger collective identity than any other security system throughout history. Because of the desperate needs of economic development and the growing threat of communism after the Second World War, the Western European states could be unified and developed into a regional economic and security community within

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[197]North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5. See NATO Information Service, *NATO Basic Documents* (Brussels, 1976).

NATO. As long as those states identified themselves as members of the community and also perceived the other members positively -- that is, not as enemies -- they could expect security interests from the system.

a. Forming collective identity

One of the most distinctive characteristics of NATO was that the member states already succeeded in forming a collective identity, even before the establishment of NATO. In fact, right after the Second World War, Western European states were faced with two problems that would have threatened their survival: economic disruption, and political and military insecurity from the threat of communism. Economic disruption was far more than that of the end of the First World War. With the human destruction of 35 million, or possibly 60 million people, and industrial damage, "The years following the war witnessed no revival or rebirth of spirit but rather a continuing, even deepening, despair over the future of Europe."[198] Even Britain was in a state of crisis in the Winter of 1948: industries could not get fuel, gas and enough electricity, and factories were closed. Before the economy could recover, the hope for economic reconstruction had to be recovered.

On the other hand, in such a desperate economic situation, the Soviet Union was succeeding in reviving the expansionist policy that Russia had pursued on and off for over a century and a half. Unlike Great Britain and Western European countries, "the Soviet Union had the resources to absorb its losses and the dynamic ideology to celebrate its survival as proof of the inevitability of communism."[199] As a suzerain state of communism, she suggested communism as a solution to the failure of democratic capitalism, and stimulated and supported nationalistic movements in Eastern European countries. Huston describes the process of communizing those countries:

> In a series of swift seizures of total authority, the Communists moved to consolidate their control. On 31 May 1947 Communists ousted Premier Ferenc Nagy of Hungary,

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[198]Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States* (New York: Twayne, 1994), p. 3.

[199]Ibid., p. 6. There was no specific evidence that the Soviet Union was a superpower that was equal in any sense to the United States in 1945. "But its sense of direction and its strength relative to the weakness of the rest of Europe made it a formidable competitor to a restored capitalism and certainly to groups seeking a democratic federation."

> whose Smallholders party had won an absolute majority in the election of 1945; .... In October Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, vice premier of Poland and the leader of the Peasant Party, had to flee for his life when the Communists moved in to take complete control. ... In November Ana Pauker became a foreign minister of Romania, and her Communist regime dissolved the National Peasant Party and imprisoned its leader, Iuliu Maniu; ... In Bulgaria, the Agrarian Union Party was broken up and its leader, Nikola Petkov, was hanged. ... in February 1948 this country [Czechoslovakia] too came under full Soviet sway.[200]

Needless to say, these moves of Eastern European states supported by the expansionism of the Soviet Union came closer to the Western European states as the most dangerous threat to their military as well as political stability.

The two urgent tasks that the Western European countries had to solve made them feel the needs of unified Europe more than ever before. European union was required not only to revive their economy. But also, it was required to pool the military strengths of the West like an alliance from the recognition that "there could be no economic recovery without the political confidence that military security could offer."[201] In January 1948, escaping from its traditional sense of separation from the continent, the British proposed a political community in concert with the French, Dutch, Belgians, and Luxemburgers, which eventually would be open to other Europeans in time.[202] It was another "Concert of Europe" in European history, but it was different from the previous concert: while the previous one was based mainly on morality among states, the British proposal was based on converging the national interests of each state -- that is, economic reconstruction and containment of communism.

The Brussels Pact, or Western Union (WU), was an outcome of the necessity of economic and political unity in Europe. Just before the Berlin Blockade by the Soviet Union,

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[200]James A. Huston, *One for All* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984), p. 19.

[201]Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 18.

[202]Ibid., p. 17. Unlike its traditional reluctance before the Second World War, Great Britain was quite active in forming a political, economic, and military union among the European nations. Winston Churchill suggested establishing an international armed forces under the United Nations in the Fulton speech on March 1946, and the recreation of European family through political and economic union in Zurich speech On September 1946. See Hans Morgenthau, Principles and Problems of International Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 408-421.

the pact was developed under "the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense," and was signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.[203] The pact declared that "in the event of an armed attack in Europe against one party, all the others would give all military and other assistance in their power in accordance with the provisions for collective self-defense of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."[204] Coupled with the Soviet's blockade of West Berlin, more close military cooperation among members was required. Recognizing the necessity for U.S. support, the Western European states welcomed the participation of the United States (the only strong power that could counter the threat of the Soviet Union), as well as Canada, as observers to the conferences of the Permanent Military Committee in London in July 1948. As a result, the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO) was created as a military body under the Brussels Pact in September 1948.

Table 1. European Views on the Necessity of NATO, 1987[205] (unit: %)

State	Denmark	Norway	France	F.R.G.	G. Britain	Italy
Still necessary	61	71	49	70	72	65
Not necessary	22	14	19	15	16	23
Don't know	16	15	32	15	12	12

Thus, even before the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty, Western European countries formed a collective identity. When France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Italy agreed on the establishment of Western Union, it was the threat of communism that made them so unified. Economic urgency, which required political stability, also increased their need for more unity. In fact, unity was necessary not only for economic development, but

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[203]James A. Huston, *One for All*, p. 23.

[204]Ibid., p. 23.

[205]See Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO in the 1990s* (Great Britain: The North Atlantic Assembly, 1989), p.155.

also to deter the expansionism of the Soviet Union. The collective identity among NATO member states can be illustrated by the public opinion about the necessity of the system as Table 1 shows. After nearly forty years after the birth of NATO, an absolute majority of people in each country, even in France, still felt the need for NATO.

Most of all, NATO has developed and strengthened the collective identities among member states. The Franco-German identities, one of the most difficult relationships to be improved in NATO, is one case. Similar to the situation after the First World War, their relationship after the Second World War started with the French concerns about the possibility of German rearmament, especially when the United States hoped for German membership in NATO. Truly, Germany's joining NATO was one problem that members had to solve by any possible means. Faced with the Korean War in 1950, the United States felt the need for German rearmament to prepare for a possible attack by East Germany, and it supported the creation of an integrated European army under a centralized command with West Germany, under the condition that it did not entail the creation of an independent German army. However, the French soon became reluctant to countenance any form of German rearmament and the French National Assembly rejected the European Defense Community (EDU) Treaty in August 1954.[206] The demise of the EDC strengthened the conviction of the U.S. and the British Governments that West Germany should join NATO to strengthen their military power as well as to protect West Germany from the threat of the Soviet Union and East Germany. If there was an attack from the east, Germany would be the front line. Then, there was a compromise: instead of the U.S. guarantee to station and commit its troops permanently to the defense of Europe, France conceded on German rearmament and NATO membership under the condition of a prohibition on West German production of

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[206]The Treaty was signed in Paris on 27 May 1952 by France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations to construct NATO ground forces. It was outlined by Rene Pleven, Prime Minister of France, for the creation of a unified European army, including German contingents, to be established within the framework of NATO in 1950. The U.S. strongly backed the EDC Treaty but French support soon wavered due to apprehension concerning German rearmament. See NATO Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Brussels: NATO, 1989), p. 16.

nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of certain equipment restrictions.[207]

Thereafter, despite those incipient problems of distrust of Germany by France, the growing political, economic and military rapprochement in Franco-German relations made by the interrelations between them in the system has been one of the major successes of NATO.[208] Also, the widespread support for a reunified Germany's right to NATO membership demonstrated the remarkable progress that Europe had made in overcoming the divisions and suspicions engendered by the Second World War.[209] The formation and reinforcement of a collective identity in NATO contrasts with the background of the Locarno Pact whose members' identities were full of hatred and enmity. Even though France, Germany, and Great Britain were the member states of the Locarno system and NATO, their identities in NATO were quite different. In the former case, they considered each other a potential threat to be contained and balanced for their security; in NATO, they considered the others allies that were absolutely needed for their security. The different perception of others in NATO compared to the Locarno system thereby also produced quite different expectations of their interests, as will be examined in the next subsubsection.

b. Mutual security gains

Member states' interests within NATO were converging to a single goal: European security. As the case of the Western Union showed, European states realized that it was impossible to counter the Soviet Union individually. When they decided to organize the Western Union, they were already sharing the common security goal with each other. Even Great Britain, a traditional off-shore balancer, casted off her isolationism from the continent and led the European states to the Western Union and the North Atlantic Treaty. Unlike before the Second World War, Great Britain could not expect her security interests to be served by the traditional balancing role. Coupled with the changes in her identity to

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[207]Mark Stenhouse, "Historical Overview; NATO's Evolving Role From Cold War to the New Security Environment," ed. Bruce George, *Jane's NATO Handbook* (Virginia: Alexandria, 1991), p. 3.

[208]Ibid., p. 3.

[209]Ibid., p. 3.

others,[210] Great Britain sought her security interests from the participation in NATO, not from a politically dominant position like in the case of the Locarno system. For France, it was apparent that at least she did not intend to use NATO as a tool for securing a guarantee of involvement by Great Britain and the United States in European security. Because the participation of Great Britain and the United States in NATO was not "reluctant" but "voluntary", which resulted from changes in their identities, NATO was not a tool for them, but a shared arena for their security interests. For the United States, also a traditional isolator from the continent, the security of Europe was related to her own national interests of the protection of democracy and free trade. In fact, it was not surprising that she gave military aid to the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO) and NATO, in addition to economic assistance.

Actually, the involvement of the United States in European security matters resulted mainly from her national interests rather than collective identity. To contain the Soviet Union, her main interest, there were two measures: economically, the Marshall Plan; and militarily, alliance with Western European states. The Marshall Plan was formed to alleviate immediate economic distress throughout the world after the two Great Wars. Of course, economic stability in Europe had important implications for the long-term economic well-being of the United States. However, strategically, the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to deter communism which tended to penetrate into economic weakness and instability.[211] Alliance with Western Europe was initiated by joining the WU and developed into NATO after the Vandenberg resolution.[212]

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[210]Traditionally, Great Britain's identity to the Continent had been a balancer between the two "doubtful" powers, France and Germany. Even in the Locarno system, she wanted to be a balancer. However, as the threat of the Soviet Union increased up to the level that she could not control, Great Britain defined herself no more off-shore balancer, but a participant as a frend of the Continent and the United States.

[211]James A. Huston, *One for All*, p. 20.

[212]The critical weakness of WUDO, however, was that its military was too weak to counter the Soviet threat: all available ground forces were only ten divisions and thirteen brigades; much of the Second World War equipment was not serviceable, and it could not be rehabilitated soon because

France's withdrawal of her military from NATO in 1966 showed the importance of shared interests as a factor to maintain a system. France was discontent with two facts from her participation in NATO: "the apparent replacement of France with Anglo-Saxon superiority"[213] in the continent and the question of liability of the U.S. nuclear protection after the Soviet development of *Sputnik*. To overcome those discontents, in September 1958, de Gaulle proposed that the United States establish within NATO "a triumvirate of Britain, France, and the United States to consult on the use of the American nuclear deterrent during war in western Europe."[214] As the proposal was turned down, France accelerated its own way "to assert its independence from America and a base from which to claim leadership of the Continent."[215] She already initiated the *force de frappe*, an independent nuclear deterrent, under Guy Mollet. When the Kennedy Administration weakened a joint NATO nuclear force,[216] and when Kennedy and Macmillan made a decision on Skybolt,[217] France felt nuclear vulnerability as well as Anglo-Saxon dominance. Then, when Brezhnev showed, at least in

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of shortage of parts and technicians. This problem among Western European states and the United States resulted in "the idea of a single mutual defense system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty." Among debates over the involvement of the U.S. military into European matters, the idea was rearranged and specified by Vandenberg resolution, which became the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic area.

[213]Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 85.

[214]Morton A. Kaplan, *The Rationale for NATO* (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), p. 24.

[215]Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 85.

[216]The Kennedy Administration changed: the nuclear force based on Polaris submarines into the one based on surface ships, easily vulnerable to Soviet attack; the American veto into six allied nations' vetoes.

[217]Skybolt is a long-range American air-launched cruise missile then in the process of being developed. "To extend the life of its aging bomber fleet, Great Britain had decided to buy it. But the Kennedy Administration canceled Skybolt without advance warning in the fall of 1962. This confirmed the French warning against nuclear dependence on the US, and was protested by Great Britain. In the meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan in Nassau, they agreed to modernize the Anglo-American nuclear partnership. Instead of Skybolt, the United States decided to sell five Polaris submarines and associated missiles. See Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 601.

the eyes of France, no aggressive designs against Western Europe,[218] France got a chance to go its own path.

When her interests were confronted within the system in terms of its national pride and the reliability of NATO, France gave up her membership. When a state feels that other interests have priority over its security interests in a system, it cannot cooperate with the system any more. In fact, as the security environment became favorable after the Soviet's policy of "peaceful coexistance," France considered her national pride to be more important than security interests derived from participation in NATO.

On the other hand, it was other members' shared interests within NATO that allowed the system to continue to work. France's decision for military withdrawal from NATO was critical because it could have increased not only the credibility of nuclear deterrence, but also the distrust of states toward the NATO system. The demise of NATO also could have influenced Germany's individual military rearmament reviving her nationalism.[219] Moreover, French territory was an alliance heartland, available for the unloading and deploying of reinforcements or for a logistical rear base.[220] Other member states, however, reaffirmed the effectiveness of NATO as an instrument of defense and deterrence, and declared that no system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute for it. Even though the action of France considerably deranged the working and operations of NATO, the 14 full members showed a firm determination to carry on and a readiness to adapt to changed situations and

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[218]Due to excessive military expenditure, the Soviet economy depressed in the 1960s: the growth rate of national income reduced 10.2% in 1950s to 5% in 1960s; the growth rate of industrial production reduced 12.5% to 4.8% respectively. Brezhnev wanted the introduction of foreign capital through appeasement policy. See Baek Gyung-Nam, *Kugjewankyesa* (Seoul: Bubjisa, 1990), p. 280.

[219]The revival of German armed forces had been carried out entirely within the framework of NATO. If the French withdrawal caused the end of NATO, and the NATO military staffs were to be dissolved, the Germans might be driven to reorganize a national general staff. See James A. Huston, *One for All*, p. 148.

[220]Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," ed. Jeffrey Simon, *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization* (Washington: National Defense University, 1988), p. 269. For the reason for the French military withdrawal, see James A. Huston, *One for All* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984), p. 143-145.

conditions. In addition, faced with the dilemma of assured nuclear protection, the Defense Planning Committee established the Nuclear Planning Group and the Nuclear Defense Affairs in March 1966 as a means for an effective political executive authority and fuller participation of the Allies in nuclear planning.

For France, despite the assumption of an autonomous defense posture within the Alliance, her military withdrawal from NATO was only partial because she remained a signatory member of the Alliance and has her own ambassador on the North Atlantic Council.[221] Also, though her involvement in multilateral training activities with the Allies has been deliberately low profile since France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure, the frequency and scope of French participation has gradually expanded over the years with the easing of French domestic political opposition to greater military cooperation with NATO forces.[222]

In summary, the member states' interests converged to one common goal of security of the North Atlantic area. The threat of the Soviet Union was a decisive factor for setting up their collective identities as well as unifying their main interests into a single goal. With the identities and for their interests, states could have cooperated with each other within the system as long as they expected mutual security gains. As in the case of the French military withdrawal, however, when a member could not expect any gains or feel any necessity of the system for its interests, the member state would reject its cooperation with the system.

2. Institutional Capability and Information

Another important factor for the success of NATO rests with its properly functioning institutions. Even though NATO could not be an authority to govern its members states, institutions within NATO have had institutional capability to control and adjust states' behaviors and to facilitate information to make each state's policy transparent. First of all, institutions in NATO have been conspicuous in view of the fact that they have adapted NATO to the changing security environment since 1949. Unlike a simple alliance between states, it

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[221]Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," p. 279.

[222]Ibid., p. 281.

was those institutions that helped NATO to continue overcoming conflicts over changing national interests among members. Also, unlike a traditional alliance, the NATO members have activated research and discussions about security policy options and their roles for regional stability. Due to restriction on the volume of this thesis, this subsection will focus on NATO's general structure, some of the most representative functions of its institutions, and the role of information.

Institutions of NATO consist of the three main bodies of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Under the main bodies, there are 28 principal subcommittees including the political committee, economic committee, defense review committee, and the like. The NAC, established as a supreme political decision-making body of NATO by Article 9 of the Treaty, meets at Ministerial level twice each year, or sometimes more frequently, when each nation is represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs.[223] The DPC meets at the level of Defense Ministers at least twice a year, and deals with most defense matters and subjects related to collective defense planning.[224] The NPG is the principal forum for consultation on all matters relating to the role of nuclear forces in NATO's security and defense policies.[225] The NAC and DPC, as NATO's highest political structures, provide a unique forum for confidential, constant and timely intergovernmental consultation, and have been called a "standing committee of governments, or a diplomatic workshop."[226] The institutions have the authority and powers of decision-making at each level, which is possible because of its members' cooperation.

Above all, NATO's institutional capability was the result of sincere endeavors by its member states to strengthen the institutional functions. The establishment of the "Committee

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[223]Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," p. 41-42.

[224]NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels, 1995), p. 96. All member states except France participate.

[225]Ibid., p. 96. All member states except France participate.

[226]Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," p. 42.

of Three on Non-Military Co-operation" and the Harmel Report are examples. Firstly, "In 1956 a 'Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation' was established to study the ways in which NATO could improve methods of more effective collaboration on policy formulation."[227] The Committee suggested the future direction of NATO to counter the increasing Soviet challenge from Europe to the entire world in the Report of the "Three Wise Men." The Report stated that: "member governments were to inform the North Atlantic Council of any development significantly affecting the Alliance in order that effective political consultation could be held on the action to be taken; each Spring the Foreign Ministers were to make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance, based on a review prepared by the Secretary General; disputes among members not capable of direct settlement as called for in Article 1 of the Treaty should be submitted to good offices procedures within NATO and the Secretary General was empowered, with the consent of the parties to initiate procedures to settle such disputes."[228] Most conspicuously, the Report of the Committee of Three accentuated the necessity of close contact and cooperation among member states within NATO, and strengthened the function of the North Atlantic Council. As a result of the Report, in the ministerial meeting in 1957 in Bonn, NATO's defense policy was discussed and there was acceptance of a general disarmament agreement. The latter was approved by a considerable majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations, but the USSR announced it would boycott.

Secondly, the Harmel Report in 1967 was another endeavor to accentuate the functions of the institutions within NATO. The relaxation of tension in Europe after the Soviet doctrine of "peaceful coexistence," which has changed the nature of the confrontation between East and West,[229] allowed the Council to adopt the Harmel Report, which examined

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[227]Mark Stenhouse, "Historical Overview," p. 5.

[228]NATO Information Service, *NATO Facts and Figures*, p. 38.

[229]Ibid., p. 402. "Peaceful co-existence" came from the meeting of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow in 1961, which ended with the publication of a voluminous document from which it was clear that Mr. Khrushchev's view on peaceful co-existence had finally been approved unanimously by the delegates.

the future tasks of the Alliance. In this report, Harmel suggested the Allies maintain as necessary a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces for creating stability, security and confidence, and at the same time to promote an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. Also, he urged the study of disarmament and practical armaments control measures. In fact, the adoption of "Ostpolitik" by the Federal Republic of Germany was an outcome of the Harmel Report. Through a series of negotiations and treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and, later, Czechoslovakia, "Ostpolitik" contributed to relaxation of tensions between East and West. In 1973, there were talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Vienna. In 1975, the Helsinki Final Agreement was a kind of "declaration of coexistence on the part of East and West, a mutual recognition of the lines of demarcation settled at Yalta."[230]

On the other hand, NATO's "dual track" policy and, at the same time, negotiations for arms control showed its adaptability to the changing security environment. When "detente" faded since the mid-1970s by a series of events -- that is, the East's unwillingness to honor its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act; Soviet activities in southern Africa and the Horn; an accelerated build-up and deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles; Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; and the imposition of martial law in Poland -- NATO adopted a "dual track" policy as Harmel doctrine suggested deterrence and dialogue at the same time. "The first track was a call for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve a balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces at the lowest possible level. The second track -- in the absence of such an agreement -- was the decision to modernize NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces by deploying ground-launched Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe."[231] Then, coupled with the INF Treaty of December 1987 and its subsequent ratification, "the United States and its partners in the Alliance succeeded in achieving the first arms control agreement to remove globally an entire category

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[230]Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 109.

[231]NATO Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, p. 33.

of nuclear weapons."[232] Needless to say, NATO's policy contributed to confidence building between East and West.

As one of the most distinctive functions, NATO has made information available to its member states and the people of each state. There were two functional dimensions of information within NATO: to facilitate the procedure of political cooperation and to inform the public. First, information through the institutions of NATO was quite effective and critical for their procedure of political cooperation. After the resolution was approved in April 1954, which urged member countries to submit to the Council all political information likely to be of interest to other members, there were actual outcomes. Under the authority of the Council, there were discussions and negotiations about the German problem, the Paris and London agreements, and the preparatory work for the Geneva Summit Conference. Coupled with the establishment of the Committee on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, the Council made it the duty of its members to inform the Council of any development significantly affecting the system not as a formality, but as a preliminary to effective political consultation.[233] With the information that members provided, NATO has facilitated the process of political consultations and decision-making.

As a second dimension, NATO has made its information available to the public. The Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, which meets with representatives of Cooperation Partners annually to discuss the implementation of information activities, was an outcome of the Committee of Three described as follows (Chapter V, 81);

> The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.[234]

Based on the principle of democracy, it was an unprecedented institutional function to make

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[232]NATO Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, p. 34.

[233]Ibid., p. 185.

[234]"Report of the Committee of Three," Chapter V. See NATO Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, p. 397.

information available to the public compared to the secret diplomacy before the Second World War. Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991,[235] the Office of Information and Press has worked with each country to disseminate information on national defense and security policy, thus making each state's objectives and policy more transparent. Actually, NATO recognized the importance of public recognition of the achievements of the alliance and of its continuing role in maintaining the ability of the alliance to carry out its basic tasks, and, currently, to expand and deepen its relations with former adversaries for a new partnership based on cooperation and common security interests.[236]

In summary, NATO's institutional capability resulted from its member states' endeavors to seek new roles and policy of NATO to meet a new security environment. Research and political consultations were activated and produced the most constructive options for them. Benefits that NATO enabled were apparent, from the stability of Western European security to the easing of tensions between East and West. Even though NATO could not have the authority to enforce its member states as much as the institutionalists asserted, it succeeded in facilitating political consultations and cooperation among the members, and unifying their behaviors within the resolutions that were agreed to through the consultations and negotiations.

3. Reiteration of Interaction between Actors and System

As reviewed in the previous subsections, the positive identities and shared security interests among NATO members have enabled their cooperation with the system, reinforcing institutional capability. Also, the system has endowed security benefits to its member states, thus strengthening their cooperation. Reiteration of that interaction between the member states and NATO, then, has made the system more stable.

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[235]Facing the fundamental changes which were taking place in Central and Eastern European countries, in December 1991 the NACC was established to develop a new partnership with them based on constructive dialogue and cooperation. For more information, see NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, p. 43-50.

[236]NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, p. 117.

The reiteration can be examined by the four development phases of NATO. The first phase, from 1949 to 1956, is characterized by the expansion of NATO. In 1952 the twelve original signatories were joined by Greece and Turkey and in 1955 by the Federal Republic of Germany. In this phase, the interaction between actors and system strengthened NATO militarily, thus providing more stability to them. In addition to Greece and Turkey joining, German membership in NATO resulted from the cooperation among other members through the guarantee of the United States and Great Britain. Due to the impact of the Korean War, on the other hand, NATO military power was expanded: military organization in the WEU, the Brussels Treaty Organization, and its principal responsibilities in the defense field were transferred to NATO in 1951; the United States militarized NATO with more troops and equipment, especially since the breakout of the Korean War.[237] As a result, NATO was more reinforced militarily and became more stabilized.

The second phase was the period from 1956 to 1967, which was characterized by the adoption of the Report of the Committee of Three. During this period, by overcoming the doubts and conflicts over the relevance of NATO related to the Soviet nuclear capability and Sputnik, and her deceptive peaceful co-existence, NATO members could make their alliance more unified again. When the Soviet Union launched the first space satellite, *Sputnik*, in October 1957, NATO members questioned the U.S. technological capability which had been assumed to be superior to the former. *Sputnik* not only implied the Soviets' superiority in the area of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but it also raised doubts about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear protection, especially after a Soviet direct nuclear strike at the heart of America. Coupled with the higher growth rate of the Soviets' gross national product and Khrushchev's offer of "peaceful coexistence"in the late 1950s, it made the alliance shaky rather than hardened. "The allies wondered about the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella and

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[237]Jervis considers the Korean War as a watershed of the Cold War, influencing the U.S. high defense budgets, the globalization of American commitments, and the militarization of NATO. See Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 24, December 1980, p. 563. 579-580.

about NATO's usefulness in assuring them security." [238] This circumstance might have led the allies to the end of NATO, which was an aim that the Soviets had intended.

However, member states were unified again by solving the conflicts by consultation and cooperation, as the Committee of the Three suggested. It was the Soviets' harshness toward disarmament and the Berlin question that made the allies unified again. Their refusal to accept a thorough disarmament inspection was contradictory to their "peaceful coexistance." Also, the Soviet's intention to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany would unilaterally have nullified the Yalta agreements. It would jeopardize the right of the three Western powers to remain there; it would not assure freedom of access and communication between Berlin and the free world.[239] Then, there was a Ministerial Meeting in Paris in December 1958, and in the same month, the allies rejected the Soviet plan for Berlin with some resolutions such as continuous installation of intermediate range ballistic missiles and the approval of the use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression. Consequently, states' cooperation in the system enabled them to solve the doubts and conflicts over the relevance of NATO, thus increasing trust in the system. As a result of this confidence in the system, faced with the French military withdrawal from NATO, other members could commit themselves to NATO continuously.

In the third phase, from the adoption of the Harmel Report in 1967 to the end of the Cold War, there were tangible benefits from the interactions between actors and system. By accepting the Harmel Report, as mentioned earlier, the German *Ostpolitik* was conducive to the relaxation of tensions between East and West. Also, partly starting from the second phase, disarmament talks became more active and productive in this phase. As Table 2 shows, even though main arms control treaties and agreements were achieved by the two superpowers,

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[238]Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 74.

[239]See NATO Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, p. 54. On November 1958, the Soviet Government confirmed this intention that "it proposed to transfer to the East German authorities, within six months, all the powers it exercised in East Berlin by virtue of the 1945 agreements, as well as the control of communications between the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin."

it was NATO that provided the background and support for those agreements. Even though there were some tensions which had resulted from the Soviet's hostile actions toward Czechoslovakia, the disarmament issue, and the force reduction issue, NATO continued to explore the possibility of such issues through Ministerial meetings, Defense Planning Committee meetings, and the Rome Declaration. "In view of the new developments in East-West relations, it was obvious that efforts to reduce the level of armed confrontation in Europe must be given priority."[240] As a result, arms control treaties and agreements were achieved. Of course, these contributions to easing of tensions in Europe were another outcome of the interaction between the member states and NATO.

Table 2. Key Arms Control Treaties and Agreements[241]

Treaty	Key Contents
Non-Proliferation Treaty	Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons (1968)
Biological Weapons Convention	Not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire those kinds of weapons (1972)
SALT I Interim Agreement	Limitation of strategic offensive arms (1972)
ABM Treaty	Limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (1972)
PNET	Limits any individual nuclear explosion carried out by the parties outside U.S. and Soviet weapon test sites (1976)
SALT II Treaty	Replaces the SALT I (1979)
Inhumane Weapons Convention	Prohibition or restriction on the use of certain weapons (1981)
Stockholm Document	Security-building measures and disarmament (1986)
START I, II	Reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms between U.S. and USSR (1991, 1993)

The fourth phase of NATO is associated with the demise of the former Soviet Union,

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[240]NATO Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, p. 79.

[241]NATO Information Service, *NATO Facts and Figures* (1989), p. 277-281.

which fundamentally changed the security perceptions of the members of the Alliance. Contrary to many predictions of the demolishment of NATO without the threat, NATO can still exist as a main security mechanism in Europe. It has been possible mainly because of the cumulated interactions between the members and NATO, and subsequently because of their trust in the system. Different from an alliance system in a balance of power structure, which would be weakened or would end if the common threat disappears, NATO is characterized by its durability even after the disappearance of the threat. In fact, as long as they have a positive identity with each other, and as long as they can see their interests from their participation in the system, NATO will continue as a collective security mechanism in Europe despite the disappearance of the threat.

In the post-Cold War era, the member states have tried to improve security relations with former adversaries within the structure of NATO, by allowing them to join. Also, even though size and preparedness of the NATO military were reduced, the member states reaffirmed the continuity of NATO and its adherence to its fundamental tasks with their cooperation, through the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Rome Declaration, and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PFP). In particular, the Strategic Concept adopted by Heads of State and Government in Rome in 1991 was based on dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defense capability, reduced dependence on nuclear weapons, and improvement of military forces in terms of mobility and flexibility.[242] Also, PFP was to "expand and intensify political and military cooperation through Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships."[243] For a new role of NATO and for a contribution to world peace, attention was directed increasingly toward NATO's potential role in the field of crisis management and peacekeeping activities. From July 1992, NATO started to participate in the UN peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia by monitoring operations in the Adriatic.

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[242]NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, p. 24.

[243]Ibid., p. 51.

Thus, the interactions between the NATO members and the system have been reiterated and strengthened the bonds between the members and the system throughout history. This has also influenced the development of a collective identity and reinforced the institutional capability of NATO to control the members' behavior. Some of the conflicts or tensions even among member states were inevitable. By overcoming them, however, and by facilitating their security interests through the system, they have developed NATO beyond the level of a collective security system. It would not be wrong to say that the establishment of the European Community in 1992 and economic integration was partly the result of the stability and unity that NATO has provided.

In summary, during the nearly fifty years of NATO's presence, nobody can deny its role in maintaining peace in Europe, summarized by these three major achievements: the prevention of war, arms control, and peacekeeping operations. Even though there have been some disputes over minor problems, such as the U.S. monopolistic role or the failure to prevent the Bosnia Civil War, the most superb achievement has been the prevention of war in this region. It has been possible because of the proper structure that has enabled the goals of the Alliance to be implemented, and because of the member states' common commitment and mutual cooperation centered on that structure.

As a successful case of the collective security mechanism, NATO satisfies the five variables. First, the member states have formed a collective identity and share common security interests within the system. The changed attitudes of the two traditional isolators, Great Britain and the United States, show their changed identities as well as shared security interests in NATO. Further, the system enabled the member states to strengthen the collective identities such as the case of Franco-German relations. Most of all, these collective identities and the shared security interests were important because they facilitated cooperation among states. Second, NATO had proper institutions which have controlled its member states. Also, the institutions have provided the states the opportunities to conciliate and consult over the policies and strategy of NATO. Faced with a new security environment, NATO has adjusted itself to it with the agreement of the member states. In fact, as long as states cooperate, the system has its capability to control them. By providing information on the policy of each state

to the public, NATO has also had the support of the people in the member countries. Finally, the interactions between the member states' cooperation and the benefits from the system have been reiterated. They have strengthened the collective identities and cooperation in NATO, and therefore the institutions have had more capability based on the states' cooperation.

C. SUMMARY

1. Nature of Collective Security

Collective security necessarily requires cooperation among states. In the Locarno case, realists were right in that states cooperated with each other transiently only for their own self-interests. Also, in the case of NATO, the basic motivation of NATO was the member states' own self-interests for security, not any benevolence for others. As institutionalists insisted, however, cooperation, beyond the transient type, was possible if there were mutual gains like in the case of NATO. Attention should be paid to the fact that even though both the Locarno Pact and NATO cases were based on the self-interest of each state, there was a basic distinction between the presence or absence of shared interests. Even though the Locarno Pact was welcomed as a solution for "peace settlement" among peoples, they could not cooperate with each other because of their conflictive national interests. When we consider the fact that a state's behavior is dependent on its self-interest, the more shared interests there are, the more cooperation there will be, therefore, there will be a greater possibility for a collective security system to be successful.

The shared self-interests among states are influenced by the identity that each state builds in a system. As far as security matters are concerned, the definition of others as a friend or enemy, or as "positive" or "negative," is important for sharing their security interests. Even though security interests are shared in a system, if a state distrusts others or it defines others as enemies, its self-interest can no longer be shared. Compared to NATO, the Locarno system failed to recover from the distrust of others and to form a positive identity among states. In fact, mainly due to the faults of the Versailles Treaty and the bitter memories of German aggression during the First World War, it was impossible for France and Germany to form

such identities up to the level required for collective security.

Collective security requires proper institutions to control states' behavior, adjust their self-interests, and facilitate their cooperation. As realists assert, an institution cannot be an authority to govern its member states. Even in the case of NATO, institutions cannot be an international government standing beyond the sovereignties of the member states. Rather, institutions can provide the opportunities for states to adjust and conciliate with each other's different interests, policies, and strategies. Therefore, institutional capability depends on its incentives to attract states' cooperation. As Kenneth Oye asserts about the asset of an institution that "conventions provide rules of thumb that can diminish transaction and information costs,"[244] NATO has had effective incentives to the member states by providing them the opportunity to consult about common security policy, thus reducing their transaction and information costs. Also, the institutions within NATO have shown their capabilities by facilitating contacts and conciliation among states, and by readjusting NATO's new strategy to the changing international security environment. As long as the system was beneficial, it was not surprising that the members followed the resolutions and agreements that were concluded by the Council and subcommittees. Actually, institutional capability is possible when member states cooperate to achieve their shared self-interests. If the Locarno system had had such proper institutions, of course with the members' willingness to cooperate, it might have been a more productive security mechanism than it was.

As one of the most important functions, institutions should have information to provide transparency to the public. Information in this case does not mean top secrets in a state, but the policy and strategy that each state pursues. By the dissemination of information, NATO not only could get much stronger public support, but also made the policy of each state more transparent than in the Locarno system. Needless to say, this strengthened trust in the system among the states. In the Locarno system, the lack of information about the level of German rearmament and of French disarmament led France and Great Britain to the

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[244]Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," p. 20.

miscalculation of military power, resulting in distrust of each other.

Collective security requires the reiteration of interaction between actors and the system. As the purpose of the system for each state is self-interest in terms of security, a collective security system should reward its members with less transaction costs, security stability and, if possible, economic benefits. The more gains that the system provides, the more cooperation the member states will commit. Such interactions between the cooperation of actors and benefits from the system will make the collective security system more stable as they are reiterated.

2. Consideration of Another Variable: An Existing External Threat

In addition to those five variables, an existing external threat might have been another factor that influenced the outcome of the two cases of collective security. The fact that the collective identity and shared mutual security interests in NATO was due to the existing apparent enemy raises the question: without an external threat, could the member states form a collective identity or share any common security interest within NATO? This question also raises another question: can collective security and collective defense share the same characteristics? That is, collective defense can succeed because there is an existing threat, but collective security cannot because there is no threat. Actually, it was the threat of the Soviet Union that made the NATO members so unified, and without the threat they could not have formed such a level of collective identity, nor shared the common security interests.

However, the presence or absence of the external threat cannot be a necessary condition for the formation of collective identity. That is, even though the external threat can facilitate the formation of a positive identity for collective security, it is not the only factor for the formation of a positive identity. Like the Concert of Europe or the Organization of African Unity, even without any existing external threat, a positive identity can be formed by other factors such as the abhorrence of war or pan-nationalism. Then, the threat of any external threat would be a sufficient condition for the formation of a positive identity and shared interests for collective security. Therefore, collective security and collective defense can share the same characteristics for the success of those systems. This also justifies the case study of NATO in this chapter. Consequently, what should be focused on for the condition

of collective security is ultimately cooperation based on identity and shared interests, not on the existence of external threat.

IV. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA

This chapter reviews the security policies[245] of the United States and the Northeast Asian states, and assesses the prospects for the future regional security environment based on the premise that the remnants of the Cold War will end by the demolishment of North Korea and the advent of Korean reunification. Then, this chapter will suggest the necessity of a new security system in Northeast Asia. It will provide a basis to estimate in Chapter V the applicability of a collective security system to this region after Korean reunification.

Korean reunification, in any form, will considerably reduce the military influence of the United States in this region. As a result, there may be two factors that would make the security environment instable: Japan's expanding security role and rising Chinese neo-nationalism. Japan's military buildup, seemingly having already started, may be a natural action not only to fill the power vacuum, but also to balance with China as a sovereign state. At the same time, however, the lack of trust among regional states has also increased security concerns about the recurrence of Japan's militarism. Also, Chinese nationalism, which works toward recovering its national status as a "great nation" in history, has been rising. When China feels the inferiority of its nation to other powers including Japan, its neo-nationalism will strengthen the "anti-hegemonism" and claim its national status as a regional dominant power with a hard-line policy. Thus, without the U.S. role as a balancer of power, the future

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[245]The concepts of national security policy have been used too variously to define specifically. Freedman defines the term security as "the extent of a state's confidence in its capacity to withstand another's power."According to Wolfers, "security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such value will be attacked." Also, Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock define it as a nation's capability to protect internal values from outer threats. However, even though there are some differences of viewpoints to a degree, most views tend to converge to "a sovereign state's behaviors and capabilities to prevent and minimize any internal, external threat and aggression, using all kinds of political, economic, social and military measures." Then, the definition of national security policy in this paper will be a state's policy to pursue its behaviors and capabilities for that purpose. This is differentiated from the definition of defense policy in that the latter focuses mainly on political and military measures. In this paper, the terms such as 'security policy,' 'foreign policy,' 'economic policy' will be considered types of security policy. See Lawrence Freedman, "The Concept of Security," ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics* (1992), p. 731-732. Also, see Baek, Jong-Chun, *National Defense Affairs* (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1985), p. 6-7.

security environment in Northeast Asia will be instable because of rivalry between Japan and China.

This chapter argues three main points. First, the Northeast Asian states have had negative identities and conflictive security interests with each other throughout modern history. Even though the Northeast Asian states shared the same culture in pre-modern history, which originated from ancient China, they had to confront each other in their struggles for hegemony, survival, and sovereignty in the process of modernization and development. From the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War, Japan's invasion of Korea and China left the unforgettable bitterness of past history to the victim countries. During the Cold War era, and even today, there has been an invisible war between the democratic side and the communist side around the Korean peninsula. Despite the increasing economic relations among the Northeast Asian states, the incompatible ideological confrontation and the unpleasant historical background has still caused their security policies to be conflictive.

Second, the current regional balance of power system will not fit in with the future security environment as the U.S. security role in this region would be reduced. While the security environment in this region has been confrontational during the Cold War era, it seemed to be more predictable and manageable than in the post-Cold War era in terms of "calculation" of power. This was mainly due to the distinct identity and national interests of each state, which were decided by the different ideologies. When the remnants of the Cold War end in this region, unfortunately there will be an increasing security instability by the power vacuum that will rise due to the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. military commitment in this region. Moreover, the conflictive security policy among the Northeast Asian states will make the calculation of power more complicated than ever before and lead them to power competition for regional dominance. Should the balance of power be maintained, it will not be as a stable system but a fragile one.

Finally, a new security environment after the end of the remnants of the Cold War in this region will suggest the possibility of the collective security system rather than the current balance of power structure, which would be based on cooperation rather than power

competition. With the current negative identity and conflictive interests, it seems to be difficult to establish a regional collective security system. However, as long as the balance of power does not fit in with the future security environment, collective security can be considered as an alternative for a future security system. Moreover, if those regional states can build confidence before Korean reunification and form a positive identity to a degree, the institutional functions that collective security provides will contribute to improvement of their security relations and thus promote regional stability.

This chapter consists of five sections. The first section will argue that the end of the remnants of the Cold War will necessarily reduce the U.S. security role in Northeast Asia. The second section will examine the security policy of Japan and will suggest that Japan will expand its security and political role in this region. The third section will examine the security policy of China based on its nationalism and will suggest that Chinese neo-nationalism may inflame their traditional aspiration to be a regional hegemonic power. The fourth section will review the security policy of Korea and its future security role after its reunification. Finally, the fifth section will argue that the current balance of power system in this region would not fit in with the future security environment and will suggest a collective security system as a means for future regional stability in Northeast Asia.

A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN POST-COLD WAR

This section examines the implications of U.S. security policy on the security environment in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era and assesses the prospects for the future trends of the U.S. military in this region. As a current balancer of power in Northeast Asia, changes in U.S. policy in the post-Cold War era would be the nucleus of a future security structure in this region. Whereas the security environment in Northeast Asia has not changed so much, the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union has inevitably caused the U.S. security strategy to be changed "from a global containment strategy primarily directed to the Cold War era Soviet threat to a focus on selective engagement in critical

regions of the world."[246] As a result, the lack of threat perception has constrained the U.S. military commitment to this region in terms of its military size and budget.

The question, "Can the United States take the role of balancer of power continuously even after the Korea reunification?" lies at the heart of future security stability in Northeast Asia. There are basically two options for the United States: strengthening its current bilateral alliances or becoming an off-shore balancer.[247] The former will necessarily be a containment policy against China and may lead them to another confrontational structure. Without any distinct threat, the U.S. deployment in this region will naturally create a hostile environment against China whose nationalism is directed toward anti-hegemonism. The latter will produce a power vacuum,[248] and lead the regional states to power competition, especially between Japan and China. Even though currently the United States focuses on strengthening bilateral alliances,[249] the future end of the remnants of the Cold War in this region will force the United States to choose its role as an off-shore balancer rather than strengthening current bilateral alliances mainly because of two factors: the lack of duty and justification, and budgetary constraints.

1. The U.S. Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

While the current security environment in Northeast Asia can be considered more or

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[246]Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1992.

[247]The United States can also be an isolationist, looking away from all security matters in Northeast Asia. However, because it would be less probable as long as her national interests are closely related to the stability of that region, this thesis does not consider such U.S. policy.

[248]The power vacuum seems to be simply minimized if Japan takes the security role of the United States equivalent to the level of China. However, due to the conflictive security interests between Japan and China, and even Japan and Korea, remilitarizing Japan will not acceptable to Japan and Korea. Also, when we consider the fact that the United States has pursued deterrence based on preponderance, not simple balancing with enemies, it will be more difficult for Japan to fill the vacuum completely. Thus, the power vacuum seems to be inevitable in the future security environment in Northeast Asia.

[249]Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Feb. 1995, p. 5.

less stable under the commitment of U.S. forces, a series of U.S. moves toward a new world order made the states feel uncomfortable about the regional stability. As the former Soviet Union was demolished, the United States withdrew its military from Subic Bay and has reduced the level of its military in Northeast Asia. This increased the doubts over the future U.S. military commitment in this region, thus amplifying the security concerns of a power vacuum. In June 1993 Secretary of Defense Aspin's military and civilian advisers recommended that the United States adopt a 'win-hold-win' strategy,[250] which was considered as another reduction program by the South Korean Government. Although the strategy was replaced by the 'win-win' doctrine,[251] what the Northeast Asia states realized was the changeability of U.S. policy in any circumstances, such as budget problems or policy changes by decision makers. Actually, the guarantee of U.S. commitment is the key to stabilize the security environment in this region, as the guarantee of Great Britain for France was critical in European security after the First World War.

However, even though Northeast Asia still faces a Cold War security environment, the post-Cold War order requires a new strategy for the United States. During the Cold War, resisting the spread of international communism, coupled with Soviet expansionism, had priority over other interests. Then, the U.S. strategy toward this region was the containment against the expansion of the Soviet communism, which would harm U.S. economic interests as well as political initiatives. In fact, the end of the Cold War can be considered as a watershed that changed U.S. security strategy, from containment to selective engagement. The selective engagement policy is based on the uncertainty and the flexibility of the world security environment, prompt engagement in conflict areas, not a military presence

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[250]This change anticipated that if the United States were confronted with two major regional conflicts simultaneously it would 'hold' the second conflict's adversary by employing air power and a limited number of ground forces. After prevailing in the first conflict, the United States forces would be redeployed to reinforce the ally under siege in the second theater until the conflict was terminated on favorable terms. See William T. Tow, "Changing U.S. Force Levels and Regional Security," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 15, no. 2, August 1994, p. 17.

[251]The win-win doctrine does not mean that the United States fights two regional conflicts at the same time, but it means nearly simultaneously.

everywhere in peace time, and is focused on regional levels of conflict, not global levels. The U.S. plan for the three-phased reduction of its forces in the Asia Pacific region in 1990 and the revised plan, even though Phase II was postponed in 1992, showed the changed U.S. security strategy in the post-Cold War era.

The U.S. economic recession became a major factor that restricted the level of military maintenance, and that forced the U.S. security policy to depend on international cooperation with its allies. In September 1993, the Clinton Administration completed the Bottom Up Review (BUR), a full-scale assessment of what defense forces and systems the United States needs for this new security era.[252] By the BUR, there was a cut of the defense budget by $88 billion from 1994 to 1997, and the number of active duty personnel would shrink from 1.8 to 1.4 million by 1997.[253] While the BUR focused on the effectiveness of military operations in terms of costs and benefits, the continuing reduction of the U.S. military budget has required more burden sharing with its allies, Japan and Korea in Northeast Asia. For example, Japan's share of the non-salary costs for U.S. forces deployed in Japan rose to 73 % in 1995.[254] This means a more independent defense capability of Japan in the future, which will substitute for the security role of the United States in the end.

Despite the change of U.S. security policy, the United States assured the ongoing military commitment to the Asia-Pacific region at the summit meeting in Tokyo in April 1996. Actually, the United States has vital national interests in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of economy and security. By strengthening the bilateral security alliance with Japan, the United States can not only secure its sea lines of communication, but also continuously use the

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[252]The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995, p. 3.

[253]Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1993-94* (New York: Brassey, 1993), p. 53.

[254]Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1992.

military base in Japan for "forward military presence"[255] to deploy its military to the Asia-Pacific region and up to the Middle East. Moreover, it is less expensive for the United States to station its forces in Japan than in any other place in the world, including the United States.[256] However, the U.S. promise to maintain an approximate level of 100,000 troops in this region seems to be "symbolic" rather than realistic, because the promise seems to be an "assurance" to stabilize the current instable situation about the U.S. ongoing military commitment in this region, which resulted from the inconsistency of U.S. policy after the Cold War.

U.S. policy toward Japan and China seems to be quite contradictory. The United States wants to strengthen the bilateral partnership with Japan which serves as the basic mechanism through which they work together to promote regional and global security.[257] The Japan-U.S. joint declaration on security alliance in Tokyo in 1996 can be understood by the same context. At the same, the United States tries to "engage China and support its constructive integration into the international community, including participation in global efforts to limit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and foster transparency in its defense policy and military activities".[258] However, the more the United States strengthens its alliance, the less its security relation with China improves. In fact, China considered the outcomes of the summit meeting in Tokyo as nothing more than a containment policy toward China.

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[255]"Forward military presence" is a security concept of U.S. security policy in the post-Cold War era. It is broader term than the concept of "forward deployed forces" during the Cold War era. While the latter has a specific mission of deterrence and defense against an identified enemy, the former may have more ambiguous military missions designed to achieve the political objective of providing assurance of a stable regional order for friends and allies. See Thomas L. Wilborn, *International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle*, Strategic Studies Institute, March 21, 1996, p. 32.

[256]Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1993-94*, p. 55.

[257]Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Feb. 1995, p. 4.

[258]Ibid., p. 4.

In summary, even though the U.S. security policy toward Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War has lost its coherence and caused increased security concern in this region, the U.S. military commitment seems to continue for the time being. The current security environment in Northeast Asia absolutely requires the U.S. military presence as a deterrence force. After the Gulf War, the United States realized the possibility of regional conflicts and the necessity of prompt power projection to the unpredictable theaters. Therefore, it is sharing interests between the Northeast Asian states and the United States that has enabled the U.S. military presence in this region. As long as the current hostile security environment continues, mainly due to North Korea's nuclear and conventional threat, the United States will remain in this region assuming the role of a balancer of power.

However, the end of the remnants of the Cold War which would result from the demolishment of North Korea suggests the possibility that the U.S. security role would be conspicuously reduced in this region. The loss of duty for the U.S. military in Korea, and even Japan, will decrease the justification of its stationing in this region. The U.S. budgetary constraints will force Japan and Korea to assume more security roles that the United States has taken in this region. Above all, the Northeast Asian states will not want the same level of U.S. military commitment mainly because it might result in another confrontation with China. Thus, the United States will have to choose its future role as an off-shore balancer, instead of strengthening the current bilateral security alliance, and decrease its security role in this region.

2. Conspicuous Reduction of the U.S. Role after Korea Reunification

a. Duty and justification

During the Cold War era, the U.S. security role in Northeast Asia was to contain the expansionism of communism, and it was justified for the regional stability that secures the freedom of economic trade and sea lines of communication, preventing any hegemonic power to rise. After the Cold War, when Russia gave up the hegemonic aspiration in this region and "appears to be in full retreat from previous alliance and forward

deployments,"[259] the U.S. military role in this region has been justified by the continuing hostile security environment under the remnants of the Cold War around the Korean peninsula. As long as the threat of North Korea exists and thus impedes the regional stability, the U.S. military commitment will be critical as a deterrence force and welcomed by its allies.

However, if the threat disappears when North Korea becomes enervated especially in terms of its military as her economy is weakened, then the U.S. duty and justification, at least in the Korean peninsula, will be significantly reduced. The U.S. claim of a military base to deploy its forces to other theaters may not be able to be accepted by reunified Korea unless there exists an apparent threat of China. When we consider the improving economic and political relations between Korea and China, it would be difficult for the U.S. military to continue its stationing in reunified Korea, which will not want any confrontation with its northern power.

The disappearance of the threat of North Korea will also influence the U.S. military presence in Japan. Even though the United States requires military bases in Japan for power projection, its size will be restricted by maintenance costs. For Japan, the incentives to pay most of the stationing costs will decrease. Of course, Japan may need the U.S. nuclear umbrella against China's nuclear threat. However, unless there exists any tangible threat, the presence of the U.S. forces will be adjusted to the minimum level.

The lack of duty and justification may cause public opinions of Japan, Korea, and the United States to oppose the U.S. military stationing in Northeast Asia. Even in the United States, the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. military commitment in this region has not been a new agenda. Nixon withdrew about 320,000 troops from Asia from 1970 to 1971, and Carter tried to withdraw all U.S. forces from South Korea until 1981. In a report to Congress in 1990, "A Strategic Framework for Asia Pacific Rim Looking for the 21st Century," the United States planned the three-phased reduction of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific region. When the justification loses its color, the U.S. public may call for the withdrawal or reduction

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[259]Sheldon W. Simon, *East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 3.

of U.S. forces in this region. The public opinion in Japan and Korea will be a more critical factor in deciding the level of future presence of the U.S. forces. People in those countries may consider the U.S. presence in their territories as a violation of their sovereignties. Crimes by the U.S. soldiers, which have been settled secretly so as not to cause any trouble in military relations between them and the United States, can be a big issue like in the case of the Okinawa incident in 1995. As Japan and Korea become more democratized, those issues will affect their policies toward the U.S. presence in their territories.

b. Military budget problem

William Tow mentions that the U.S. ability to fulfill the role of an "honest broker" is impeded by domestic budgetary constraints, which will lead to substantial reductions in the U.S. defense forces by the end of this century unless a new global or regional adversary emerges to take the place of the now defunct Soviet military threat.[260] In the Cold War era, U.S. security strategy to contain the former Soviet Union had priority over a domestic budget problem. For example, between 1980 and 1987, the defense budget increased its share of outlays (from 23 to 28%) and of GNP (from 5 to 6.3 %), while nondefense spending fell from 68 to 58% and 15.1 to 13.2 % respectively.[261] Without a major threat, however, even though the budget cannot control the U.S. security strategy, it can influence the overall framework of the latter. Coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union and the trade deficit in her current economy, the Department's FY 1996-2001 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) was another option for the Clinton Administration, which will continue the restructuring of America's defense posture to reflect the end of the Cold War.[262] Under this plan, as Table 3 shows, by FY 1997 the cumulative real decline since FY 1985 will

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[260]William T. Tow, "Changing U.S. Force Levels and Regional Security," p. 10.

[261]Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Political Economy of American Strategy," ed. Theodore Rueter, *The United States in the World Political Economy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1994), p. 55.

[262]William Perry, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, February 1995, p. 271.

reach 41 percent.[263]

Table 3. DOD Budget Authority (Current $ Billions)[264]

FY	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999	FY2000	FY2001
DOD military	252.6	246.0	242.8	249.7	256.3	266.2	276.6
DOE and other	10.9	11.8	10.6	9.9	9.9	9.9	9.9
Total	263.5	257.8	253.4	259.6	266.3	276.0	286.5
Real change (%)	-1.9	-5.3	-4.1	-0.1	-0.2	+1.1	+1.2

The FYDP is premised on cooperation with allies by sharing the burdens of military presence in overseas. In 1995, Japan paid roughly three-quarters of the costs of stationing U.S. forces in her country, and Korea also assumed about one-third of costs. Their burden sharing has been increased as their economic growth went up and will continue to increase as long as the threat of North Korea exists.

However, the cooperation with its allies means that the U.S. security role is decreasing respectively. According to a report to Congress in 1992, "Japan will continue to develop its capability to provide for its own territorial defense, as well as continue to develop its air defense capabilities and the capability to conduct sea lane defense out to 1,000 nautical miles."[265] Coupled with Japan's FS-X program which is a co-development program based on the F-16 airframe, "the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century" in 1996 opened a new way for Japan to increase its military power. The declaration not only strengthened Japan's logistic role in case of U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, but also activated cooperation between the countries in the fields of military

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[263]FY 1985-96 real change was -39 %. See *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, February 1995, p. 273.

[264]Ibid., p. 272.

[265]Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1992.

technology and equipment, research and development of equipment, and interoperability between the U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces. Also, South Korea has increased its security role on the Korean peninsula. A DOD report states, "The transition of the Republic of Korea to the leading role in its own defense is a long-standing policy goal of the United States and reflects the growing maturity and capabilities of the Republic of Korea's armed forces as well as the desires of the Korean people and government."[266] Actually, for the purpose of shifting the primary responsibility for the ROK's defense to South Korea, "the combined ground component commander is now a South Korean four-star general rather than an American, and the transfer of peacetime operational control of ROK forces to South Korea took place in 1994."[267] Now, the South Korean Government is pursuing the Korean Fighter Program (KFP) which will acquire 120 F-16's from the United States and is considering procuring the next generation fighter among F-15 and SU-35. In the long term, such moves of Japan and South Korea toward their self defense and a more active military role will replace a portion of U.S. military commitments. Then, it seems to be inevitable that the security role of the U.S. military in this region will be changed from a leading role to a supporting role in the relatively near future.

3. Impact of the U.S. Military Reduction on Regional Security

Coupled with the budgetary constraints, the lack of duty and justification after the Korea reunification will force the U.S. security role and its military presence to be reduced conspicuously. Like in the case of the Philippines whose Senate rejected the U.S. use of military bases, the Korean people may refuse the U.S. stationing in her territory. Even if not, the disappearance of the current threat will force the U.S. military in the Korean peninsula to be reduced significantly. Also, it will be questionable whether Japan will permit the U.S. forces to use a part of its territory as a military base without any apparent theat. Even though Japan requires the U.S. military for nuclear protection, the size of U.S. conventional forces

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[266]Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Feb. 1995, p. 27.

[267]William E. Berry, Jr., *The Invitation to Struggle: Executive and Legislative Competition over the U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula* (SSI: Army War College, 1996), p. 21.

will be at best the minimum required for power projection to other theaters.

The U.S. military reduction will cause a power vacuum and regional rivalry in Northeast Asia. Considering the lack of trust among those states, the future security environment after Korean reunification will be more conflictive rather than cooperative. Japan will increase its political and security role in international society. Based on its economic power, Japan is trying to be a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council with the support of the United States and is expanding its security role in this region. Also, new Chinese nationalism in the post-Cold War era will necessarily be aimed at the recovery of their status as a regional dominant power. These two rising regional powers will be the nucleus of the Northeast Asian security environment. On the other hand, reunified Korea will have to strengthen its military capability, because it will have doubts about the intention of the two states.

Under the U.S. influence, the changes of a regional state's policy could not impact the overall regional balance of power so much. If the U.S. influence is reduced, the current balance of power system will be susceptible to even a minor change of power. The lack of flexibility will cause conflicts in adopting the future security policies of China and Japan to the new security environment after the reunification of Korea.

B. SECURITY POLICY OF JAPAN

Japan's security policy from the Meiji Restoration to the end of the First World War has been the major reason for the current negative identity between Japan and other regional states. During the Cold War era, while the Japan-U.S. security alliance provided the security of Japan from the threat of neighboring powers, Japan gradually increased its potential military capability based on high technology and economic power. Currently, Japan has opened the way to expand its security role in the Asia-Pacific region with the Japan-U.S. joint declaration on security alliance in April 1996. If and when the U.S. military is reduced significantly in this region after the Korea reunification, Japan will rearm its military to fill the gap of the U.S. military withdrawal. While it seems to be inevitable that Japan will expand its political and security role, unfortunately, such a move by Japan will conflict with the security

policies of the other regional states and cause security instability in this region.

1. Review of Pre-Modern Japanese History

Pre-modern Japanese history suggests some of the nature and characteristics of Japanese people and society. First, due to the geopolitical reasons, the Japanese formed their own peculiar self-identity, mixing other cultures with their traditional one. Second, Japan had been a military dominant society from the twelfth century to the end of the Second World War. As a result, there had been formed a military based mind in the Japanese people, such as collectivism and importance of status. Third, Japan could achieve the Meiji Restoration successfully without bloodshed because of their adaptiveness.

a. Strong self-identity

The Japanese people have had a strong self-identity. Geographically, Japan had been isolated from the Asian Continent and they could develop their own self-identity. Because of the geographical reason, Japan had never felt any external threat until the nineteenth century, except for Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, while the nearest neighboring state, Korea, had suffered from the frequent invasions of China and northern nomadic tribes throughout history. Without security concerns and the interference of others, Japan could maintain unity and homogeneity[268] of its people, which have always remained as their ideal despite long centuries of feudal divisions. As a result, "the Japanese do seem to view the rest of the world, including even their close cultural and racial relatives in Korea and China, with an especially strong 'we' and 'they' dichotomy."[269] Even though Japan was influenced by China and Korea in terms of language, literature, politics, and philosophy, they have been culturally a very distinctive people, diverging sharply from the patterns of China and Korea. Even today, Japan occupies a unique place in the world as a major industrialized

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[268]Japanese unity and homogeneity does not mean that all Japanese had the same origin, rather it means that they have shared the same culture for quite a long time in their territory, geographically isolated from others.

[269]Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese Today* (Belknap: Harvard), p. 32.

and fully modernized nation that has a non-Western cultural background.[270] The success of the Meiji Restoration and modernization especially was due to their strong self-identity which resulted from long geographical isolation.

b. Military dominant society

Traditionally, the emperors could not have practical political power. In the Nara period (710-794), the first Japanese ancient-state which was started from the completion of a capital city, the emperor was mainly charged with Shinto rituals while civil bureaucracy controlled administration. Kammu, who was unprecedentedly the most powerful emperor, decided to give up Nara and built a new city in 794, Heian, but that decision seemed to be made not on his own, but by the pressure of great priests.[271] Especially, the dominance of the Fujiwara family from 858 to 1068 exerted a powerful hold over the emperor and set the pattern of the control of government from behind a figurehead emperor. Thereafter, that became general practice in Japan. Even after the restoration of the emperor to power in 1868, Japan's political system has not allowed him to get power practically. Meanwhile, after the success of the revolt in 1185, Yoritomo became the undisputed military master of the land and got the title of shogun, or generalissimo of the emperor's army.[272] From then on, Japan's military rule continued until 1868.

On the other hand, the rise of local military power resulted from the limits that the Shoen system faced since the ninth century. The Shoen system, which enabled privatization of a large amount of land and exemption of tax under the loose control of law, eventually weakened the government power as the sources of public revenue diminished. As the authority and power of the central government declined in Japan, various local groups which were in essence vigilante bands of warriors -- known as samurai, or bushi -- cooperated

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[270]Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese Today*, p. 31-32.

[271]Kim Hankyu, Jeon Yongman and Yoon Byoungnam, *Dongyang Munhwasa* (Seoul: Eulyumunhwasa, 1993), p. 421.

[272]Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese Today*, p. 53.

together for mutual protection.[273] As time went on, Bushido, the "Way of the Warrior," which placed great emphasis on the military virtues of bravery, honor, self-discipline, and the stoical acceptance of death, spread into the larger population almost for 1,000 years, forming a military based mind of the Japanese.

Collectivism: One of the characteristics which resulted from the traditional military dominant society of Japan can be considered to be collectivism. The tight organization and long continuity of the feudal system based on military rule strengthened group identification, and power was usually shared by paired officers or collegial groups because of the suspicions and fear of other rising groups or individuals for authority.[274] Even in the process of rapid change of the Meiji Restoration, "there was never any one dictatorial leader, nor did any person ever attempt to gain such powers."[275] Still, collectivism exists in that decision making in Japan has depended on the principle of a needed consensus of about 80 % of participants, not of a majority.[276]

Importance of status: Japanese beliefs and values of status were formed by the respect for military leadership, unquestioning loyalty, and emphasis on group organization. Wakabayashi explains that one of the reasons why the Japanese imperial institution has survived and prospered into modern times is that imperially bestowed indicators of status have remained strong for longer, while others, such as power or wealth, have counted for relatively less in and of themselves.[277] In the Second World War, the absolute loyalty toward the Emperor that Japanese soldiers showed was an example of the importance of social status in modern Japan. Still, a hierarchial structure which respects the leaders, elders, and higher-status person exists in Japanese society.

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[273]Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese Today*, p. 52-53.

[274]Ibid., p. 55. 70.

[275]Ibid., p. 236.

[276]Baek Jong-Chun, p. 376.

[277]Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, "In Name Only: Imperial Sovereignty in Early Modern Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 17, p. 54.

c. *The success of the Meiji Restoration*

"The Meiji Restoration was the pivotal event in modern Japanese history; it is the starting point for any discussion of major developments that followed in the Meiji period (1868-1912) and beyond."[278] Firstly, even though the Meiji Restoration may seem to have been an almost inevitable development, it is undeniable that "no other country responded quickly and successfully to the challenge of superior Western economic and military technology."[279] Then what was motivation of the Meiji Restoration? And what factors made it successful, which enabled Japan to be modernized and a leading power afterward?

The motivation of the Meiji Restoration can be examined broadly in terms of a strong Japanese self-identity,[280] uniformity and justification. Even though China, Korea and Japan shared the same cultural background, China had a strong view of its central position in Asia as well as in the world. With frequent cultural contacts, Korea accepted the Chinese world view. Actually, it was much more difficult for the two countries to adapt the Western concept to their traditional cultures. However, the Japanese perception of strong self-identity, which was differentiated from the Chinese world view, was better fitted to overturn their existing beliefs and thoughts that were far behind Western countries. Second, their traditional perception of uniformity sharply conflicted with the local division of political system and class division in the Tokugawa era. This created internal tensions in the nineteenth century that, by opening cracks in society, made change easier than in the more monolithic and long-established systems of China and Korea.[281] Third, Japan had the most effective justification to eliminate feudal political and social division, the "restoration" of imperial rule.[282] For the

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[278]Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), p. 127.

[279]Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese Today*, p. 85. China had a very strong self identity too. However, while Chinese self identity was formed absolutely by their own philosophy and belief system, Japanese self identity was thoroughly mixed and adapted with others.

[280]Ibid., p. 85.

[281]Ibid., p. 233.

[282]Ibid., p. 233. Especially, the four class division influenced from China seemed to produce dilemma as Confucianism spread into Japanese society.

Japanese, the emperor was the legitimate symbol of unity in their beliefs which had continued through their entire history. Accordingly, even though there existed reform-minded leaders in China, Korea and Japan who realized the necessity of modernization by accepting Western culture, only Japan could achieve that goal because of its strong self-identity that was differentiated from others'.

After the Meiji Restoration, there was no severe opposition or conflicts in the process of modernization through accommodation of Western political, economic, and military systems. This was mainly because of the state building[283] in the Tokugawa era. "From Edo, the shogun's government and bureaucracy administered the shogunate's domain and the major cities, and controlled the functions and policies with countrywide implications, such as *sankin kotai* (alternate attendance of lords in the capital), foreign trade, defense, and minting."[284] Even though the Tokugawa state suffered from fiscal viability in the nineteenth century, it had the absolute power in that the bakufu had the power over the warrior aristocracy, the court, the lords and their people, over region and trade, and over political ideology.[285] Also, there appeared the concept of *kogi* or public authority, a clear national locus of political power to which lords and their peasants were directly subordinate. The formation of a "nation-state" in the Tokugawa era, in terms of central power as well as institutional development, contributed to the continuous success of reform toward a matured and modernized nation-state after the Meiji Restoration.

2. From the Meiji Restoration to the Second World War

a. Security policy in the Meiji era

Japan's open-door policy, which ultimately resulted from the pressure of

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[283]"State building" is defined as the process of "the creation of a governmental monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." See James W. White, "State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 14, p. 1.

[284]Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century*, p. 128.

[285]James W. White, "State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan," p. 5-6.

Western powers and which was aimed at "expelling the barbarians,"[286] gave it a great chance to achieve their economic and political development. To catch up with the Westerners, Japan placed a major emphasis on education. Many young students were sent abroad to learn more advanced modern technology and political and economic systems. On returning, they assumed the positions of leadership. "Economic and political development proceeded at a great pace, considerably greater than that which marked the corresponding period of development in Europe."[287] Japan could take advantage of the experiences of Western powers, avoiding some of their mistakes. Also, the doubled agricultural production in the last quarter of the nineteenth century contributed to promoting their industrialization, because the surplus capital was available for investment and economic expansion.

Surrounded by the threat of "imperialist" countries, however, Japan started to build strong army and navy with the recognition that military strength was needed to maintain a its security and independence. The national miliary force was manned through a conscription system from 1872, and the high command was reorganized after the study of the French and Prussian military systems.[288] Warships were built using the advanced Western technology, especially against China. In the early 1880s, China began to expand and modernize its navy partly in response to Japan's growing naval strength, Japan's establishment of the Prefecture of Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands and its demand of the same trading and navigation rights with China.[289]

Security policy in the early Meiji era was directed outward, toward imperialism like

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[286]Even though the slogan "expel the barbarians" was a main issue of the Meiji Restoration, it could not practiced by the reformers as a national policy because the latter realized the needs of Westerners to achieve modernization. Instead, the meaning of slogan was changed to "catching up the Westerners" and extremists, who were against foreigners, were punished by law.

[287]Louis D. Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics* (New York: Paragon House, 1992), p. 20.

[288]James H. Buck, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces," ed. Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika, Jr., *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p.71.

[289]Hishhiko Okazaki, *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), p. 19.

the Western powers.[290] To promote its international stature and to secure its islands from external threat, Japan looked first to Korea as a strategic target, which was important not only geopolitically for the security of Japan as well as China, but also economically for securing an additional food supply and market. Then, "In the 1870s and 1880s, Japan's Korea policy resulted in an inevitable confrontation with China which asserted a historical claim of suzerainty over Korea as a tributary state."[291] Also, Japan's expansion toward the North was confronted with Russia's interests over Manchuria and Korea. As a result, Japan had to fight and won wars with China in 1894-1895 and with Russia in 1904-1905. Victories proved the success of modernization after the Meiji Restoration and encouraged Japan to gain the status of a significant miliary power. After victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan could get initiatives in the Korean Peninsula and annexed Korea in 1910, thus establishing a bridgehead of expansion toward the Asian Continent.

b. The rise of expansionism after World War I

After the First World War, Japan pursued a "trade-first" policy to cooperate with the new international environment under Wilsonianism which claimed the peaceful settlement of conflicts other than war. The European powers also re-entered into international economic competition to revive their destructed industries. For Japan, the growing industry required a larger amount of natural resources, which had been dependent on foreign states such as Dutch East Idies and the United States. The explosively increased population needed more farm products from Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan, because of decreased domestic agricultural production after industrialization.[292] Coupled with the Washington Conference for securing peace in the Pacific, Japan had no choice but to concentrate their efforts on the economy. Also, there was an domestic effort of political parties toward the democratization of politics, with a social movement that advocated a variety of democratic reforms, which

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[290]Louis D. Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, p. 23.

[291]Ibid., p. 23.

[292]Even though there was an increase of population, Japan's economic capacity which was expanded by making a large profit from World War I could cover the problems of overpopulation at least at that time.

resulted from internationalism and new liberalism.

However, the economic and domestic political situations in the 1920s became worse. With an enormous population growth, which reached 60 million after World War I, more than double the figure at the beginning of the Meiji era, abundant cheap labor produced surplus goods and at the same time required more food. This resulted in a growing dependence on foreign markets and imports. The unbalanced economic structure between imports and exports caused economic depression. Urbanization resulting from industrialization brought about anxiety and the growth of proletarian unrest. Also, there was increased leadership tension between military elites and political/economic elites, and democratization was impossible under such an unstable social political environment. Sensitive to this instability, "the governing elites stressed the importance of an ideological bond to hold society together."[293]

The Great Depression in 1929 was a major cause of the rise of militarism in Japan. Faced with an unprecedented economic depression after modernization, the Japanese felt that Western economic powers had no problem, because France, Great Britain and Holland had already established many colonies over the world, and the United States and Russia had vast land with plenty of natural resources. However, Japan had neither colonies, except Korea, nor enough natural resources. Japan also felt that they started too late and stopped too early. Moreover, by succeeding in its effort to unify China, Chiang Kai-shek's "Northern Expedition" would be a threat to the Japanese economic hold on the Shandong province.[294] Then, while they invaded Manchuria in 1931 with the accusation of the Mukden Incident, Japan ceased the system of government by civilian parties from the time of Inukai's assassination in 1932 until after World War II.[295] Actually, their only option for reviving the

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[293]Louis D. Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, p. 24. Later, this ideological bond proved to be a military expansion.

[294]Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century*, p. 203.

[295]Ibid., p. 203-205. In popular sentiment, Manchuria was viewed as a recompense for the 100,000 Japanese lives lost in the Russo-Japanese War. Also, it was a buffer zone against Russia. See John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia, The Modern*

economy and thus stabilizing domestic unrest was to resume military expansion.

It was the military establishment itself, neither political groups like the Nazis and the Fascists nor a charismatic and powerful leader like Hitler and Mussolini, that dominated Japanese policies in the late 1930s and early 1940s.[296] The long Japanese tradition of a military dominant society was revived again. Their characteristics of collectivism prevented any dominant leader from rising to a power even during this period. Elementary education was provided to all Japanese people, but students had to follow military styles such as uniformed clothes, short-cut hair and an oath of loyalty to the Emperor. With the appearance of a power vacuum in Southeast Asia when World War II broke out, then Prime Minister Konoe announced the idea of a "New Order in Asia"in 1938, which was later renamed the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," and merged all political parties into a single party, the "Society for Assisting the Imperial Rule."

In summary, Japanese military expansionism originated from three factors: Japanese security from the threat of other imperialist countries; recovering its economic situation; and a bid to become a dominant regional power by forming an "East Asian political and economic community." The "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was actually aimed not at a "co-prosperity" but at a "unilateral prosperity." The method was not cooperation and compromise, but military power and coerciveness. The consequence was destruction of entire East Asia.

The brutal and frantic Japanese military expansion from the merger of Korea and the occupation of Manchuria to Japan's unconditional surrender became the major factor in China and Korea forming anti-Japanese emotion, which exists even today. Japanese policy toward Korea was to eliminate the roots of Korean history and tradition. In the territory of China, the Japanese 731 secret unit used live human bodies as samples in experiments of chemical and biological warfare materials. Many young women of neighboring states were victimized as

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Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 584.

[296]Yukio Satoh, *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*, Adelphi Paper (1982), no. 178, p. 2.

"military sexual slaves." These atrocities and inconceivable violations of human rights have still impeded China and Korea in forming positive identities. In particular, Japan's attitude toward the history of its invasion of neighboring states, the massacre of civilians, and the solution of the military sexual slavery problem has been untruthful and has hurt its neighbors' national emotions, which has openly caused political conflicts in this region.[297] Actually, Japan's explicit apology for its past history has been, and will be, the most important factor in recovering trust with neighboring states.

3. Japan's Security Policy during the Cold-War Era

Its defeat in the Second World War brought Japan to a new "non-militaristic" world that they had rarely experienced. The result of their past policies were too disastrous: "at home, patriotic hysteria, military dictatorship, and a war that accomplished only destruction and death; abroad, a legacy of distrust and suspicion, not only from the United States as a result of the attack without warning on Pearl Harbor but also from the Asian peoples whose lands they invaded and whom they then governed with much brutality."[298] Realizing how frantic their military expansionism was, the Japanese people voluntarily responded to the disarmament under the control of the United States. The Peace Constitution which prohibited Japan's rearmament was widely endorsed by the Japanese people who felt a strong aversion to war, even though it was drafted under the influence of General Douglas MacArthur, then Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers occupying Japan.[299] After the establishment of the Constitution, Japan has pursued its security policy based on a non-military principle which could be represented by the Yoshida Doctrine in the early 1950s. Faced with continued pressure of rearmament from the United States, the doctrine survived in the form of a "comprehensive security policy" in the 1980s. However, it must not be overlooked that Japan

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[297]Takami Eto, director of Japan's Management and Coordination Agency, resigned because of the protest by Korea when Eto insisted on Oct. 11 1995 that "Japan did some good things." See *The New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1995.

[298]Bernard K. Gordon, "Japan: Searching Once Again," ed. James C. Hsiung, *Asia Pacific in the New World Politics* (Boulder: Rienner, 1993), p. 50-51.

[299]Yukio Satoh, *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*, p. 2.

has gradually pursued a military buildup of its forces for self-defense, despite the prohibition of armament in the Constitution, depending on the interpretation of the law.

a. Peace Constitution and "war potential"

The most conspicuous feature of Japan's post-War security policy was the adoption of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. In particular, Article 9, whose interpretation has caused the most controversial debates among policy makers in and out of Japan, states:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.[300]

Despite the fact that the Constitution has become the basic framework for present security policy reflecting the changed Japanese security posture after the defeat of World War II, it has lost consistency in translating the meaning of "war potential", which would decide the total level of military strength that Japan possesses. When Japan was creating the Police Reserve[301] in 1950, the government's position was that it was not a violation of law because the Police Reserve existed to maintain public security. But it was not convincing because the Police Reserve was equipped with tanks and artillery whose capabilities were beyond securing public order.[302] Tokutaro Kimura, director of the Security Board, explained in 1952 the war potential was to fight with sufficient equipment as military unit.[303] In 1954, the Japanese government suggested a new interpretation that "war potential was anything beyond the

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[300]From the Japanese Constitution, Chapter 11 (Renunciation of War).

[301]It was created right after the breakout of the Korean War to settle domestic unrest, with a small ground force that was half police department, half army. After the Chinese participation in that war, however, the United States started to strengthen the Police Reserve as tension grew across Asia. At that time, the Police Reserve was equipped with artillery, incendiary projectiles, and medium-size tanks. Four years later, in 1954, maritime and air branches were created and the Police Reserve was renamed the Self-Defense Force. See Tetsuo Maeda, *The Hidden Army* (Chicago: Edition q, inc., 1995), p. viii, 21.

[302]Tetsuo Maeda, *The Hidden Army* (Chicago: Edition q, inc., 1995), p. 77.

[303]Ibid., p.77.

minimum required for self-defense."[304]

Then, another problem became the question of how much the minimum is. In 1970, the Japanese government determined the minimum of defense as "not to have offensive weapons which will pose a threat of aggression to other nations, such as long-range bombers like B-52s, nuclear attack aircraft carriers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)."[305] In 1978, however, "the phrase, 'pose a threat of aggression to other nation', was changed to 'cause mass destruction to territory of neighboring nations', which in effect dramatically raised the upper ceiling of the weaponry permitted under the constitution."[306] The Defense White Paper in 1994 mentions that "the specific limit of the minimum level necessary of armed strength for self-defense varies depending on the prevailing international situation, the standard of military technology and various other conditions,"[307] giving much flexibility to the translation of "minimum." While there has been no consistency in interpreting the meaning of "war potential" and "minimum necessary for self-defense" during the Cold War era, the most apparent fact is that Japan's war potential has been increasing, even though gradually, as they have varied the interpretation. Tetsuo Maeda makes cynical remarks about the inconsistency of the interpretation of war potential:

> Since this compromise [of the Constitution] did not specify just what the minimum required for self-defense was, an inevitable conflict arose as years passed, and in the 1980s the inherent contradictions in Japan's defense posture became obvious to many. Was the world's third largest military budget really the minimum required for self-defense? This led to a loss of credibility for Japan in the international community, as other countries were treated to the spectacle of a nation whose constitution pledged the country not to maintain war potential continuing to renounce war while at the same time increasing its defense budget year after year and maintaining Self-Defense Forces with

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[304]Tetsuo Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p. 78.

[305] Ibid., p. 116.

[306] Ibid., p. 117.

[307]Also, the Paper mentions that "whether the Self-Defense Forces are allowed to possess some specific armaments depends on the judgement whether the country's total strength will or will not exceed constitutional limitations by possessing such armaments." See *Defense of Japan* 1994, p. 62.

considerable war potential.[308]

b. The Yoshda Doctrine and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

The U.S. occupation which aimed to demilitarize Japan could not last long because of the burden of occupation and the changing international environment. Beginning as early as 1947, certain American premises about the postwar world now seemed unjustified because the expenses of occupation and relief, which ran up to one-half billion dollars a year, constituted a heavy burden for their taxpayer. [309] Moreover, the prospects for a China that would be friendly and democratic were broken as it became a communist country in 1949, and the Soviet's expansionism threatened Europe as well as Asia. "By 1949, American authorities realized, on the one hand, that the occupation was reaching a point of diminishing returns, and, on the other hand, that continuing economic and political ties between the two countries were a mutual necessity."[310] Decisively, the Korean War in 1950 became the motivation for the United States "reconsidering" Japan. With the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles encouraged Japan to assume more responsibility for their security by building up a force of three hundred fifty thousand men.[311] Taking advantage of the Cold War development, however, Yoshida rejected this proposal and suggested lending bases in Japan in exchange for an U.S. guarantee of Japan's defense.[312] After a compromise, a security bargain was produced that "Japan would undertake gradual rearmament as its economic progress permitted and the United States agreed to defend Japan in the meantime."[313] As a result of the bargain, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded in

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[308]Tetsuo Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p. 79.

[309]Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of Japan," ed. Roy C. Macridis, *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (New Jersey: Brandeis University, 1989), p. 317.

[310]Ibid., p. 319.

[311]Louis D. Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, p. 248.

[312]F. C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), p. 27.

[313]Ibid., p. 27.

1951 and came into effect on April 28, 1952 with official independence for Japan.

For Japan, facing those changing international security environments, there were two broad alternatives for their defense. Scalapino indicates that: "One was Japanese pacifism, which involved seeking universal agreements guaranteeing the sanctity of Japanese territory and backing these with pledges of protection by the United Nations, and possibly by the United States, separately. The alternative was to acknowledge the Japanese need for, and right to, military defense, and to underwrite Japanese rearmament with American power."[314] The Yoshida government, which decided to conclude the treaty, chose the second alternative, that of a political, military, and economic alliance with the United States.[315] Truly, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru shaped the basic structure of Japan's post-Occupation security policy by establishing a doctrine that advocated a non-military role for Japan and formed the core of its contemporary diplomatic identity. He aimed at three purposes:

> First, political-economic cooperation with the United States would undergird Japan's economic growth. Second, a small national defense expenditure would leave industry free to commit itself to productive industrial development. Third, Japan's own security would be guaranteed by the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" in exchange for allowing the Americans to situate bases in Japan.[316]

c. The Japan - U.S. Security Treaty: Its consequences

The Japan-U.S. security treaty played a vital role in ensuring the security of Japan during the Cold War era. However, there was a fundamental difference in the perception of the security treaty between the two states. "Japan has taken a local or regional and narrow view of Japan's military security, while the United States has always seen the defense of Japan in a global context."[317] As Japan's economy grew, the United States began to persuade it to reinforce the military level to counter the threat of the Soviet Union more effectively. The Kennedy Administration wanted Japan to take over more of the security role

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[314]Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of Japan," p. 320.

[315]Ibid., p. 320.

[316]Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century*, p. 250.

[317]James H. Buck, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces," p. 76.

of the United States in Northeast Asia in the early 1960s. The Nixon Doctrine in 1969 influenced the acceleration of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan of Japan in the 1970s[318] and called for Japan to make the Malacca Strait safe for the transport of oil. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States made clear her unhappiness with Japan's unwillingness to raise the level of defense spending. Then Defense Secretary Brown encouraged the Japanese government to increase its spending, citing the Soviet invasion and the recent build-up of Soviet forces on the Kurile islands.[319] Wisely enough, however, Japan seems to have been successful in keeping the pace of Yoshida in responding to those U.S. pressures. Even though there were inconsistencies of the interpretation of their Constitution, the role and level of Japan's military seemed to be limited within the boundary of the Constitution.

On the other hand, Japan had to pay the costs in the process of implementing the security treaty with the United States. At the revision of the treaty of 1951, Japan faced public opinion which insisted on the end of subordination to the United States. Also, there was the pressure of communist countries that considered the revision of the treaty to be a threat to them. In fact, cooperation with an ally would force Japan to be faced with a threat of the ally's enemy. Then, Japan aimed at greater independence from the United States while revising the treaty which would be absolutely important for their economy as well as security.[320] For instance, the fact that under the old treaty the United States also had the power to help put down "domestic disturbances" was a clear infringement on Japanese sovereignty, and Japan demanded this content be removed. With a seemingly more independent policy, Japan wanted to not only soften the relations with China by encouraging unofficial contacts and trade independently, but also, domestically, to appease the censure of

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[318]In 1970, Defense Agency indicated the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan was expected to cost $14.4 billion which would double the cost of the previous plan. See F. C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, p. 125.

[319]The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1979* (London, 1980). p.67.

[320]F. C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, p. 21.

its people about Japan's subordination.[321] Owing to the renewal of the treaty, however, the Soviet Union withdrew its offer which was to return the southern two islands in return for a peace treaty in 1956, and thereby causing the islands to be remained an unsolved problem.[322] Anyway, Japan has had to face domestic opposition of public opinion and criticism of U.S. "enemy" countries every time the security treaty is revised.

Japan's security dependency on the United States sometimes made a fallacy of its foreign policy with communist countries. For example, when the U.S. troops were reduced in Asia as a result of the Nixon doctrine, Japan felt the need to reinforce its military. But it failed to predict the benign aspect of the doctrine, improvement of the Sino-America relationship, thus raising tension with China. When Japan decided to accelerate the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan of Japan in the 1970s and issued the first Defense White Paper in October 1970, [323] China made the most extreme criticism of its plan. The *People's Daily* denounced that:

> These two counterrevolutionary documents [the defense White Paper and Fourth Defense Buildup Program] are a new challenge by reactionaries among the Japanese people to the peoples of the nations of Asia and the Pacific. With words like "our goal is peace" and "we will not become a military power," they hope to drown out violent intentions with a veil of extreme peace. They are trying to get the people to lower their guard against Japanese militarism.[324]

In addition, against the move of Japan's military buildup, Chinese premier Zhou En Lai visited North Korea in April 1970 and issued a communique denouncing the revival of Japanese

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[321]See Tetsuo Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p. 120.

[322]David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 15, no. 2, August 1994, p. 50.

[323]See F. C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, p. 126. "The White Paper repeated all the customary denials against nuclear arms, strategic bombers, and assault aircraft carriers and asserted Japan's limited aim of repelling direct aggression against Japan through local control of the seas and air."

[324] *People's Daily*, 1 November 1970. Quoted from Tetsuo Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p. 146.

militarism.[325]

The new security environment in the early 1980s around the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, inevitably drove Japan to a new policy, a comprehensive security policy. This was another cost for Japan, which decided to contribute economic aid for international peace; but it was worth it for Japanese security and status in international society. Japan's comprehensive security policy was motivated by two factors. First, Japan's concern over security rose after the fall of Vietnam because the military superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union waned, and because the U.S. military capability around Japan could be stretched thinner in the event of a crisis elsewhere.[326] Second, Japan faced the pressure of the United States for Japanese military expansion and defense burden-sharing in the early 1980s. Then, the Japanese concept of "comprehensive security" (*sogo anzen hosho*) was developed to satisfy these requirements. Arase explains that:

> Comprehensive security called for the co-ordinate application of economic, political and military measures at three levels: the global level; with selected groupings of countries; and in national self-help efforts. Key security objectives identified at each level were: at the global level, arms control, better North-South relations, and free trade; at the intermediate level, maintenance of good relations with political allies and key economic partners; and at the national self-help level military defense as well as economic productivity and export competitiveness.[327]

Of course, these were non-military efforts to sustain national security through the improvement of relations with neighboring states and the contributions to international affairs. From that point of view, the comprehensive security policy can be considered as another version of the Yoshida doctrine. Japan could divert attention from the pressure of their military expansion as well as the expected severe opposition of public opinion which still prevented Japan from explicitly committing their Self Defense Forces to anything but local defense of the Japanese homeland. To broaden its contributions to Western security, Japan began to portray economic assistance as a security contribution in such cases as the 1987-

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[325]Tetsuo Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p. 146.

[326]Yukio Satoh, *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*, p. 4-5.

[327]David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," p. 45.

1988 Kuwait oil tanker reflagging crisis. It also extended sizeable loans to South Korea and increased official development assistance (ODA) to such front-line states as Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jamaica.[328] There was also an improvement of relations with neighboring states. Nakasone visited Korea in 1983 as the first Japanese Prime Minister to go to South Korea, eighteen years after rapprochement, and in 1985 the USSR Foreign Minister visited Tokyo. The Japanese comprehensive security policy was positively responded to by its allies, especially the United States. Based on economic power, their financial contribution to developing countries was helpful in resisting the expansion of communism, which in return rewarded Japan with a stable international economic environment.

During the Cold War era, the most important benefit of the security treaty for Japan has been considered to be their economic development. Japan has gotten by "on the cheap" in defense for 40 years avoiding spending what other nations must spend on defense, by keeping defense expenditures under one percent of GNP.[329] In addition, Japan contributed to the end of the Cold War not only because the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan contained the expansion of communist states, especially into the Northeast Asian states, and thus maintained the regional balance of power, but also because Japan's contributions and economic assistance helped the maintenance of world peace and strengthened the front-line states' resistant power against communism.

d. Capability of military technology

The National Defense Agency and the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces were created by the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law on July 1, 1954. Facing U.S. pressure for a more concrete military commitment to the security alliance, in 1958 the Defense Agency started to formulate defense buildup plans: the 1st Buildup Plan (1958-1960); the 2nd Buildup Plan (1962-1966); the 3rd Buildup Plan (1967-1971); and the 4th Buildup Plan (1972-1976). As goals of these Plans were not

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[328]David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," p. 45-46.

[329]James H. Buck, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces," p. 76.

accomplished,[330] in 1976 the National Defense Council and the cabinet decided to abandon the formulation of them and adopted instead the National Defense Program Outline, which did not specify a date for the buildup of the SDF.[331] Also, realizing that annual budgeting was counterproductive, in 1979 a new system of "mid-term planning estimates" (Chuki Gyomu Mitsumori or *chugyo*) was installed.

During the periods of first three Buildup Plans, Japanese investment in research and development (R&D) for their greater autonomy was salient. With the U.S. technology transfer of HAWK (medium-range) and NIKE (long-range) missiles, Japan got an opportunity to revive its defense industry. "The Mitsui Group organized a team of related firms: Toshiba (electronics), Nippon Steel Works (materials), Dai Nippon Celluloid (propellent), Tokyo Instruments (controls), and Mitsui and Company (data acquisition and coordination). Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) organized a group that included Fuji Precision and NEC."[332] The Mitsui Group independently acquired a Swiss missile in order to study a system more advanced than any of their own, and KHI became Japan's sole source for four successive generations of antitank surface-to-surface guided missiles. "In 1957, when Vietnam asked for a thousand technicians to help rebuild an old French colonial shipyard, the industry claimed that export demand for Japanese merchant vessels was so great that all technicians were needed at home."[333] This had important meaning for the Japanese defense industry because "the commercially driven, technologically sophisticated, and highly

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[330]The first plan's goal of 220 vessels totaling 124,000 tons has still not been reached, nor has the goal of 1,300 aircraft for the Air SDF. See Reinhard Drifte, *Arms Production in Japan* (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p. 14. Also, because of severe public opposition to the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1951, the Second Buildup Plan was started two years after the end of First Plan.

[331] Reinhard Drifte, *Arms Production in Japan* (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p. 14.

[332]Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army* (New York: Cornell University, 1994), p. 157. At that time, firms diverted profits and acquired new debt to compete for defense contracts, because they believed that defense production raised general technological levels and promised clear commercial benefits through the diversion of technology into nondefense applications. P. 164.

[333]Ibid., p. 162.

diversified industry was pioneering Japan's new technomilitary paradigm."[334] Needless to say, this military-related technology contributed to the development of civilian technology, especially electronics during these periods. Then, this "spinning out" effect, which was further followed during the next decade, brought about "spinning on" more advanced technologies from the commercial sectors later.

In the fourth Buildup Plan, Japan tried to increase its autonomous defense capabilities because of the influences of Nixon's Guam Doctrine and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. In particular, Nakasone Yasuhiro, then director-general of the Defense Agency who was outspoken on defense issues, insisted on a new U.S.-Japan relationship based on the principle of autonomous defense in the front line and the alliance in the rear and pursued his policy to strengthen the autonomous structure of Japanese defense production.[335]

However, his policy was confronted with domestic and foreign opposition, especially after the rapprochement between the United States and China. Coupled with the oil crisis and recession, the 1972 defense budget was slashed by 500 million yen, and over this period the share of equipment purchases and capital investment in the defense budget declined from 29.2 percent to under 20 percent. In this period, moreover, there were active debates on the *kokusan* (domestic production) of PXL (next-generation antisubmarine patrol aircraft), which was scheduled for development with their autonomous weapons technology. Confronted with not only strong U.S. pressure to increase Japanese weapons imports to solve the balance of the payment problem between them, but also the "Lockheed trials," Japan decided to procure forty-five P-3C antisubmarine patrol airplanes in 1977, instead of producing them on its own.

Even though Japan spent nine years on not-so-productive debating, it should be noted that the aircraft and electronic industries confidently predicted that "Japan was capable of manufacturing a highly advanced ASW patrol airplane within seven to eight years of

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[334]Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army*, p. 162.

[335]Ibid., p. 172-173.

launching the project."[336] Also, Nakasone showed a facet of Japanese policy on the principle of autonomous defense if there were changes in the security environment around Japan.

After 1976, when the National Defense Program Outline was created as Japan's first explicit strategic doctrine in the post war era, Japan did not show any major new weapons systems and its defense production decreased. However, Japanese defense R&D consistently expanded and was further integrated with commercial R&D to the benefit of each. For instance, "research on heat resistance and structural engineering laid the foundation for Japan's heavy industrial boilers, nuclear power plants, and other high temperature applications and made similar claims for each major aircraft and electronics project."[337]

In 1981Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, formally suggested to Omura, the Japan Defense Agency Director General, that Japan might transfer defense technology to the United States. Much had changed in the U.S. perceptions of Japanese technological capabilities. Actually, Japan has been succeeding in the development of its indigenous defense technology based on its economic power. The Fighter Support Experimental (FS-X) program, a program for Japan's next generation of fighter support aircraft to replace the existing Mitsubishi F-1, is an example. When Japan tried to develop its indigenous fighter in 1985, the United States opposed it primarily for strategic and military-political reasons.[338] With its limited defense funds, the program would be less effective; the new fighter would not be fully interoperable with U.S. fighters if Japan develops it with only its indigenous technology. Strategically, a Japanese autonomous defense capability would bolster a more independent security policy, less amendable to U.S. influence. Moreover, Japan's neighboring states became uneasy over a more capable and independent Japanese defense industry. After severe confrontation for two years, in 1987 Japan agreed to the cooperative development of the FS-X based on a GD F-16C fighter. Despite years of haggling and stacks of signed agreements,

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[336]Sungjoo Han, "Japan's "PXL" Decision: The Politics of Weapons Procurement," *Asian Survey*, vol. 18, number 8, p. 773.

[337]Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army*, p. 179.

[338]Mark Lorell, *Troubled Partnership: An Assessment of U.S.-Japan Collaboration on the FS-X Fighter* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), p. 13.

the program has evolved away from the original Pentagon concept of a minimally modified F-16 to a virtually all-new Japanese-developed fighter broadly based on the F-16.[339] It is critical in that the "FS-X is providing Japanese industry with an entree into the highly exclusive world club of developers of advanced fighter aircraft weapon systems, one of the most potent conventional weapons in existence."[340] Mark Lorell describes Japan's capability to produce their new fighter:

> In outward appearance, the FS-X still closely resembles the F-16, ... But appearances can be deceptive. Over 95 percent of F-16 engineering drawings are being changed ... The FS-X wing is an all-new Japanese design that is 25 percent larger in area than the F-16 wing. Its structure and materials are based on a Japanese-developed occured CFC process. The horizontal stabilizer is also a newly designed composite structure, about 20 percent larger than the F-16 tail plane. Japanese-developed stealth technology is being applied to the airframe. The center fuselage is 10 inches larger and has new structures and materials. The nose and canopy are changed, as is the landing gear. There is a Japanese-developed "glass" cockpit with three liquid-crystal flatpanel displays and numerous other new items. In addition to the four primary indigenous Japanese avionics systems, at least 40 or more important subsystems and major components are Japanese developed. Virtually all of the FS-X avionics will be Japanese-developed component systems or modified versions of F-16 systems. The FS-X will be armed with many indigenous munitions, including air-to-air and antiship missiles.[341]

In summary, the security policy of Japan during the Cold War era can be characterized by three facts. First, the Japan-U.S. security alliance was the heart of Japan's security. Represented by the Yoshida doctrine, Japan has stayed back of the United States benefiting from the economic development without serious security costs. Second, Japan increased its potential military capability based on its high technology and economic power. Third, Japan failed to improve its security relations with neighboring states. As long as it maintains the alliance with the United States, Japan cannot link its economic relations with China to security matters. Without a clear resolution for past history, Japan could not get any security relations with South Korea.

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[339]Mark Lorell, *Troubled Partnership*, p. 7.

[340]Ibid., p. 7.

[341]Ibid., p. 7-8.

4. Japan's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

The demolition of the former Soviet Union forced Japan as well as the United States to set a new security framework in the post-Cold War era, suggesting the following three questions. First, what are the potential threats to their national security? Second, what should the role of Japan be in regional and global security affairs? Third, what kind of new relationship with the United States should be established, especially in terms of the latter's military commitment in Japan? As an answer to all these questions, the Japan-U.S. joint declaration on a security alliance toward the 21st century has important meanings. First, their move toward reinforcing security relations is intended to prevent any regional conflicts that would threaten their national interests in the Asia-Pacific region, necessarily including the threat of China. Second, with the constraints of the U.S. budget, Japan can assume a much more active military role reinforcing their military cooperation. Third, even though the post-Cold War environment weakens the justification of stationing U.S. forces in Japan in terms of the disappearance of the major threat, security interests from their alliance still exist.

a. Japan's threat assessment

"In the Asia-Pacific region, the picture of antagonism is complicated and countries' security perceptions are diverse, and there exist unsettled issues, such as those concerning the Korean Peninsula, the Spratly Islands and Japan's Northern Territories."[342] The fact that this region is still confronted with the remnants of the Cold War, and that regional states have built and modernized their military capabilities, contribute to making the regional security environment worse. Most of all, despite the declining Russian military power in the Far East, the highest priority for Japanese defense planners seems to have been Russia before the Japan-U.S. joint declaration on the security alliance in 1996. Japan has kept an eye on the fact that Russia has huge stockpiles of rationalized and modernized war capabilities, and that it, suffering from a tight fiscal condition, made clear its policy to actively export weapons for foreign currency, and has already sold SU-27 fighters to China and Kilo-class

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[342]Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1994*, p. 5.

submarines to Iran.[343] Coupled with the disputes over the return of four northern islands, which has impeded a formal peace treaty between the two states, Japan has continued to carefully monitor the movement of Russian policy.

Since the Japan-U.S. joint declaration on the security alliance, however, Japan's security policy seems to focus on China rather than Russia as a main potential threat. Despite the ongoing economic reform and the removal of more than one million troops since 1985, its nuclear bomb tests, its hard line policy toward Taiwan, and the Spratly Island issue have made these regional states feel uneasy. China also has enhanced its relations with Russia and gradually modernized its military, concluding a five-year military cooperation agreement in 1993.[344] In particular, related to the Spratly Island issue, it has been trying to enhance naval and air forces with a special emphasis,[345] which might threaten Japan's sea lines of communication.

North Korea's nuclear development program and the test firing of a new type of missile, the Nodong 1, with an estimated range of 1,000 kilometers, also can be considered as another threat to Japan's security. "Nuclear development in North Korea raised the long-taboo question of Japan developing nuclear weapons,"[346] and the success of the development of the Nodong 1 missile prompted sudden and active consideration of a new anti-missile system, which is a combined missile defense and satellite detection system.

In summary, Japan's threat perception in the post-Cold War era is based on the fact that there still exists the danger that various antagonistic relations peculiar to regions may come to the surface and escalate into armed conflict, while the possibility of a world-scale war

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[343]Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1994*, p. 33.

[344]Arthur S. Ding, "The PRC's Military Modernization and a Security Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific," in *Issues & Studies*, vol. 31 No. 8, p. 9.

[345]Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1994*, p. 51-53. Although most of the ships are obsolete and small, naval modernization is underway through the construction and deployment of Luhu-class destroyers and Jiangwei-class frigates capable of carrying helicopters and retrofitting the ships with the new types of missiles.

[346]The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey* 1993-1994 (London, 1993), p. 162.

has become remote.[347] The ongoing regional conflicts, such as the Gulf War, the Bosnian War, and conflicts in the Middle East, have illustrated that there is no relation between the end of the Cold War and regional peace. On the contrary, those kinds of conflicts might increase because of the diminished influence of the superpowers. Especially, when it comes to the unstable security environment of Northeast Asia, Japan strongly feels the need not only to maintain a security alliance with the United States even in the post-Cold War era, but also to prepare their "proper" self defense capability for future regional instability. "While the possibility of a limited conflict breaking out in Japan's neighborhood cannot be dismissed, the military balance between the superpowers and the existence of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements are expected to continue to play a major role in maintaining international stability and in preventing full-scale aggression against Japan."[348] On the other hand, however, any possibility of U.S. military reduction in this region, like the "East Asia Strategic Initiative" in 1990 which suggested a three-phase gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces, would be a major factor for Japan to try to reinforce their self defense capability.

b. Active security posture

Japan's active security posture in the post-Cold War has been due to the lessons learned from the Gulf War. First, the post-Cold War era would not be free of armed conflicts. Second, a nation cannot attain international stature by economic means alone.[349] With the existing public abhorrence to a military role and the post-war "low politics," the Japanese response on August 31, 1990 to the demands[350] of the United States that requested

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[347]Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1994*, p. 7.

[348]See "National Defense Program Outline" in *Defense of Japan 1994*.

[349]Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), p. 15.

[350]The demands included: directly contribute to the defense of the region through the dispatch of personnel and equipment, including minesweepers and transport planes; provide monetary support for the multinational forces; provide aid to neighboring countries in the region affected by the crisis; reveal plans for buying major weapons systems from the U.S.; and increase financial support for stationing U.S. troops in Japan. See Courtney Purrington and A. K., "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis," *Asian Survey*, vol. 31, no. 4, April 1991, p. 308-309.

more active participation of Japan to the Gulf Crisis was too passive to satisfy the United States as well as Western allies. Japan's $1billion aid package was criticized in the U.S. for being designed to maximize corporate profits and minimize the risk of Japanese lives. There was a severe confrontation between the two.[351] On September 12, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the defense authorization bill calling for the annual withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Japan beginning in five years if the Japan did not agree to pay the full cost of deploying U.S. troops there. Japan announced that it would tell U.S. forces to "please go home." Facing a storm of international criticism and the danger of permanent damage to relations with the United States, however, Japan decided to contribute $12 billion more -- before the war $3 billion and during the war $9 billion -- to pay the costs of Operation "Desert Storm" and dispatch four small wooden minesweepers after the end of the Gulf Crisis.[352] However, their passive posture in the crisis, coupled with the situation of "no risk of Japanese lives," contributed little to Japanese credit.

Japan's recognition of the post-Cold War environment, which requires their active participation and role in international security affairs, resulted in the dispatch of Self Defense Forces personnel abroad for U.N. peacekeeping operations. After severe controversy over the Constitutional problem, the "Bill Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations" and the "Bill to Amend Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team" were enacted at the 123rd Ordinary Session of the Diet in June 1992. The PKO bill states that no more than 2,000 Japanese

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[351]Courtney Purrington and A. K., "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis," *Asian Survey*, p. 310. During a Senate House conference a month later, the provision of withdrawal of U.S. forces in Japan was dropped.

[352]David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," p. 46. One major reason for the dispatch of minesweepers was the support of the majority of Japanese, who only five months earlier had overwhelmingly opposed it. According to an Asahi Shimbun survey, 56 percent of those polled supported the dispatch of SDF minesweepers while 30 percent opposed the action. These changes were due to Japanese disappointment over the lack of recognition accorded to their $13 billion in aid, unease over becoming isolated in the international community, and fears of worsening relations with the United States. See Courtney Purrington, "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the 'Iraqi Shock' on Japan," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 65, no. 2, Summer 1992, p. 171-172.

troops can be sent overseas in a PKO force, and even those troops can perform only noncombat functions that are strictly defined: supervise the disarming or withdrawal of troops; monitor compliance with cease-fire arrangements; patrol buffer zones; collect, maintain, dispose of, or check on the movement of weapons; assist in cease-fire-line demarcation; and help in prisoner exchanges. While this implies Japan's "contribution" to world peace, however, it also means that for the first time since 1945 Japan can send troops abroad, thus provoking widely differing views abroad. The United States and many Western countries welcomed it as a sign of Japanese efforts to contribute to the new international order, while some neighboring Asian countries such as China, South Korea and North Korea expressed concern that this was the beginning of an inevitable resurgence of Japanese military might.[353]

Most of all, the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which was completed on November 28, 1995, showed the changed defense posture toward the security of Japan. Even though the basic principle of "to possess an adequate defense capability" was the same as the existing one made in 1976, the most distinct change in the new NDPO was the change in the purpose of that principle: from "to prevent aggression" to "to secure peace and security around Japan."[354] Also, while it denied the right of collective defense because the latter would require more than the limit of the minimum defense capability, the new NDPO recognized Japan's military contribution to international peace through the participation in the PKO, anti-terrorism activity, and relief activity for a large scale disaster, which reflected and guided the more active security posture of Japan in post Cold-War.

On the other hand, U.S. policy toward East Asia in the post-Cold War era is premised on a more active security role by Japan. The changes in U.S. security strategy in the report of April 1990, the "U.S. East Asia Strategy Initiative," which included a shift from a global containment strategy primarily directed to the Cold War era Soviet threat to a focus on

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[353]The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey* 1993-1994 (London, 1993), p. 140.

[354]Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1994*, p. 260. Also, see *The Choongang Ilbo*, November 30, 1995.

selective engagement in critical regions of the world, increased doubts over the U.S. military commitment in this region.[355] Even though a further reduction of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia was suspended by the doubt over a nuclear development program by North Korea, Japan could not help seeking a new security relationship with the United States. As a result of the series of examinations of the security environment through the "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region" in 1994 and Japan's new "National Defense Program Outline" in 1995, the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century" was concluded in April 1996 in Tokyo to suggest a future security relationship between the two states.

c. The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance

On April 17, 1996, the U.S. President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century."[356] In this declaration, the two summiteers agreed that a continued U.S. military presence based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States is essential not only for the defense of Japan but also for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation, which is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Clinton promised the maintenance of the current U.S. force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in Asia, including approximately the current level in Japan. Hashimoto confirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan. Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and U.S. forces, they also decided to enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment, such as the support fighter.

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[355]Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 27 July 1992.

[356]For more detailed, see the text of "*Japan-U.S. joint declaration on security alliance for the 21st Century.*"

As "the most significant summit talk since the end of the Cold War" as U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry said, the Japan-U.S. joint declaration has three important meanings. First, the boundary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between them was changed from Far East Asia including the area around Japan, north of the Philippines, and South Korea and Taiwan[357] to the Asia-Pacific region adding Southeast Asia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands.[358] It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the new boundary includes the Spratly Islands, which has faced territorial disputes among China and some of the Southeast Asian states. Second, Japan can expand their security role in the Asia-Pacific region as bilateral defense cooperation between them increases. Clinton and Hashimoto confirmed the launch of a joint study to revise the 1978 bilateral defense cooperation guidelines in order to develop plans for cooperating with each other militarily in case of security emergencies in this region. "The study, with an eye to crafting plans for joint military operations during crises, is expected to look into what logistical support Japan could provide in such areas as naval blockades, escorting warships, mine-sweeping operations in international waters, intelligence-gathering activities, and supplying goods and services."[359] Also, Hashimoto has expressed the government's willingness to consider U.S. proposals to legislate some clarity into how it might assist the U.S. in regional conflicts, a longtime political taboo for previous administrations.[360] Therefore, regardless of whatever the outcomes of study and legislation might be, coupled with the increased possibility of Japan to get involved in regional conflicts with the United States, they will ultimately contribute to expanding Japan's security role in the future. Finally, Japan can get a basis to legitimize its military buildup as its security role is increased. In an address to the Diet on April 18, 1996, Clinton praised Japan's PKO activities in Cambodia, Rwanda, and the Golan Heights, which had caused severe arguments

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[357]Takahiko Ueda, Ako Washio and Mari Koseki, "Tokyo makes major defense policy shift," *The Japan Times* (April 17, 1996).

[358]See the text of "*Japan-U.S. joint declaration on security alliance for the 21st Century.*"

[359]Takahiko Ueda, Ako Washio and Mari Koseki.

[360]Ibid.

about the translation of the constitution in Japan, as a kind of "leadership," and requested more commitments.[361] To implement the Joint Declaration and the Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ASCA), the majority of opinion is converging on the inevitability of a constitutional revision, rather than further interpretation of it.[362] Even if Japan decides to make a revision of its constitution, it does not seem to be faced with any serious opposition from international society, except some neighboring states.

The new security relations between Japan and the United States will necessarily be a basis for expanding the security role of Japan. According to Takahiko Ueda, Ako Washio and Mari Koseki, staff writers of The Japan Times, Japan's responsibility for security arrangements has now increased due to the bilateral commitment in enhanced defense coordination which is intended to prepare for regional issues such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and the Spratly islands.[363] Of course, there is no explicit explanation about Japan's expanding future military role in the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration. With the given flexibility of the text, however, their mutual cooperation in the fields of logistical support, exchange of military technology and intelligence, and research and development of equipment seems to pave the way by which Japan can increase its military power to a degree. Especially in terms of logistical support, the two countries concluded the Acquisition and Cross-Serving

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[361]Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Urges Broad Global Role for Japan," *The New York Times*(April 18, 1996).

[362]The stance of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which has opposed any progressive interpretation of the Constitution, is to protect the current interpretation of the Constitution. Also, a leader of New Party, Sakigake, takes the same posture as SDP. Opposing them, Shinshinto leader Ichiro Ozawa has called on Japan to become a "normal country" to be able to use military forces to contribute to the world. And, "At Kudan Kaikan Hall in Tokyo's Chiyoda Ward, about 800 people gathered at the annual symposium of the People's Congress to Protect Japan, a civic group calling for a drastic revision of the Constitution." Among them, Tadae Takubo, a professor at Kyorin University, and Toshiyuki Shikata, a professor at Teikyo University and former commander of the Hokubu District Army of the Ground Self-Defense Force, argued that Japan should be a truly sovereign state. See "Revision, status quo calls mark Constitution Day," in *The Japan Times* (May 3, 1996). That is to say, without any revision of Constitution, it would be difficult for Japan to keep their promise with US.

[363]Takahiko Ueda, Ako Washio and Mari Koseki, "Tokyo makes major defense policy shift," *The Japan Times* (April 17, 1996).

Agreement (ACSA) to improve Japan's logistical support for U.S. forces, including fuel and weapons parts, during peacetime joint exercises, United Nations-led peacekeeping operations and international relief activities.[364] Then, to support the ACSA, Japan would increase its military capabilities even though not for combat operation but for logistical support, and there would be an increasing possibility for Japan to get involved in international conflicts regardless of Japan's willingness.

Japan's neighboring states, especially China and South Korea, have expressed their concern about the Joint Security Declaration. Even though there was no mention of China as a destabilizing factor in the text of the joint declaration, China has felt the US-led efforts to contain it. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang, expressed public concern on April 18, 1996 for the first time since the end of the Cold War that "The Japan-U.S. treaty on the guarantee of security is a bilateral arrangement left over from history," given the reduction of the Russian naval presence in the Pacific.[365] Also, in a specific warning to Tokyo, he cautioned the Japanese not to embark on a defense buildup, reflecting China's fears of Japanese militarism rooted in World War II. Also, in South Korea, the mass media raised voices concerned about Japan's move toward rearmament, reporting that Japan will possibly use the declaration as an opportunity to build its military up to the level of countering China independently.[366] Two days before the declaration, Clinton and Perry visited South Korea, and Perry explained the good will of that declaration to Lee Yang-ho, the South Korean Defense Minister, to relieve the opposite atmosphere in South Korea.

5. Summary: Prospects for the Future Security Policy

Japan's security policy will be directed toward increasing its political role in

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[364]The United States first proposed the idea in 1988 to pave the way for Japan's logistical support, but Japan was unable to conclude arrangements due to the expectation that they would be opposed by leftwing political groups. See "Mondale, Ikeda Ink Mutual Military Provisioning Pact," in *The Japan Times* (April 15, 1996).

[365]Patrick E. Tyler, "China Cautions U.S. and Japan On Focus of New Security Pact," in *The New York Times* (April 19, 1996).

[366]*The Choongang Ilbo*, April 17, 1996.

international affairs. Olsen indicates in terms of economic power, "Japanese national pride is resurgent in a generally positive way that is propelling the Japanese to seek political influence matching their economic power," which is more likely to increase in the 1990s and beyond.[367] Scalapino says, "Virtually every commentator and politician asserts that Japan must assume a greater responsibility for world order. Yet there is a continuing uncertainty as to how that role is to be played, and what price should be paid."[368] Also, the United States, currently under the Clinton Administration, supports Japan's permanent membership in the UN Security Council. In addition to these requests and predictions for a greater role for Japan, Japan learned a lesson from the Gulf War: with only an economic contribution, they cannot get along with international society. Commensurately with economic stature, Japan will participate in international affairs and take responsibility more actively than before.

Japan's expanding political role will necessarily require its military buildup for its "self-defense" and the "contribution" to world peace. Most of all, Japan's dependency on natural resources which started from its modernization period after the Meiji Restoration is a major factor that would expand its boundary for self defense to protect the sea lines of communication. Coupled with her growing economic capacity, the safety and stability of the regions that export raw materials to Japan, or which import manufactured products from Japan will become more and more important for her national interests.[369] Also, the safety of the Sea Lines of Communication, such as the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, is the security of her economic life. As Japan's economy expands, the security boundary that they have to defend will expand respectively for its survival and prosperity. Also, Japan's expanding political role, coupled with its upcoming membership in the UN Security Council, will require a greater military role for international security

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[367]Edward A. Olsen, "The End of the Cold War and Northeast Asian Security," ed. Dora Alves, *Change, Interdependence, and Security in the Pacific Basin* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1991), p. 183

[368]Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of Japan," p. 338.

[369]Toshiyuki Shinkata, "Japan's Grand Strategy," ed. Michael D. Bellows, *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities* (Washington: National Defense University), p. 63.

activities, such as peacekeeping operations. Therefore, even though it is not up to the level of "nationalists" claims,[370] Japan's security role and military build up would be reinforced while assuming some U.S. security roles and participating in the UN peacekeeping activities. Considering its high level of technology and economic power, Japan will rise as a new military power with the most modernized military equipment in a certain security environment, such as U.S. withdrawal or regional conflicts that may directly harm its national interest.[371]

Table 4. Military Budget and Forces in 1994[372](Bgt.: U.S. current billion $, Forces: million)

State	GDP	Military Budget	Mil. Bgt./GDP	Regular Forces
Japan	4,602.0	42.1	0.92	0.24
China	515.0	6.7	1.3	2.93
South Korea	377.0	14.0	3.7	0.63
North Korea	20.4	2.3	11.3	1.13

While Japan is one of the largest economies in the world, it has been considered as only a middle-ranked military power with minimal force projection capability due to its constitution which bars dispatching its forces to other countries.[373] Despite constitutional

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[370]The parties to a debate on national security can be distinguished by "mainstream," "nationalist," and "pacifist" in terms of political philosophies. Nationalists consider the post-Cold War as a non-polar world, and insist that Japan must be ready to defend itself without relying on the United States. The first task in doing so should be to revise the constitution, which prohibits Japan from using force against other nations. Their reactions to the Gulf War were radical. They objected to Japan's effort to gain respect from other states through financial contributions to the war. They believed that the monetary contribution in place of military participation was foolish and they would have preferred that Japanese troops go into combat with UN forces. See Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War*, p. 30.

[371]Of course, this premises just conventional warfare, not nuclear use.

[372]Richard D. Fisher, Jr. and John T. Dori, *U.S. and Asia Statistical Handbook 1995* (The Heritage Foundation, 1995). China's budget is based on official figures. Outside estimates range from $20 billion to $140 billion.

[373]Sheldon W. Simon, "Regional Threat Environment in Asia," ed. Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika, Jr., *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies* (Boulder: Westview Press,

restrictions, however, Japan's military can no longer be ignored in terms of military expenditures, as well as its technological level. As table 4 shows, while Japan's regular military forces are about one twelfth that of China and a third of South Korea, its military budget has been about three times that of Korea and seven times China's official budget. The portion of equipment acquisition, including weapons, aircraft and vessels, is about 20-25 % of the total military budget,[374] which is more than the total military budget of China. Also, Japan's equipment is the most modernized, based on its technology. Then, in terms of military budget and its use, Japan has strong potential to rise as a military power in the near future. That is the reason why all the neighboring states, including Southeast Asian countries, are concerned about Japan's rearmament.

Based on its economic power, Japan already has a potent technology-intensive military capability and is expanding its military options: 64 major surface combatants with four groups each consisting of eight destroyers configured for blue water service; 15 attack submarines; 85 long-range patrol aircraft; 95 anti-submarine helicopters.[375] Japan is acquiring four Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), at least four Aegis-equipped ships of the Kongo class which are comparable to US Aegis cruisers. By the end of this century, Japan will have a new FSX attack fighter aircraft and a theater missile defense (TMD) system. In addition, now Japan is considering acquiring satellite monitoring capabilities. David Arase makes cynical remarks with regard to Japan's future military capability that "what remains to

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1986), p. 344.

[374] See Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan* (Japan, 1994), p. 281.

Item	Personnel Provisions	Equipment Acquisition	R&D	Facility improvement	Maintenance	Others
Ratio (%)	42.6	21.3	2.7	4.3	16.9	12.1

[375]David Arase, "A Militarized Japan?" ed. Desmond Ball, *The Journal of Strategic Strudies*, vol. 18, no. 3, September 1995, p. 88-89.

be developed are amphibious capabilities."[376]

C. SECURITY POLICY OF CHINA

China's security policy, despite the revolutionary characteristics based on Marxist-Leninist theory, has been defensive rather than offensive. Economic failure under Mao Zedong was the major reason why China could not develop its incipient position after the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into a "transnational" leadership like the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. The economic reform under Deng Xiaoping has contributed to more international relations based on national interests rather than transnational relations for communist revolution. Coupled with the end of the Cold War, China's economic development seems to suggest less of a possibility of its position as a leader of the third world countries and of its strategy of communist revolution.

The future direction of China's security policy will be closely related to Chinese nationalism, which has been aimed at anti-hegemonism and recovering its national status throughout its recent history. China's security policy has traditionally been influenced by its nationalism. Contrary to most other countries' nationalism, which was motivated by their national independence from colonial imperialists, Chinese nationalism can be characterized by two factors: anti-imperialism and recovery of national status. While other states' nationalism was weakened after their independence and withdrawal of imperialists, Chinese nationalism has survived and will continue until they become satisfied with their national status, which would necessarily mean the status as a hegemonic power in this region.

While China is rising as a new regional power in terms of economic development and military strength, it is in an awkward dilemma: the more economic development opens its market, the less legitimacy its regime has. Coupled with the end of the Cold War, which decreased its legitimacy, their modernization based on capitalism will necessarily lead to the introduction of democratic principles or, if not, less despotism. It may cause domestic instability and result in the split of China into several independent states, such as inner

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[376]David Arase, "A Militarized Japan?" p. 90.

Mongolia, Tibet, Taiwan and others. One solution for this dilemma can be to appeal to its nationalism, which will help in unifying its national power and legitimizing its regime. In addition to the issues of Taiwan and the Spratly Islands, the rise of Japan as a new regional dominant power will inevitably be a basis for Chinese neo-nationalism.

1. Characteristics of Pre-Modern China

a. Sinocentrism and response to Western powers

Based on its own philosophy and belief system throughout its long history, China had a Sinocentric world view, which considered itself as the center of the world and considered others to be on the periphery. Historically, the Chinese developed their culture, philosophy and political system, and disseminated them to most East Asian countries. Accepting the Chinese leading culture, the neighboring states maintained Sinocentric relations sometimes voluntarily and sometimes for their survival. A key principle of Sinocentrism was related with its hierarchical nature, derived from the beliefs of distinction between civilized China and "barbarian" neighbors. "The tribute system was said to be a manifestation of this world view and resulted in China not appreciating the concept of alliances."[377] That is to say, China was at the top of a pyramid-type hierarchical structure and others accepted the status quo. Therefore, there was no concept like the balance of power.

Facing the requests of "opening the door" from Western powers, their failure at modernization, like the Japanese Meiji Restoration, can be examined in terms of two factors. The first factor was Sinocentrism. Chinese national pride and sense of superiority toward Western culture caused them to be resistant to their requests. It was never conceivable for their Emperor, the top of the top of their hierarchical structure as a "son of heaven," to negotiate with the representatives of other "barbarian" countries. On the contrary, the Chinese requested a tribute from the Westerners for opening their foreign relations. Their attitudes, of course, influenced other states such as Japan and Korea, although Japan realized much earlier the inevitability of an "open-door" policy. On the other hand, John Wills indicates the wariness of China to contact foreigners, especially in the late Qing Dynast, that open-door

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[377]Gerald Segal, *Defending China* (New York: Oxford University, 1985), p. 32.

policy might increase "the fragility of their systems of authority in late imperial times: a 'status quo' despotism's superficiality of bureaucratic controls and the heavy reliance on cultural orthodoxy in maintaining a vast and variegated empire."[378] As another factor for the failure of modernization, the Chinese economic system was ultimately different from the Western states. While the latter demanded commercial trade, the former maintained a self-sufficient economic system based on agriculture. Their different economic structures were not interchangeable, and thus failed to make a basis for China to open its door. Even though there was trade in restricted areas, like Canton in South China since the 18th century, Chinese exports such as tea and silk were traditional production which required intensive labor and home handicraft, and this made it difficult for China to accept the Western style economic system easily.

b. Chinese nationalism

When we define the term nationalism as "the desire of a people to be unified as an independent, sovereign state for the betterment of their lives,"[379] Chinese nationalism in the early 20th century fits with that definition, because there was a strong nature of "anti-imperialism" toward a sovereign state: the Boxer Uprising of 1900; the anti-American boycott of 1905; and Sun Yat-sen's nationalism.[380] However, their nationalism did not end with the withdrawal of the Western powers. Instead, it was another start of nationalism that drove them to catch up with the West. Selig Harrison asserts about Asian nationalism that "independence heightens nationalist consciousness by bringing Asian countries face to face

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[378]John E. Wills, Jr., "Chinese and Maritime Europeans, 1500-1800: Cases and Contexts," Wintergreen, Va., Aug. 1987, p.9. Quoted from William C. Kirby, "Traditions of Centrality, Authority, and Management in Modern China's Foreign Policy," ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, *Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 21.

[379]Lawrence Ziring and C. I. Eugene Kim, *The Asian Political Dictionary* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1985), p. 104.

[380]Before 1920s, Sun's nationalism included anti-Manchu -- that is pro-republic -- as well as anti-imperialism. But, his lectures in 1922 and 1923 strengthened anti-imperialism. See Translated by Kim Hankyu, Jeon Yongman and Yoon Byoungnam, *Dongyang Munhwasa* (Seoul: Eulyumunhwasa, 1993), p. 387, 430.

with global inequities and awakens an ever-growing desire for greater strength and adequacy in relation to the West."[381] Nationalism thus becomes a visceral compulsion and is likely to assess and reassess itself for at least as long as Asia continues to feel a sense of subordination in world affairs.[382] China is an example. With the past "shameful period" and national division, the People's Republic of China pursued its domestic and foreign policy strongly based on nationalism, striving to legitimize its regime and keep its national identity. As their revolutionary struggle against Japan declined with the end of the War, Chinese nationalism survived to catch up with the West including Japan during the Cold War era.

2. Communist Revolutionary Policy under Mao Zedong

Because of the characteristics of despotism that communist countries have, Chinese security policy during the Cold War era has been influenced by the two leading figures, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In this context, this chapter reviews Chinese security policy, dividing it into two durations.

Chinese security policy under Mao was closely related to the Chinese nationalistic movement during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Mao's revolutionary theories were directed toward anti-imperialism, and its motivation was to recover its national status as a leading country in international society. In an essay in 1949, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," Mao spelled out his ideas of Chinese national policy in two basic categories. The first was a "people's democratic dictatorship" wherein the working class which would lead should be formed by building a "domestic united front" including the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie, as well as the working class. Second, an international alliance with the Soviet Union, the countries in the Soviet bloc, and the world proletariat should be established for communist revolution.[383] Basically, Mao's ideas were to pursue communist revolution, as "no longer a child or a lad

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[381]Selig S. Harrison, *The Widening Gulf* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 6.

[382]Ibid., p. 6.

[383]Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1990), p. 514.

in his teens but an adult."[384]

The Chinese concept of security policy has been strongly related to anti-hegemonism during Mao's period. The "theory of three worlds" that suggested the Chinese world view based on anti-hegemonism has become the dominant theoretical basis for its security policy. About the theory of three worlds, Mao stated in 1947 that:

> the United States and the Soviet Union forms the first world, Japan, Europe, Canada and intermediate zone are the second world, and China is the third world. The third world has vast population. Except Japan, Asia is the third world, and Africa and Latin America also are the third world.[385]

By this theory, the first world is the direct threat to China because it has imperialistic characteristics and expansionism. The second world consists of developed countries which have the experience of colonial rule or invasion by the first world. The third world consists of developing countries with the same experience of the second world in the past. To resist the imperialism of the first world, the third world should align with the second world.

Even though there were several changes of the theory, the main concept of all theories were converging to anti-hegemonism or anti-imperialism. Considering the relations with the Soviet Union, the two camps theory from 1949 to the middle of 1950s, which divided the world into the capitalist side and the socialist side, was directed against the imperialism of the United States. After the relations with the Soviet Union worsened in the early 1960s, China described the Soviet Union as an imperialist country and developed the "intermediate zone theory"[386] which suggested the need of alignment with all countries between the two camps. One year after the death of Mao, the People's Daily reported in 1977 on the ongoing validity

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[384]Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, p. 514.

[385]See Baek Jong-Chun, *Gukga Bangwiron* (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1985), p. 314.

[386]There are three kinds of intermediate zones. The first intermediate zone consists of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The second intermediate zone consists of nonhegemonial developed countries such as Western European countries and Canada. The third intermediate zone consists of Eastern European socialist countries. The theory suggested that the first intermediate zone countries should improve the relations with the second intermediate countries to counter the threat of the United States, and should expand the force to the third intermediate countries to counter the threat of the Soviet Union.

of the three world theory as a way to properly adapt Marxism-Leninism to a new situation.[387] Even though the theoretical concept became weakened by economic development in Deng's era, anti-hegemonism has still been continued as a main frame of Chinese security policy.

China's main goal of reinforcing international relations with socialist countries, especially with the Soviet Union, in the 1950s was not only to counter the threats of anti-communist countries. It was also directed to reestablishing its prestige that had dwindled during the past decades under Yuan Shikai and the warlord leaders, and Kuomindang rule. "In the 1950s, China's relationship with the Soviet Union laid the foundation for the new China to survive and grow. An estimated 10,000 Chinese studied in the Soviet Union; and the modernization of military weapons, the beginning of China's nuclear capabilities, and the early transformation of the Chinese economy all took place with Soviet assistance."[388] Also, China promoted solidarity with socialist countries: an economic and cultural agreement with the Mongolian People's Republic in 1952; a formal aid agreement with North Korea in the same year; and further close ties with the insurgents in Vietnam, India and Burma.

While the transnational relations under the name of socialism raised the status of China as a leading socialist country with the Soviet Union, the communist hard line policy based on the two camps theory inevitably worsened the relations with the capitalist side. In particular, "The Korean War further complicated China's international status by fixing the United States in a position of hostility, which in turn ensured that Taiwan would remain outside the control of the PRC and the PRC outside the United Nations."[389] In 1954, there was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) agreement which was to build an international alliance for stopping further communist revolts in Southeast Asia. The United States also signed a mutual-defense treaty with Taiwan in 1954.

Mao's communist revolutionary policy was constrained by domestic factors: economic failure and political instability. Economic development was required for legitimacy of its

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[387] Back Jong-Chun, *Gukga Bangwiron*, p. 314.

[388] See Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century*, p. 449.

[389] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, p. 551.

regime as well as for supporting the international communist revolution as a leading socialist country. Coupled with the isolation of China from the capitalist side, however, the ideological stiffness impeded Chinese industry in adopting a new developed technology. Political reforms to refresh its revolutionary capability destroyed the traditional beliefs and ethics, and increased the domestic social disorder. Radical rural reform was practiced through rent reduction and land redistribution until 1953. Three Anti campaigns were directed at the Resist America and Aid Korea, domestic counter-rvolutionaries, and anti-corruption since 1950. Five Anti campaigns launched in 1952 were directed against the bourgeois. After the failure of the agricultural sector during the First Five Year Plan from 1953 to 1957, a cutoff of Soviet aid and a poor harvest in 1957 triggered the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 1958, whose purpose was to develop rural-based industrialization using traditional technology to produce inputs and mechanization for agricultural production in decentralized communes.[390]

Also, there was Cultural revolution which was a brutal measure to eliminate bourgeois influence,[391] cadre corruption, and other misconceptions.[392] However, these measures failed because of the lack of economic skills of Mao, the limits of the socialist economic system, and, as a result of those, inefficiency. Actually, Mao was an efficient nationalist, but not an economist, thus creating structural economic problems that still exist today.

While the political and economic problems in China can be considered as the main factors for China's defensive posture during the Cold War era, the Chinese concept of strategy based on "flexibility" suggests another clue for such a defensive attitude. The

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[390]Rosser and Rosser, *Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy* (Boston: Irwin, 1996), p.364.

[391]As the nationwide famine in 1960 resulted in the flight of thousands of starving people from China to Hong Kong and Macau, Mao realized that his economic strategy was impractical. He reinstituted the commune system and industry management to increase efficiency by introducing partial capitalistic factors, such as limited private ownership. As a result, even though both agriculture and industry grew solidly between 1961 and 1965, Mao felt that bourgeois influence would reduce Chinese revolutionary passion.

[392]However, it changed from an ideological movement to a political struggle against the so-called anti-party clique, including Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and Luo Ruiqing.

flexibility of Chinese security doctrine resulted from Mao Zedong's personal thoughts, which later became Maoism. Based on the idea that theory without practice is useless and dangerous, Mao emphasized policy experimentation, flexibility and useful knowledge.[393] He was influenced by successful guerrilla warfare whose tactics required much flexibility according to the battle environment and emphasized harmony, which was related to the traditional Chinese concept of yin and yang. Gerald Segal indicates that "The absence of any unified ideological view of how much Party control was required stems from the needs of military flexibility."[394] Also, "in his early writing Mao spoke of the need not to counterpose military and politics, and Zhou Enlai made clear that no 'rigid instructions' should be given to the military as 'concrete circumstances' change."[395]

Providing the guiding principles of China's military strategy, the concept of "People's war" shows the strategic defense based on flexibility. The concept is comprised of three stages:

> The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat.[396]

It can be summarized as "a defensive military strategy relying on mass mobilization, 'trading space for time' and 'luring the enemy deep', then drowning him in a sea of people'."[397] This concept reflected Mao's experience with guerrilla warfare during the struggles with the Kuomindang government and excluded the needs of engagement with the enemy outside the gates. While it enabled China to take advantage of its vast area and "enough" human resources, China's defensiveness was due to their respectively weak capability in terms of

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[393] Lawrence Ziring and C. I. Eugene Kim, *The Asian Political Dictionary*, p. 102.

[394]Gerald Segal, *Defending China*, p. 47.

[395]Ibid., p. 47.

[396]Georges Tan Eng Bok, "Strategic Doctrine," ed. Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, *Chinese Defense Policy* (Hong Kong: University of Illinois, 1984), p. 9.

[397]Ibid., p. 6.

modern technology, transportation, and economic power needed to engage long-term warfare. Even after the development of the nuclear weapon in 1964, China announced the continued effectiveness of the People's war with some corrections such as the modernization of the weapon system.

Of course, the People's war did not mean China should not engage outside the gate in any case. Xu Xiangquan, then Chinese Defense Minister, said in 1978 that "Engaging the enemy outside the gates has never been a good method of fighting, but the enemy should not be allowed to run rampant."[398] The Korean War and Vietnam War participation showed examples of this. During these two wars, China never deployed its military fully to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. But, by engaging with the enemy outside, China deterred the wars to be carried into Chinese territory. Despite such limited forward policy, the Chinese People's war was defensive when we consider Mao's stance that:

> Others may come and attack us but we shall not fight outside our borders. We do not fight outside our borders ... but if you should come and attack us we will deal with you. It depends on whether you attack on a small scale or a large scale. If it is on a small scale we will fight on the border. If it is on a large scale then I am in favor of yielding some ground. China is no small country. If there is nothing in it for them I don't think they will come ... If they invade our territory then I think it would be more to our advantage ... they would be easy to fight because they would fall into the people's encirclement.[399]

If we can consider the People's war as a military doctrine, "a united front doctrine" can be considered to be a more strategic concept to counter a hegemon power. Its basic concept came from Sun Zi, who urged the best policy of first attacking the enemy's strategy, then disrupting his alliances, then attacking his forces and finally the enemy people.[400] Mao developed this idea into the unified front doctrine during the struggle with Kuomindang and Japan. At that time, Mao strategically allied with the Kuomindang to disrupt Japan, and then fought with his ally and won. Then, during the Cold War era, this became the strategic

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[398]Gerald Segal, *Defending China*, p. 55.

[399]Ibid., p. 54-55.

[400]Ibid., p. 40.

concept of Chinese security policy, especially to contain either the Soviet Union or the United States. In the 1950s, China's alliance with the Soviet Union was to counter the threat of the United States. Also, after the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969, the rapprochement with the United States was another kind of unified front against the threat of the Soviet Union.

After the alliance with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China depended heavily on the Soviet Union not only for technical assistance to develop its own industry, communications networks, and power supplies, but also military reorganization to develop a modernized professional army. With the Soviet Union's lead and developing well-armed conventional forces, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) became a regular force rather than a guerrilla unit.[401] The Chinese also believed that the Soviet Union was the only shield against the threat of possible nuclear attack by the United States. However, when the United States decided to deploy Matador missiles in Taiwan, Mao was anxious to develop an atomic bomb for two reasons: first, to reduce what might become a dangerous overreliance on the Soviet Union; second, to strengthen its military weakness compared to the other two powers. In 1957, China could get "a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture" with a secret agreement on "the new technology for national defense." After this time, China speeded up development of a nuclear-weapons and a missile program, and in 1964 China succeeded in becoming a new nuclear power. This had two meanings for the Chinese security policy. First, China could have some ability to "deter" the Soviet Union as well as the United States.[402] While the People's war policy was somewhat passive, its new deferential power gave China a more active security policy of "retaliation." Second, as Mao taught that "political power grows out of the barrel of the gun," China could enhance its political influence in both Asian and world affairs.

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[401]Defense Ministry was named, and conscription law was promulgated in 1955. Air force was strongly reinforced: the Soviet Union provided China large numbers of MIG-15 jet fighters in 1951; from 1955 on, they permitted China to manufacture more advanced MIG-17 jet fighters under license at their own plants in Manchuria. See Jonathan D. Spence, P. 557-561.

[402]Robert G. Sutter, "Development in China's Nuclear Weapons and Attitudes toward Arms Control," ed. Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr. and Bruce W. Watson, *China's Military Reforms* (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p. 106.

3. Economic Reform and Modernization under Deng Xiaoping

With Deng's ascendancy and his proclamation of the "open door" doctrine in 1978, the PRC began a rapid expansion of political involvement and economic interdependence with the global system.[403] Deng's security policy was represented by three goals: economic development, the striving for hegemonism and safeguarding world peace, and the unification of the PRC with Hong Kong and possibly Taiwan.[404] Of the three goals, economic development through "opening their door" was foremost. He mentioned that "Any country that closed its door to the outside world cannot achieve progress. We underwent this bitter experience and so did our forefathers.... China closed the country to international intercourse for more than three centuries from the middle of the Ming Dynasty to the Opium War, or for nearly two centuries from emperors Kangxi and Qianlong. Hence the country became impoverished, backward, and ignorant."[405] Deng's stance against imperialists was much weaker than Mao's, reflecting a then existing "unified front" with the United States. However, Chinese nationalism was still alive in that even economic development was aimed at overcoming their backwardness and thus gaining their prestige in international society. Actually, Oksenberg insists that since the mid-1980s "a patient and moderate nationalism was rooted in confidence that China can regain its former greatness through economic growth, based on the import of foreign technology and ideas."[406]

From 1978 to 1982, China's pro-US policy was mainly due to Deng's modernization program which required access of Western high technology and funds. If China decided to keep the neutral stance between the United States and the Soviet Union, then neither would promise the huge Western technological and economic support it needed for modernization,

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[403]Allen S. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of China," ed. Roy C. Macridis, *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 278.

[404]Ibid., p. 278.

[405]Deng Xiaoping to Third Plenary Session of Central Advisory Commission, October 22, 1984, *Renmin Ribao*, January 1, 1985. Quoted from Allen S. Whiting, p. 278.

[406]Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 65, no. 3, 1987. Quoted from, Allen S. Whiting, p. 280.

nor help it to be quickly accepted out of its previous isolation from the world community as an important member, as it strongly desired in the late 1970s.[407] But if the United States recognized China's status or its strategic importance, China could exploit its status for more economic and technological assistance.[408] During the first two years, there was much improvement between China and the United States. Bilateral trade rapidly increased from US$1.1 billion in 1978 to US$2.3 billion in 1979 and US$4.8 billion in 1980. The number of Chinese scholars and students entering the United States jumped from only 500 in 1978 to 4,300 in 1980. The Chinese unified front policy seemed to be successful. However, their front did not last long because of a series of Sino-U.S. conflicts on the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan issue was a litmus test so that China could estimate the real U.S. intention toward China. However, ongoing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan[409] made China rethink their unified front policy. In terms of Deng's policy toward Taiwan, which was "peaceful co-existence" of "one country, two systems," the U.S. behavior was translated into that they did not consider China an important partner in containing the Soviet Union. More importantly, China felt that the United States considered the Chinese as needing the Americans more, instead of vice versa as Beijing liked to see.[410] Then, Chinese policy toward the United States could not seem to achieve Deng's overall strategy of status enhancement nor economic benefits and thus shifted to an independent foreign policy since 1982.[411]

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[407]Sheng Lijun, "China's 'Independent Foreign Policy,'" *Pacific Focus*, vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 1994, p. 10. By stressing the Soviet threat and China's consequent strategic importance, China could gain easier access to the pool of Western technology and funds necessary for its modernization.

[408]Ibid., p. 23-24.

[409]In 1978, instead of canceling the sale of 60 F-4s, the United States proposed to sell 48 F-5E and enable continuation of the co-production arrangement. In January 1980, there was an announcement that new military equipment valued at $280 million would be sold to Taiwan. On June 1980, Carter authorized U.S. aircraft manufactures to discuss possible sales of a more advanced aircraft, the so-called FX, to a number of foreign buyers, including Taiwan. See Sheng Lijun, p. 20-21.

[410]Ibid., p. 23.

[411]Deng accused that the United States thought that China was seeking its favor and some Americans thought that if the U.S. Government took a hard line against the Soviet Union, China

Independent foreign policy assumed no strategic alignment or alliance with either superpower. But China continued to distance itself from the United States, dropping its call for the united front and continuing to improve its relations with Moscow. "The essential purpose of the independent foreign policy was to maintain and enhance China's status or leverage over the United States for the ultimate object of comprehensive status enhancement through modernization."[412] The independent foreign policy had two implications. First, even though China changed its policy option, the basic purpose, to strengthen its status through modernization, has not changed. It was just a tactical revision from the U.S. card to the Soviet card. Second, while the united front policy targeted a certain non-united state, thus apparently confrontational, the independent policy pursued a much less confrontational line. China sought better economic relations with its Asian neighbors, and in 1992 it made a five-point proposal on Asian Pacific security order, which was a sign of its interest in a regional security arrangement.

4. The Rise of Chinese Neo-Nationalism

Chinese nationalism until the end of the Cold War was peculiar in that it aimed to recover their lost national status, differentiated from others that existed mainly to get their national independence. One of Anthony D. Smith's definitions fits in Chinese nationalism; "a movement with political goals for the attainment or maintenance of the status of 'nation', and all that it implies, entailing one or more organizations and activities designed to achieve those goals."[413] While their nationalism has survived until today, even though there were ups and downs, the end of the Cold War casted two urgent political questions, in addition to the task of recovery of national status: legitimacy of regime and national identity.

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would put up with it on issues like that of Taiwan. And he claimed that China was not seeking any country's favor. See "Deng Xiaoping's Talks to *Ming Bao* Director on 18 July." *Ming Bao*, 25 August 1981, in *FBIS/China*, 25 August 1981, p. 6. Quoted from Sheng Lijun, p. 33.

[412] Sheng Lijun, "China's 'Independent Foreign Policy,'" p. 44.

[413] Anthony D. Smith, "Nationalism," ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogdan, *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, p. 1115. The other three definitions are related with 'nation building', 'national sentiment of belonging to a nation', and 'ideology' respectively.

Most of all, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union was the greatest shock to China in terms of the political legitimacy and the psychological identity of the Great Empire. Deng's assessment of the future in April 1990 showed the rise of new Chinese nationalism; "Under the present international situation all enemy attention will be concentrated on China. They will use every pretext to cause trouble, to create difficulties and pressures for us....The next three-five years will be extremely difficult for our Party and our country."[414] From the viewpoint of China, the defeat of the Soviet Union, a suzerain state of communism, seemed to be the "bourgeois liberalization" coming to them as a threat to destabilizing the country. Coupled with the damage to ideological and political legitimacy, the Chinese crisis consciousness became a basis for new nationalism.

On the other hand, China's inferiority of its economy and military to the U.S. and Japan can be seen as another factor for nationalism. The new concept of war, with the most modernized weapons systems in the Gulf War based on advanced technology and economy of the two countries, made China realize her relatively backward status, which hurt their national pride. Overholt indicates the delicate sense of China against Japan that;

> Ever since the Meiji Restoration, China's adjustment to the West's intrusion has been consistently inferior to that of Japan. China was militarily humiliated by the British and others in the nineteenth century; Japan was not. China was humiliated diplomatically by Japan's Twenty One Demands in 1915 and militarily by the establishment of Manchukuo in 1931 and the full-scale Japanese invasion in 1937. Economically, following World War II Japan outstripped everybody, including especially China - a case of the loser climbing over the winner. Now there is a sense that China can hold more than its own in competition with Japan, if Chinese leaders maintain the momentum of reform.[415]

China is now standing on the crossroad between economic development and legitimacy of its regime. Yang Ping, editor of a magazine called Strategy & Management, says that "Before, it used to be that Marxism-Leninism secured national interests. Not any more.

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[414]Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," *The China Quarterly*, No. 142, 1995, p. 298.

[415]William H. Overholt, *The Rise of China* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 348-349.

Now there must be something to keep people inspired."[416] That would be new nationalism, which has risen not from the bottom, but from the top. As the Great Leap Forward did, that aims at unifying people to legitimize their weakened political line and to recover their status of Great Nation. Nayan Chanda and Kari Huus mention about Chinese new nationalism that "Its main goal may be to hold the country together during its rapid, turbulent transformation."[417] China's current resolute policy toward Taiwan, Tibet, and the Spratly Islands can be seen as a measure to strengthen their national identity and recover their political initiative in East Asia. Also, the nuclear bomb test in 1995, despite the protests of world opinion, can be translated in the same context.

5. Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

The most outstanding change of security environment to China in the post-Cold War era has been the disappearance of, at least nowadays, any threat from the north, coupled with Russia's cooperative approach toward it. Also, there was an improvement in relations with the south. Japan has given a high priority to improving their ties with China. There was rapprochement between China and South Korea in 1992, as a result of Chinese policy focusing on "peace and development" since the early 1980s, as well as the South Korean Government "northern diplomacy" during the late 1980s. It would be hasty if we estimate the regional security environment with only these "diplomatic" stories. There are two Chinese views of the U.S. forces in Northeast Asia: pro and con. As long as Japan is tethered to the US security umbrella, Japanese assertiveness and militarism will be kept in check; the US only serves to inhibit China's own desire to expand its influence as the dominant regional power.[418] In any case, China still gets a rival of either the United States or Japan, which impedes its security interests. Moreover, current moves such as Japan's expanding security role, Taiwan's

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[416]Steven Mufson, "China's 'Neo-Cons' See a Long March to Chaos," *Washington Post Weekly*, 20-26 October, 1995.

[417]Nayan Chanda and Kari Huus, "The New Nationalism," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 9, 1995.

[418]David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 1994, p. 51.

possible move toward independence and reinforcing air power, and the issue of Chinese human rights and piracy have made China seek another exit.

Even though it is not at the level of a united front, a new relationship is forming between Beijing and Moscow. They cemented close ties through not only exchanges of both summits and ministerial-level officials and explosively increased economic trade, but also defense realm. David Shambaugh describes their tie as follows:

> More than 30 bilateral accords have been signed since 1991. Total two-way trade, negligible just a few years ago, totaled $7.6 billion in 1993. In an ironic twist, China has become a creditor to Russia, extending several large loans and commodity credits. Russia's debt to China stood at $1.07bn in 1993. A significant indicator of growing contacts is in the defense realm. Confidence-building measures are being put in place. Troops are being reduced on both sides of the frontier and negotiations are proceeding to demarcate the entire border (the eastern sector has been mostly agreed). A 'hotline' has been established between Russia's Far Eastern Military District and the Commander of the Shenyang Military Region. ... A non-aggression treaty is apparently negotiated.[419]

Chinese military procurement from Russia can never be ignored. During Boris Yeltsin's 1992 visit to Beijing, deals were finalized for the purchase of 72 Su-27 fighters, four long-range Ilyushin transports, 18 S-300 guided missile anti-aircraft systems with 100 anti-aircraft missiles, 70 Type-72 battle tanks, and three conventional Kilo-class submarines.[420] Moreover, Beijing and Moscow concluded a five-year military cooperation agreement for the transfer of military technologies in 1993, and Russian experts have returned to China to upgrade production lines in PLA factories and to assist with both nuclear and ballistic missile technology.[421] By this agreement, various co-production arrangements have already begun, such as the MIG-31. Even though Chinese procurement occupies a large portion of their deal to minimize their costs for military modernization, as its economy grows, China will gradually focus on the development and production of its weapons.

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[419]David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," p. 51-52.

[420]Ibid., p. 52.

[421]Arthur S. Ding, "The PRC's Military Modernization and a Security Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific," in *Issues & Studies*, vol. 31 No. 8, p. 9.

The close Sino-Russian ties in the post-Cold War era seem to be rooted in a change of Chinese security perceptions in the post-Cold War era. First, with the demise of the Soviets' threat, China's security concerns shifted from the north to the south. Even though Japan's military development is not an immediate threat for China, its potential power in terms of military technology, expenditure, and "basic force" (70% of its military personnel are officers and sergeants) can allow a rapid expansion in war time.[422] Second, China realized the needs of military modernization, especially after the Gulf War, which would require three basic tasks: first, conventional combat capability to deal with local wars; second, deterrence power against major aggression, using strategic nuclear force; third, narrowing the gap in weapons R&D between China and developed countries.[423] These security perceptions made China turn its eyes on Russia, which needed capital instead of superfluous weapons.

This move toward Russia does not seem to develop up to the level of a new unified front, because their relations are based on their own national interests, not on ideological motivation. Compared to the situation of a unified front with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, the situation of Russia's military technology transfer to China is similar in that Russia is the only country which can help Chinese military modernization. But current economic relations are quite different from the situation of 1950s. China's economic interdependency on capitalist countries has increased and has become critical for further Chinese economic reform. China's new unified front with Russia will raise tension with Western capitalists, and even neighboring states, and inflict harm on its economic interests, thus impeding its overall modernization. Then, while pursuing economic relations with the capitalist countries, China will continue the modernization of its military under the cooperation with Russia.

6. Prospects for Future Chinese Security Policy

The future of Chinese nationalism will be an important factor in determining the stability of the security environment in Northeast Asia. If they proceed toward regional

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[422]Weixing Hu, "China's Security Strategy in a Changing World," *Pacific Focus*, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 1993, p. 116.

[423]Ibid., p. 126.

hegemony for their past glory, it will be a strong threat to the regional states, as well as the United States. Coupled with the near future security environment -- the reduction of U.S. forces and the rising Chinese economy -- if Japan increases its military for her self-defense, then China, which has been shocked by high-tech military equipment in the Gulf War, will necessarily accelerate much more its military buildup to contain the possible threat of Japan's military. In fact, "the long-term concern of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is responsible for the defense policy of China, is based on fears that Japan may, once more, become a great military power, while the United States will gradually withdraw from the Pacific following the evacuation of their large and efficient naval and air bases in the Philippines."[424] If Japan tries to be a military power in this region, it will conflict with the Chinese neo-nationalism, which will be reluctant to allow the expanding political and military roles of Japan. This might be inevitable in the near future, thus leading to a rivalry between the countries for regional dominance. Mark Borthwick indicates that China's current behavior with respect to the Korean peninsula, Indochina, and India seems "not only to protect China's security interests but also to legitimize a major political role in regions around its periphery. Similarly, China's expressed concerns about Japan's growing military and political role in the region appear to reflect not just direct security concerns, but the fear that Japan will come to occupy a dominant place in the region at the expense of China's status and role."[425]

The influence of the Japan-U.S. joint declaration on Chinese security policy does not seem to be welcomed. Even before the declaration, Beijing no longer viewed their bilateral alliances and security cooperation agreements in Asia as necessary without a Soviet threat. On the contrary, the reinforced alliance without the Soviet threat means that it is aimed at China as a threat. Much has yet to be seen. However, a series of Japan's moves toward a greater security role will be a threat to China without any understandable and cooperative diplomatic measures. According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Japanese government decided

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[424]Clare Hollingworth, "PLA Fears Japan," *Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter*, December 1994/January 1995, p. 29.

[425]Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century*, p. 456.

to expand the boundary to which the SDF can support U.S. troops logistically up to the Middle East.[426] Ozawa Ichiro, the chief of the unified opposition party, mentioned in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun that the Japanese SDF can participate in a multinational force if there is an international consensus.[427] These Japanese moves toward a more active security role based on the joint declaration will become a cause to strengthen Chinese neo-nationalism.

The Chinese response to the joint declaration of Japan and the United States does not mean any immediate change of their security policy. Rather, China will stick to the independent security policy because of its urgent needs for economic reform and military modernization. While Chinese economic success will apparently be a benign phenomenon for regional stability, it also suggests another concern about the increasing Chinese military capability based on economic power. Like Samuel Huntington's view that "rapid economic growth is associated with an expansionist foreign policy,"[428] Chinese economic success may lead them to a bid as a regional hegemon backed by its neo-nationalism. There are few doubts that China will be a dominant regional power in the near future. When a power vacuum occurs in Northeast Asia, China will be a strong force to fill the vacuum and to recover its title as a "glorious nation."

D. SECURITY POLICY OF KOREA

1. Lessons Learned from History

"In the age of imperialist expansion Korea became inevitably a vortex of great-power rivalry: a bone of contention between China and Japan; then a focus of Russian interest in an ice-free port; and, for Japan, 'a dagger pointed at the heart' and, later, a bridge to the

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[426]*Choongang Ilbo*, May 19, 1996.

[427]*Choongang Ilbo*, June 8, 1996.

[428]Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival*, vol. 33, no. 1, January-February 1991, p. 12. Quoted from Denny Roy, p. 52.

continent."[429] Because of its geopolitical importance, China, Japan and Russia struggled to get a political initiative through formal relations with Korea for their strategic advantage. However, Korea was reluctant to accept Western culture for reasons similar to that of China. Being aware of the fate that had befallen China as a consequence of continuing clashes with Western nations, such as the Opium War of 1839-1842 and the Arrow War of 1856-1858, the Choson government rejected Western demands for trade in the belief that this would prevent such disasters from overtaking Korea.[430] In particular, three times of repelling the U.S. and French commercial ships and warships from 1866 to 1871 contributed to hardening of Choson's isolationist policy.

The failure of modernization reform at the end of Choson Dynasty can be examined in terms of factionalism divided into pro-China and pro-Japan. While most Korean reformists were influenced by the modernization of Japan, the government tended to get political and military support from China. The reformist movements backed by Japan, such as the Coup d'Etat of 1884 (*Kapsin Chongbyon*) failed because of the opposition of the government and interdiction of Chinese military troops. The Choson government wanted to lean toward Chinese influence, but China could give nothing to it when it came to modernization. Moreover, because of the defeat of the Sino-Japan War, China had to renounce all rights in the Korean peninsula. After the *Kabo* Reform (*Kabo Kyongjang*) from 1894 to 1896, the first modernization reform under the lead of Japan, there were also confrontations between pro-Japan and pro-Russian groups. As a result of that factional disunity, the Choson Dynasty failed to gather national capacity to establish a new modernized society.

Contrasted with Japan and China, Korean pre-modern history had been characterized by incessant invasions from China and northern nomadic tribes, and twice from Japan. In modern times, a series of disastrous historical records, such as a 36-year of colonial period and the Korean War, has strongly formed a Korean mind-set that such history should never

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[429]John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia The Modern Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 461.

[430]Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, *Korea Old and New a History* (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990), p. 194.

be repeated. Koreans knew well that they had to get national power to compete with other countries, and that kind of mind-set has become a basis for their brilliant economic achievements. Coupled with the confrontation with North Korea after 1953, South Korea has maintained the strong consciousness of its security.

2. Korea-U.S. Security Alliance and "National Self Defense" Policy

Even though major U.S. interests were focused on Japan rather than Korea after the Second World War,[431] through the Korean War the United States realized the importance of the peninsula as a forefront to counter the expansion of communism. The Korea-U.S. Mutual Assistance Agreement was signed in October, 1953 agreeing that the United States would support South Korea militarily if the latter is attacked by a hostile country.[432] By the agreement, the United States has supported economic and military aid and has stationed its military for a global containment strategy against the Communist threat and deterrence against the threat from North Korea. As a result, it became a unusually successful alliance up to now, as well as during the Cold War era.

However, sometimes changes of U.S. security policy influenced the stability of the peninsula negatively, and it made Korea try to get a more self-reliant defense capability as their economy grew. In the early 1960s, the Kennedy Administration announced the "Flexible Response Strategy" to counter the new communist strategy which focused on indirect infiltration to the third world countries by riot, terror, and radical demonstration. But, they excluded Korea from the list of the third world countries and started to reduce military aid. Also, there was a political conflict between the Korean Government under then President Park Chung Hee and Kennedy. The Kennedy Administration would not recognize Park's

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[431]The United States did not participate in the Korean War to protect Korean independence and freedom so much as to protect global U.S. interests, as represented by Japan. See Edward A. Olsen, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), p. 5.

[432]The agreement recognized that "an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." See Article 3.

regime as a democratic government because Park took power by the coup in 1961. Faced with the Vietnam War, the United States tried to withdraw some of its army from Korea to support Vietnam. Actually, the agreement of dispatching the Korean army to Vietnam was a watershed for their relationship. There were three reasons for that decision by Korea: first, to prevent the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea, thus to prevent a power vacuum; second, to gain real war experience, thus to prepare for more effective defense power; third, to modernize its military with more U.S. aid. After the participation of Korea in the Vietnam War, their relations were much more reinforced "by bleeding blood together in the same battlefield."

The Nixon Doctrine in 1971, which forced U.S. friendly states to play a greater role in their own defense, was a signal for new U.S. isolationism. During 1971-1972, 320,000 U.S. troops were withdrawn from Asia and one division from Korea. To fill the vacuum, then, Korea started to increase its military level with the slogan of "self-reliant defense." In 1973, Park's government enacted the Special Law on the Defense Industry and supported defense industries through tax reductions, exemptions, and financial support. Also, the first Force Improvement Plan was carried out since 1974, and the following year a defense tax was created to back this plan.

The Carter Administration's decision in 1976 to withdraw the entire U.S. army from Korea was due to two factors: first, after the Nixon Doctrine, U.S. strategic concept was changed from "2.5 war" to "1.5 war"[433]; second, Carter related human rights situations in Korea for the withdrawal of its army. Actually, the first factor influenced just one division's withdrawal, but the second factor justified entire withdrawal. Of course, this decision caused severe opposition from not only Korea, but also U.S. allies. A series of incidents, however, caused this decision to be suspended in 1979: first, an underground tunnel which North Korea had dug was found in 1978, thus increasing tension in the Korean peninsula; second, according to a U.S. intelligence agency, the military level of North Korea was two or three

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[433]2.5 war consists of: 1 of the Soviet Union, 1 of China and 0.5 of the third world. See Baek, Jong-Chun, *National Defense Affairs* (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1985), p. 490.

times more than that of South Korea; third, Korea tried to develop a nuclear weapon to fill the vacuum after U.S. withdrawal.

The Reagan Administration's slogans, "pax-Americana" and "build a strong America," were favorable to the Koreans, at least in terms of their security. After the inauguration, Reagan seemed to consider the Korean peninsula as an important strategic point in that his first foreign guest was Chun, then Korean president. Also, in the thirteenth ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting between defense ministers in 1981, the United States promised to reinforce its military in Korea, instead of reducing, and to help Korea procure modernized weapons.

The first change of U.S. security strategy in the post-Cold War era was shown in the report of April 1990, the "U.S. East Asia Strategy Initiative," which included a shift from a global containment strategy primarily directed at the Cold War era Soviet threat to a focus on selective engagement in critical regions.[434] Even though further reduction of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia was suspended by the doubts over a nuclear development program of North Korea, South Korea doubted the reliability of future U.S. military commitments in this region. In June 1993, Secretary of Defense Aspin's military and civilian advisers recommended that the United States adopt a 'win-hold-win' strategy,[435] which was considered as another reduction program by the South Korean Government. Although the strategy was replaced by the 'win-win' doctrine,[436] what South Korea and Japan realized throughout history was the changeability of U.S. policy according to its national interests.

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[434]Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 27 July 1992.

[435]This change anticipated that if the United States were confronted with two major regional conflicts simultaneously it would 'hold' the second conflict's adversary by employing air power and a limited number of ground forces. After prevailing in the first conflict, the United States forces would be redeployed to reinforce the ally under siege in the second theater until the conflict was terminated on favorable terms. See William T. Tow, "Changing U.S. Force Levels and Regional Security," p. 17.

[436]The win-win doctrine does not mean that the United States fights two regional conflicts at the same time, but it means nearly simultaneously.

Table 5. Major Activities and Achievements of the Force Improvement Plan[437]

Classification	1st FI (1974-1981)	2nd FI (1982-1986)	3rd FI (1987-1994)
Investment spending (% of total defense)	31.2	30.5	33.3
Major activities	• Replacement of old equipment • Construction of military bases in the front area • Construction of high-speed boats • Purchase of F-4 aircraft	• Development of self-propelled artillery, Korean-designed tanks and armored vehicles • Construction of major combatant • Licenced production of F-5 fighters	• Mass production of tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery • Licensed production of helicopters, submarines, F-16 fighters

The Force Improvement (FI) plan, which was initiated in 1974 and continued until 1994, was aimed at building South Korea's self-reliant defense capability. During this period, 32.6% of the entire period's total defense spending was invested in building military capability. As table 1 shows, in the third phase of the FI, the Korean Fighter Program (KFP) which will acquire 120 F-16s is proceeding,[438] thus showing a much improved defense capability in terms of its technology and excellence of equipment. Of course, in the long term, these programs will continue to achieve a more independent, self-reliant defense capability, in some part replacing a portion of U.S. military commitments.

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[437]*Defense White Paper 1995-1996*, The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, p. 122-123.

[438]*A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, Foreword by the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, p. 24.

3. Improvement of Foreign Relations

a. Relations with Japan

Normalization of relations with Japan was mainly due to two factors: the president's tendency and the need for economic development.[439] With an urgent need for economic development, Japan which began to reemerge as an important international economic force since the late 1950s could be considered as a capital supplier for Korea's economic development. Also, ROK-Japan trade had already been growing since the 1950s despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations. Then, the two countries signed a draft treaty in February 1965,[440] among severe protests and demonstrations by students and political opponents. The benefits of normalization for South Korean economic growth were enormous, enabling lots of capital to finance its new development plan, especially when the Kennedy Administration reduced economic aid.

Even though there was much improvement in the economic fields during the Cold War era, they failed to form security relations or even security talks. The exchange visits of both summits, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone in 1983 and South Korean President Chun in 1984, brought about the establishment of a "Forum for the 21st Century," which was designed to improve bilateral diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties between the two countries, excluding security fields. Coupled with undesirable past historical issues such as the Japanese textbook problem in 1982 and absurd remarks by high Japanese officials, there

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[439]See Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, p. 391-393.

[440]The treaty called for: immediate establishment of diplomatic and consular relations; nullification of all treaties and agreements concluded between the two nations on and prior to August 22, 1910 when Japan annexed Korea as a colony; reaffirmation of the Government of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government of Korea, as specified in the 1948 resolution of the UN General Assembly; cooperation between the two countries for the promotion of common welfare and interests in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter; and further negotiations on trade, navigation, commerce, civil aviation, and other matters at the earliest practical date. See, Lawrence Ziring and C. I. Eugene Kim, *The Asian Political Dictionary* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1985), p. 342. Also, Japan was required to pay $300 million in goods and services over a 10-year period as a means of settling South Korea's property claims. In addition, Japan promised $200 million in low interest loans.

existed a strong anti-Japanese atmosphere in South Korea. Even in the post-Cold War era, security relations or cooperation between them, especially in terms of the military, seems to be very difficult because of the "basic trust" problem, mainly resulting from the past history. Of course, there was some improvement recently: the dialogue between working-level officials to promote their military relationship in 1994; and the exchange visits of Japan's chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the ROK vice minister of national defense in 1995; the exchange of a Letter on the Prevention of Accidents between Korean and Japanese Military Airplanes in 1995.[441] Also, South Korea formally proposed the Northeast Asian security dialogue in 1994, which necessarily required security relations with Japan in any form.[442] Even though their desirable security relations would be inevitable in the future in this context, however, it would never be easy work because of the lack of trust between them.

b. Northern Diplomacy

South Korea's northern diplomacy was the main policy of President Rho since 1987, which was aimed at the improvement of relations with China and the Soviet Union. From the fact that it was the first attempt toward communist countries, northern diplomacy became a milestone of future Korean diplomacy. Ongoing economic development during the 1980s and rising international status through the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics gave South Korea a motivation to play as a more independent actor on the international stage. The transition period toward the end of the Cold War was also on its side. Gorbachev tried to improve relations with South Korea, not only to get a loan from the latter, but also to stimulate Japan into supporting the Soviet's economic development program. China needed South Korea as a trading partner for its economic development more than North Korea, whose economic growth was severely declining. As a result, Seoul and Moscow announced formal diplomatic relations in 1990, and Seoul and Beijing did the same in 1992.

The influence of rapprochement with the two powerful communist countries brought

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[441]Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1995-1996*, The Republic of Korea, p. 122-123.

[442]Go Dae-won, "Talnangjeon Ihu Hanilanbohyubryugchejei Banghyanggoa Jedohwa Bangan," *Jeonryagyeongu*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1995, p. 105.

about in South Korea progress toward friendly military relations with them to a degree, but it was much improved compared to the past. The Memorandum of Understanding on Military Exchange for 1994-1995 was agreed upon in 1993, and there was a meeting between defense ministers of the two countries in Seoul in 1995. Also, in September 1995, the Russian government decided to repeal its military alliance treaty with North Korea, formally called the Treaty of Amity, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.[443] On the other hand, South Korea and China set up defense attache offices in each other's embassies in 1993 and 1994, respectively, and there was agreement at the senior working-level officials meeting in 1995 to expand their military exchanges, gradually including exchange visits by high-ranking military officials. Needless to say, these movements were conducive to the stability of the Korean peninsula as well as Northeast Asia, and would be reinforced to build confidence among them.

4. Prospects for Future Security Policy

In terms of military capability, South Korea will aim to increase its naval and air forces, casting off the current army-oriented military structure. In a meeting between Korean Defense Minister Lee and U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry on April 15, 1996, South Korea expressed its opinion that the U.S. request for South Korea to build up an army-oriented military would not be desirable because it would result in South Korea's dependency on Japan in supporting U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region.[444] Now, South Korea already has the capability to build submarines with its domestic technology, and it has a plan to build a 10,000-ton level of aircraft carrier. The development of naval capability seems to prepare it for a future strategic environment, which would accompany new naval powers such as Japan and China.[445]

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[443]Kim Yu-nam, "A Review of Seoul-Moscow Relations," *Korea Focus*, vol. 3, no. 6, 1995. The treaty was concluded in September 1961.

[444]*Choognang Ilbo*, April 16, 1996.

[445]On 28 October, 1996 President Kim indicated in the launching ceremony of a 3,000 ton-level of new Korean destroyer that there are conflicts between states over the sea territory and EEZ announcement and security environment of sea area around Korean peninsula is very instable. He accentuated the role of Korean navy to protect national interests and economic activities. See *Choongang Ilbo*, 29 October, 1994.

Korean reunification will be a watershed of their security policy from the boundary of the peninsula to the Asia Pacific region. It seems to be a matter of time when we consider North Korea's current political and economic situation and the strong "one-people" mind of the Koreans. However, the route to reunification has been, and will be, tough and sometimes dangerous for the stability of this region. As long as the threat of North Korea continues, South Korea will try to maintain relative military superiority to the former under the close security cooperation with the United States. On that point, the U.S. decision to continue its military presence would contribute to the stability of this region. On the other hand, however, the U.S. decision to share a greater military role with Japan will become a burden for South Korea which has not maintained any security relations with Japan. South Korea is paying attention to Japan's expanding military capability, and its future security policy will possibly keep pace with Japan's military level rather than North Korea's.

The reduction in forward deployed American military after the reunification of Korea will be "an impetus for the development of a new, unified Korea's regional power projection capability in order to protect the country's trade routes and promote its territorial claim against Japan with respect to the Tokto/Takeshima islands."[446] Without any arms control arrangement and security guarantee, Japan's expanding security role in this region will be an apparent threat to reunified Korea. Even though Korea will try to avoid unnecessary confrontation with China, the conspicuous reduction of the U.S. involvement to Korean peninsula will force Korea to prepare its military against the potential threat of China and Russia.

E. SUMMARY: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

1. Conflictive Security Interests

Historically, the Northeast Asian states' security policies have conflicted with each other. Before the end of the Second World War, Japan's dominant economic, military and

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[446]Sheldon W. Simon, *Alternative Vision of Security in Northeast Asia*, A paper for the SEAS Northeast Asia Symposium, May 15-17, 1996, p. 22.

political power was accomplished by the victimization of neighboring states in the name of imperialism. During the Cold War era, the two sides that had differentiated ideologies fought an invisible war with each other for four decades. One state's dominance of military power became a threat to others: China's nuclear bomb test became a threat to Japan and South Korea; Japan's military modernization brought about security concerns of China and the two Koreas. Even after the end of the Cold War, this confrontational security structure still continues to be focused on the Korean peninsula. Coupled with the current move by Japan and the United States to strengthen their security alliance, Japan will rise as an undeniable political and military power in the near future. Backed by neo-nationalism, China will try to recover political influence in this region as it had in its long history. As for South Korea which has suffered from external threats throughout history, either case is not acceptable. As long as they fail to find any common ground, thus failing to build trust, this confrontational structure will not disappear.

The major factor of security conflicts has been due to the negative identities among them. First of all, the Japanese attitude toward past history is the biggest obstacle in recovering the trust and positive identities of its neighbors. Compared to the way that German and Japanese leaders have taken responsibility for their nation's actions during World War II, international criticism of Japan is largely based on what was observed when the Japanese Diet struggled with a proposed resolution calling for Japan to apologize for its past misdeeds.[447] The United Nations Human Rights Commission accused the Japanese of "extraordinary inhumanity" during the invasion and colonial period, and demanded that the government accept legal responsibility for the system, compensate the victims, apologize publicly to the victims, disclose all documents and materials related to the crimes, amend education materials to include the history of the abuses, and identify and punish those who were responsible.[448] However, Japan Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto vowed to take legal

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[447]Nam Si-uk, "Future of Korea-Japan Relations," *Korea Focus*, vol. 3, no. 6, November-December, 1995, p. 27.

[448]*The Japan Times,* Editorial, February 10, 1996.

steps to fight the report's recommendations.[449] Coupled with Japanese high officials' frequent reckless remarks justifying their past invasion, diplomatic conflicts have continued, thus worsening distrust between Japan and the other countries.

Second, the ideological confrontation is another historical obstacle in forming positive identities. Korea was a victim of communism and Japan has also been cautious about its revolutionary expansionism. The Chinese attitude toward their ideological line should be apparent. As long as they stick to communism, thus basing the legitimacy of their regime on the communist revolution, the current confrontation structure will continue forming another version of the Cold War. China have to at least make its security policy clear in terms of its level of military, participation in arms reduction talks, and apparent attitude toward its ideological line. However, the entangled problems between the United States and Japan, such as the Taiwan issue, human rights issue, trade conflicts, and some historical issues with Japan, seem to be the most difficult problems in making China's security policy more modernized.

2. Future Regional Balance of Power

The military withdrawal after the Korea reunification will cause a power vacuum in Northeast Asia. The problem is not just a change of military power of a strong state. As Denny Roy indicates, "a regional power or security vacuum is not the outcome of the decline of a hegemon."[450] Rather it depends on the miscalculation and misunderstanding of the remaining states toward the others' policies. With negative identities of each other, there will be an arms race to cope with others' military capabilities. There also will be a new type of alliance to counter any threat that each state estimates. Let's assume possible scenarios.

- Maintenance of current balance of power structure.

As examined earlier, the current US-Japan-unified Korea vs. China structure will necessarily cause the reduction of the U.S. military and the increasing security role of Japan. Japan's rearmament will bring about security concerns of reunified Korea and China, thus leading the latter to more military buildup. In particular, reunified Korea, which has had

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[449]*The Japan Times,* Editorial, February 10, 1996.

[450]Denny Roy, "Assessing the Asia-Pacific 'Power Vacuum,'" p. 45.

strong doubts about Japan's security policy, will be reluctant to be "unnecessarily" confronted with China. If the United States continues its strong commitment, it will cause another Cold War between the US and China in this region.

- U.S.-Japan vs. China-reunified Korea.

If trust in Japan cannot be recovered, Korea may choose China as its security partner. As long as the U.S. commitment continues, the China-Korea alliance seems to be impossible. However, if Japan should be a strong military power and the US becomes a off-shore balancer, reunified Korea will prefer the alignment with China to that with Japan. China will want Korea to be on its side because of the latter's geopolitical importance and will try to improve political and economic relations with Korea. Reunified Korea will not want any confrontation with China. Then, Korea will be at least neutral, not on the U.S.-Japan side. In this case, there will be a rivalry between Japan and China.

- Japan-reunified Korea vs. China.

If China sticks to communism and takes a hard-line policy toward its neighbors, Japan and reunified Korea will align together. However, this assumption seems to be weak. For Korea, a security alignment with Japan watching Japan's rearmament will be the last thing that it wants to do. Moreover, in this case, Korea will have to face the threat of China with an "untrustful" friend. Then, the security cooperation between them will be instable and inefficient.

All scenarios based on the future possible balance of power structures suggest another regional confrontation mainly between Japan and China. As a regional balancer, reunified Korea will tend to avoid any direct confrontation with China because of its geopolitical position. Based on its domestic political environment, the United States will be either an off-shore balancer or a not-so-active participant. Without any positive identity and shared security interests, the security policies of Japan and China after the Korea reunification do not seem to have much room for cooperation with each other.

Instead of those balance of power structures, then, how about collective security as a means for regional stability after the Korea reunification? Only if Japan, reunified Korea, China and the United States can put together their different security interests for the common

goal of regional stability, collective security can be the best option for them. While there are many obstacles, the current economic relations and multilateral security approaches suggest a possibility of collective security in this region. As long as the United Sates can take the role of balancer, buiding a collective security structure may be the only solution for the future security dilemma in this region.

V. APPLICABILITY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO NORTHEAST ASIA

Can collective security be a means for regional stability in Northeast Asia after the Korean reunification? Whereas the current balance of power structure is based on the power competition among regional states, the future collective security structure, if possible, should be based on common security interests and positive identity for its success, as we examined earlier. Without such necessary requirements, collective security will be less effective than a balance of power structure, like the case of the Locarno Pact. In terms of mass miscalculation of power, if it fails, the result of collective security may be more disastrous than in the balance of power system. In this context, the premature application of collective security to this region will not be desirable. Most of all, forming a positive identity and shared security interests will be the most important task of the Northeast Asian states for regional stability, as well as the establishment of collective security.

Still, there are many obstacles in establishing a collective security system in this region. "Northeast Asia countries are still divided by different ideological beliefs and they do not have a sense of urgency for establishing a multilateral framework of political cooperation."[451] Too much disparity in the economy, democratization and modernization causes the regional states to be competitive rather than harmonious. Historical background and traditional cultural beliefs impede them in forming positive identities and in sharing common security interests. Most of all, as long as the current confrontational structure around the Korean peninsula continues and they fail to recover trust, collective security in Northeast Asia will be an illusion. This does not mean that the Korean reunification will bring peace in this region without any painstaking efforts toward "co-prosperity." As much as they have conflicted with each other throughout history, they should exert themselves in order to build confidence.

Some of the current flows of security environment suggest a possibility, although

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[451]James T H Tang, *Multilateralism in Northeast Asian International Security: An Illusion or Realistic Hope?* North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, Working Paper Number 26, April 1993, p. 12.

weak, toward collective security: multilateralism and economic interdependency. Multilateral security approaches to regional security matters, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), can be a basis for confidence building and will create much more positive identity among the Northeast Asian states than ever before. Growing economic interdependency and economic institutional activities will not only strengthen the incentives for cooperation for common economic interests, but will also provide the opportunities to practice institutional interaction. The economic organizations, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), have contributed to economic development of the regional states, increasing more cooperation in the economic field. To a degree, the economic interdependency tends to improve security relations. The normalization between South Korea and China in 1992 can be an outstanding example of the improved security relations, from enemies to economic partners, for their mutual economic interests. Even though these benign factors seem to be far from the requirements for collective security at this time, they can be considered, at least, as the first step toward more cooperative approaches to regional security and economic matters.

This chapter examines the applicability of collective security to Northeast Asia as a future security measure for regional stability. The first section will review the currently rising multilateralism and regionalism toward security and economic matters in this region as Asian views of collective security. The second section will consider the limitations of collective security in this region in terms of historical and cultural background. Finally, the third section will suggest steps toward a regional collective security system as preparatory and establishing phases.

A. ASIAN VIEWS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

While there have been many proposals for new cooperative security measures in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War, a specific collective security system has not yet been

suggested.[452] Instead, most of the views are converging to a multilateral security framework. In fact, the states of the Asia-Pacific region began to activate multilateral dialogues for regional security and economic cooperation in the post-Cold War era through the ARF, the APEC and other non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, Northeast Asia failed to create such a multilateral organization at its regional level. Truly, the Northeast Asian security environment at the current time does not seem to have much room for cooperation among regional states.

This section reviews multilateral security approaches and economic cooperation of the Northeast Asian states. However, because Northeast Asia has been involved in the Asia-Pacific sphere in terms of multilateralism, I will examine them in the boundary of the Asia-Pacific region, not of Northeast Asia.

1. Multilateralism toward Collective Security

Regarding future Northeast Asian security, many scholars suggest multilateral approaches to regional security affairs. Evans insists that the current bilateral security agreement will not be fitted to the new security environment, and that multilateral security cooperation will contribute to regional stability.[453] Sheldon Simon stresses the importance of the development of multilateral regional security "to offset threats perceived to emanate from one another by adopting policies of reassurance, transparency, and confidence-building."[454]

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[452]Georgia Institute of Technology suggests a collective security regime for Northeast Asia under the current security environment. According to its argument: the United States will be very much a player, but not necessarily the key player; the collective security regime will bind Japan most positively to the rest of Northeast Asia, not as a developing military giant; with the creation of a multilateral verification organization, a nuclear free zone for Northeast Asia will be expanded from Korean peninsula up to some part of China. As examined earlier in this thesis, however, collective security will not work without a positive identity and shared security interests. In this context, collective security cannot be created under the current security environment in Northeast Asia. See Developing A Collective Security Regime For Northeast Asia (Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Technology, 1992).

[453]See Paul M. Evans, "The Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia/Pacific Region," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 18. His insistence is not for the Northeast Asia region, but for the Asia/Pacific region including the former.

[454]Sheldon W. Simon, *Alternative Vision of Security in Northeast Asia*, p. 23-24.

Patrick Cronin asserts the need for a multilateral security framework to reduce the costs of inaction which outweigh the potential benefits and to contribute to the mediation of conflicting threat perception, to overcoming confrontational bilateralism, and to efficiency and opportunities through exchanges of information.[455] These views seem to be new approaches to the current and future regional security affairs based on cooperation among regional states, not on power competition. In this context, multilateral security approaches can be considered as a step toward collective security.

The multilateral security approaches, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, however, has a limit as an ultimate security measure for regional stability. The multilateral security framework itself implies two facts. First, there exists security tension or conflicts among a group of states. Second, states share some security interests in improving their relations and appeasing the conflicts through multilateral cooperation. While it means that states share security interests to a degree, the multilateral cooperation does not necessarily mean that positive identities are formed. On the contrary, the purpose of multilateral approaches seems to be aimed at the improvement of their relations and forming positive identities. Therefore, multilateral approaches to regional security affairs can be considered as endeavors to create and promote a conciliatory atmosphere, not as a security system that can manage power, like a balance of power or a collective security system.

In addition, the multilateral security framework cannot have any capability to control each state's behavior. It is a kind of a balance of power structure toward "cooperation" among states. Because of the lack of positive identities, however, states will count their security on their alliance systems rather than such a multilateral framework.

Even though multilateralism cannot be an ultimate security measure for a future security system in this region, it can contribute to the formation of a basis for the future collective security. Multilateral security approaches differ from the past approaches to Northeast Asian security affairs under the balance of power structure. First of all, the former

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[455]Patrick M. Cronin, "Opportunities for a Multilateral Framework," ed. Ronald N. Montaperto, *Cooperative Engagement and Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, DC,: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 170-172.

requires multilateral cooperation of all participants, while the latter is based on bilateral security relations. Also, unlike a balance of power structure, multilateral security approaches require proper organizations to facilitate the opportunities for members' interactions and engagements. In terms of the regional states' will to cooperate with each other, the current multilateralism, even though not so fruitful yet, is a benign phenomenon for regional stability. If states can promote their positive identity and shared interests through multilateral cooperation, it will be able to create the atmosphere for the establishment of collective security.

2. Multilateral Security Approaches of the Northeast Asian States

Though there has been no multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia, the regional states have been somewhat actively involved in other frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The ARF was created in 1993 as a formal inter-governmental forum, "at which representatives from 18 countries within the Asia/Pacific region would gather to discuss regional political and security issues."[456] In the ARF meetings in Bangkok in July 1994, Brunei in 1995, and Indonesia in 1996, even though there was no substantial consensus or agreement on security issues including CBMs, it opened a new way to lead regional states to security cooperation based on dialogue. As a non-governmental effort to promote multilateral security cooperation, the concept for CSCAP was developed in 1992 and formally announced in 1993 by ten founding institutes, which aimed "to create a more structured regional process that is open to all countries and territories in the region."[457] The United States, Japan and South Korea participate in the ARF and the CSCAP, while China participates only in the ARF.

The changed security policy of the United States in the post-Cold War influenced security multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States had been reluctant to

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[456]Satoshi Morimoto, "A Security Framework for the Asia/Pacific Region," p. 224.

[457]Paul M. Evans, "The Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia/Pacific Region," p. 205.

enter into regional security dialogues in Asia in the Cold War era. There were three aspects that changed the U.S. stance after the end of the Cold War. First, the regional security concerns were growing because of the uncertainties aroused by the U.S. military withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines. Second, as the Asia-Pacific region has become more important for the U.S. economic interests, the United States has recognized the importance of the security of this region. Third, the post-Cold War order requires cooperation among states separate from ideology, religion, culture and race. As a result, the United States became a supporter of multilateralism for regional security dialogues to appease the regional security concerns and "to shape a positive and cooperative security environment in the Asia-Pacific region."[458] In particular, it expects the ARF to "play a role in conveying governments' intentions, easing tensions, constraining arms races and cultivating habits of consultation and cooperation on security issues."[459] The United States has a special interest in a sub-regional security dialogue for Northeast Asia separate from the ARF. With the recognition that "Historically, Northeast Asia is the area where great power interests have clashed most sharply," the United States is trying to establish such a forum, participating in a series of government/academic conferences on security issues with Japan, South Korea, China and Russia.[460]

Of course, the United States does not see multilateral security dialogues as a way to supplant the current bilateral security alliances and forward military presence, but rather as a way to supplement them. As the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance in April 1996 showed, the nucleus of the U.S. security policy toward Northeast Asia lies with the bilateral alliance with Japan and South Korea, rather than on multilateral security approaches. In fact, it would be impossible to replace current security relations with a multilateral security framework, because the latter is just a kind of confidence building measure, not a security

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[458]The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995, p. 13.

[459]Ibid., p. 13.

[460]Ibid., p. 13.

system.

"Japanese support of multilateral approaches to regional security issues is primarily aimed at cementing the current balance of power in the Asia/Pacific region, which is favorable to Japan, by cultivating the norm of policy transparency."[461] Their multilateralism can be understood in terms of the U.S. stance: a supplement to the US role, not a way to supplant it.[462] As long as Japan depends its major security on the alliance with the United States, no other multilateral security mechanism can replace the bilateral security alliance. Instead, Japan's multilateral approaches to regional security affairs seems to improve relations with others, building mutual understanding and maintaining stability among regional countries.[463] Inevitably, this requires bilateral approaches at the same time.

Japan has tried to improve security relations with South Korea and China through bilateral dialogues and military exchanges. There were talks between the Japanese director general of the Defense Agency and South Korea's defense Minister in 1990, and exchange visits between Japan's chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and South Korea's vice minister of national defense were made in 1995. In the same year, by exchanging a Letter on the Prevention of Accidents between Korean and Japanese Military Airplanes, the two countries made a big contribution to their military confidence building.[464] After the suspension of exchanges since the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, basic agreement was reached at the Sino-Japanese Foreign Ministerial Conference in 1993 with regard to the necessity of promoting dialogue over security matters. In a 1994 dialogue, basic agreement was reached to promote exchanges between defense authorities of the two countries in the future for the

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[461]Paul M. Evans, "The Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation," p. 209.

[462]Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, February 1995, p. 13.

[463]Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1994*, p. 138.

[464]Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1995-1996*, The Republic of Korea, p. 122-123.

purpose of expediting mutual understanding.[465] Also, Japan sent a message of cooperation for a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) to China in 1995,[466] because, as a long term plan, Japan wanted a military transfer and joint military training for co-activity in a PKO in order to get transparency of the expanding Chinese military and to build confidence between them. These bilateral approaches to recover confidence with neighboring states will contribute to the future multilateral security dialogues in Northeast Asia.

While Japan's current multilateral approaches have limits within the security alliance with the United States, Japan has actively suggested multilateral security cooperation as a future regional security framework in the post-Cold War era. Terumasa Nakanishi, a professor of international politics at Kyoto University, mentions that, "In the long run, it is necessary that Japan (and neighbors) make efforts to create an alternative security framework by building up mutual dialogue as viability of any bilateral defense arrangement would not last forever."[467] In summit talks with Bush in July 1992, Miyazawa, then Japanese Prime Minister, suggested establishing a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation and political dialogues which would be aimed at recovering trust in the Asia-Pacific region.[468] Also, one research institution under the Liberal Democratic Party presented the need for creation of a "council for security cooperation in Asia-Pacific region to maintain peace and to prevent regional conflicts" in its report in 1992.[469] While focusing on recovering trust with regional states, Japan will increase its opportunities to lead such multilateral security talks and will

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[465]Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan* 1994, p. 140.

[466]It is similar to the military transfers related to the PKO among the Western countries, such as military transfer between United States and England. There was no response of Chinese government. *The Sankei Shimbun*, November 28, 1995. Quoted from *The Choongang Ilbo*, November 28, 1995.

[467]Quoted from Akahiko Ueda, Ako Washio and Mari Koseki.

[468]According to Miyajawa, the framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance should be expanded into Asia including Russia and China in the future. See Jeong Ku-jong, *21 Segi Ilbonui Kuggajeonryag* (Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 1993), p. 102.

[469]Jeong Ku-jong, *21Segi Ilbonui Kuggajeonryag* (Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 1993), p. 102.

expand its political and security role in this region.

Chinese views of multilateralism have been ambivalent: neither obstructionist nor static. Paul Evans explains Chinese reluctance toward multilateralism in terms of three points: first, Chinese diplomatic tradition has been rooted in a combination of moral unilateralism or bilateralism through the tribute system; second, China does not want to be constrained by multilateral entanglements which restrict freedom of action; third, a multilateral process will internationalize the Taiwan issue, which Beijing sees strictly as a matter of domestic concern.[470] Also, China does not want the United States to lead multilateral security talks on their own, reducing its political influence to regional states. Coupled with the bitter experiences of devastation and semi-colonialism at the hand of Japan and major Western powers in the past, China has become cautious about dealing with them.

Nevertheless, the post-Cold War environment made China somewhat positive toward multilateral security approaches, which could make it possible to maintain regional stability for a favored economic condition, not being excluded from regional states. Qian Qichen, China's Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in 1994:

> China is favor of a variety of channels and levels of bilateral or multilateral dialogues on issues of Asia-Pacific security.... China appreciates the efforts of the ASEAN to promote a multilateral security dialogue in the region and will take an active part in ARF activities. In the meantime, we would like to see more bilateral security with the countries concerned.[471]

In fact, China has participated in regional security talks, such as the ARF and the APEC. With the "Five Principles of Coexistence,"[472] China seems to have no reason to refuse multilateral security dialogues at this time.

Keeping pace with the U.S. policy of multilateral security cooperation, South Korea's multilateral approach to security has been actively participating in regional security dialogue

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[470]Paul M. Evans, "The Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation," p. 210-211.

[471]Ibid., p. 210.

[472]According to the second principle, "Disputes should be settled peacefully and more confidence building measures should be developed..." The third principle states, "Cooperation should be based on common interests and not on the basis of a common social system, ideology or values."

of various forms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Further, South Korea formally proposed the Northeast Asian Security Dialogue in 1994, including North Korea, to push forward security dialogue and cooperation in this region. From the point that the Security Council is primarily responsible for settling international disputes, the election of South Korea as a nonpermanent member of that institution in 1995 could be considered as successful diplomacy toward multilateralism. In terms of military cooperation, South Korea has participated in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, Western Sahara, Angola, and the Indo-Pakistan region. Also, since 1990, it participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, which is a comprehensive combined maritime maneuver exercise conducted biennially since 1971 under the leadership of the U.S. Pacific Command.

Coupled with the confidence of northern diplomacy, South Korea's option for multilateralism is due to the uncertainties over the future security environment in the post-Cold War. Most of all, the upcoming U.S. military reductions and Japan's rising military power are apparent negative factors for its security in the future. Under these uncertainties of the future security environment, South Korea will more strongly seek multilateral approaches to its security while maintaining the current bilateral arrangement.

3. Economic Interdependency

What is the influence of economic interdependency on political relations? While there are two major confronting views in political economy theories, under the current economic environment based on free trade and an open-market system, which has proven more beneficial to developing countries as well as to developed countries than in the controlled and closed market system, there are growing views that economic interdependency tends to intensify political relations.[473] Klaus Knorr insists, "The new world economic order was also

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[473] The liberals argue that "trade and economic intercourse are a source of peaceful relations among nations because the mutual benefits of trade and expanding interdependence among national economies will tend to foster cooperative relations." On the other hand, the mercantilists (nationalists) regard economic relations as basically conflicting, because economic activities are subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of the state. These two confronting views are based on liberalism and mercantilism respectively. See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of

perceived as a potent source of political benefit. ... a system producing continuous, massive, and pervasive improvements in the material foundations of human life would make possible a politically peaceful and stable world in which nations would be capable of solving disputes by judicious bargaining and compromise."[474]

Table 6. Trade Volume among Northeast Asian States[475] (Millions of US dollars)

State \Year	1970	1980	1985	1990	1994
China - Japan	867	9,201	21,269	17,645	47,809
China - S. Korea	43	21		669	11,694
China - N. Korea		677	484	491	624
Japan - S. Korea	1,047	8,433	11,303	29,242	37,885
Japan - N. Korea	57	579	435	465	485

Economic interdependency in terms of trade volume has increased among Northeast Asian states.[476] Except for the case of North Korea, as table 6 shows, the volume of trade

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International Relations (Princeton University, 1987), p. 30, 34.

[474]Klaus Knorr, "Economic Interdependency and National Security," ed. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, *Economic Issues and National Security* (Kansas: Allen Press, 1977), p. 2.

[475]*Direction of Trade 1970 - 1994, Yearbook.* The number is the amount of import and export, and can be somewhat different form year to year and country by country because of the differences of measuring standards.

[476]R. Rosecrance and four other scholars insist that "Interdependence can be defined as the direct and positive linkage of the interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others and in the same direction. Interdependence, then, is measured both by the flow of goods between states and the equalization of factor prices among states." That is, economic interdependency means relations in which one state's economic benefit necessarily causes another's economic gain at the same time. Therefore, the more the volume of trade between the states and the more equalized factor prices such as of capital or labor, then the more economic interdependency there is. However, I will estimate economic interdependency in terms of the volume of trade excluding the equalization of factor prices, because the latter can be applied to a much higher level of economic interdependency like the states in EC. Actually, the present economic relationship among Northeast Asian countries is just at an elementary level because China opened only a part of its market and North Korea still remains closed. Therefore, it would be hasty if we consider the

among Northeast Asian states has been increasing. Above all, trade between China and South Korea in the post-Cold War era is impressive. Coupled with the weakening ideological confrontation -- of course, not between South Korea and North Korea -- the increasing economic imperatives will further strengthen the economic interdependency among Northeast Asian states in the future.

There are two major implications of the economic interdependency among regional states in terms of the applicability of collective security. First, it forms economic regionalism and creates the identity of "Asia-Pacific," which is differentiated from other regional economic organizations such as the European Union (EU). Even though Northeast Asia does not have its own economic organization, the regional states can get identities as members of the Asia-Pacific community. Of course, this does not mean that such economic identity can necessarily be developed into the improvement of security relations. However, as in the case of the rapprochement between China and South Korea in 1992, and even the normalization between Russia and South Korea in 1990, the imperatives of economic benefits sometimes can prevail over political situations if the security conflicts are not very high. The economic activities and benefits from the "Asia-Pacific community" will contribute to the improvement of political relations and lead the regional states, including the Northeast Asian states, to cooperative security approaches to regional affairs. The economic cooperation will, even though at an elementary level, form a much more positive identity than before.

Second, economic interdependency provides the regional states the opportunities to practice institutional activities. "Growing economic integration in the Pacific makes APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group, an important, new post-Cold War institution."[477] To achieve their common goal, the members of APEC have working groups

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influence of factor prices, which shows too much of a gap from country to country in Northeast Asia, such as the prices of commodities, capital, and labor among Northeast Asian countries. See R. Rosecrance, A. Alexandroff, W. Koehler, J. Kroll, S. Laqueur, and J. Stocker, "Whither Interdependence?" *International* Organization, vol. 31, no. 3, Summer 1977, p. 425.

[477]Robert B. Zoellick, "Economics and Security in the Pacific," ed. Ronald N. Montaperto, *Cooperative Engagement and Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 150.

in transportation, telecommunications, tourism, energy, marine resource conservation, fisheries, and human resource development. Considering the lack of institutional interactions among the Northeast Asian states, economic activities in the APEC will be a basis for regional states to form the beliefs that cooperation through an institution can be more beneficial to them.

In summary, even though Northeast Asia has none of its own multilateral security framework or economic organizations, the Northeast Asian states have participated in those within the boundary of the Asia-Pacific region. The post-Cold War world order requires the regional states to strengthen the multilateral approaches to security and economic affairs, and Northeast Asian states now share the necessity of regional cooperation for their common security and economic goals. Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region suggests three implications to Northeast Asian states regarding regional collective security in the future. First, the Northeast Asian states' multilateral approaches to security affairs imply that their security interests are converging to a single goal toward regional stability. Still, security interests are diverse and conflictive because of the power competition under the remnants of the Cold War situation. However, their multilateral security approaches can be seen as evidence for the same view of the importance of regional stability. Second, their active posture toward multilateral cooperation will contribute to the improvement of political relationships and the formation of positive identities. Even though there are a lot of conflictive issues related to territory, trade, military and even past history, they strongly feel the need for cooperation. More opportunities for dialogues will lead them to greater mutual understanding. Third, their experience with institutional activities through the ARF and the APEC will be the basis for the institutionalization of collective security in the future. They will tend to be respective of international law, the norm and rules of the organizations, and the sovereignty of others. Also, the benefits from the ARF and the APEC will strengthen their beliefs in the institutions and further the institutionalization of collective security.

B. LIMITATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

This section examines the limitations in applying collective security to Northeast Asia based on the five variables that were needed for the success of collective security. First, historical background suggests the lack of shared security interests and the absence of a positive identity among regional states. Second, traditional Asian culture is characterized by the lack of institutional functions in their international relations. Compared to Europe, the less developed democratic political system in this region may be a factor in impeding the workability of an institution in a collective security system.

1. Historical Background

Current enmities among Japan, China, and South Korea are rooted in historical experiences. Japan's military expansionism to the neighboring states in the early twentieth century left bitter memories in the Chinese and the Korean people's minds. Today, Japan's ambiguous attitudes toward its history, coupled with the military sexual slavery issue, remain as the main factors in impeding the formation of positive identities between Japan and the other two countries. Communist China also had been an apparent threat to South Korea and Japan through the Cold War era. China's military intervention in the Korean War in 1951 made Korean reunification impossible at that time, and its communist line policy and the alliance with North Korea has conflicted with South Korea and Japan.

The normalization of their foreign relations shows the difficulty of harmony and trust among them. After the Second World War, Japan signed a peace treaty with the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan in 1952. However, Japan and South Korea did not reach an agreement on a peace treaty until 1965, fourteen years after discussions begun in 1951.[478] Also, Nakasone was the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Korea in 1983, eighteen years after the treaty, and the following year Korean President Chun traveled to Tokyo and met with Emperor Hirohito. The process of improving relations between Japan and China has proceeded even more slowly because of ideological problems. After the Sino-U.S.

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[478]R. Mark Bean, *Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia* (Washington: National Defense University, 1990), p. 78.

rapprochement in the early 1970s, a Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in 1978. Also, no agreement formally ending the Korean War between South Korea and China has yet been consummated, and it was not until the early 1980s that the two countries allowed any direct contact between each's citizens.[479] They achieved rapprochement in 1992, as an outcome of South Korea's Northern Policy and China's economic reform.

Most of all, Japan's apparent attitude toward its history has been the major obstacle in recovering trust from Korea and China, and thus in forming positive identities with each other. High Japanese officials' statements that justified and beautified their past history has annoyed the peoples of China and Korea quite often. In 1986, "Minister of Education Masayuki Fujio stated publicly that the 'rape' of Nanjing did not violate international law," and Nakasone dismissed him amid a storm of protest after he refused to resign.[480] In 1988, National Land Agency Director Seisuke Okuno contended that "Japan had not intended to invade China," and Takeshita "expressed uncertainty about Japanese responsibility for aggression in World War II."[481] Japan tried to glorify the past war in high school history textbooks, changing the term of "invasion" to "military advance," and deleting the terms of "rape," "violated" and "biological warfare detachment."[482] Now, the Japanese Government forces schools "to display the Hinomaru (Sun Flag) and students to sing "Kimigayo" as the national anthem."[483] Also, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on July 1996 set off a renewed international controversy about their attitude toward history.[484]

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[479]R. Mark Bean, *Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia*, p. 78.

[480]Lowell Dittmer, *China under Reform* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994). P. 194.

[481]Ibid., p. 194-195.

[482]Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 126,127

[483]Ibid., p. 132.

[484]The Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol and sanctuary of Japanese militarism because it is dedicated to the souls of more than 2.5 million war dead, including executed war criminals such as

As a result, 89 % of South Korean people and 77 % of Chinese people still feel that the Japanese did not regret their past faults, while 55 % of Japanese think they already regretted them.[485] Particularly, in this context, the South Korean people think that future cooperation between South Korea and China will be more possible than that between South Korea and Japan, and that between China and Japan (Table 7). Without a sincere Japanese apology and regret, anti-Japanese mind in China and Korea will continue and impede improving the current identities.

Table 7. South Korean View of the 21st Century Cooperation[486] (Percent)

Field	S. Korea - China	China - Japan	S. Korea - Japan
Economy	87.3	73.2	58.0
Foreign/Security	77.9	59.2	48.0
Culture	82.2	66.3	54.4

Japanese ambiguous attitude toward Japan's history seems to be related to their social characteristics. Their strong "we" and "they" dichotomy tends to justify the past military expansion by the pretext of that "we did as they did." Their peculiar self-identity, or their special pride that they were chosen people by God (*Kami*), has made them reluctant to admit their past faults. Their collectivism, which means decentralized responsibility or divided power, has blurred the subject who should be the main body for apology, or who should be blamed. As a result, while Japanese feel that they already have expressed regret and apologized, other victimized countries are not satisfied with Japan's attitude. Their loyalty in a hierarchical structure, which was based on a military-dominant society throughout history,

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former Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo. Therefore, Hashimoto's official tribute at the shrine may be interpreted as an attempt to justify and legitimize the history of Japan's militaristic imperialism. See Korea Foundation, *Korea Focus*, vol. 4, no. 4, July-August 1996, p. 133.

[485]*Choongang Ilbo*, October 23, 1996.

[486]*Choongang Ilbo*, October 23, 1996.

also has impeded the state to make a public apology, and has resulted in ongoing high officials' absurd remarks and beautified text books. Considering those social characteristics formed throughout a long Japanese history, it would be difficult for them to make any clear apology for their past historical faults in the near future.

China's opaque security policy also is an obstacle in forming positive identities among Northeast Asian states. There have been a series of provocative postures in China in the post-Cold War era. First, coupled with the growing neo-nationalism, China's communist-line policy seems to be directed toward anti-hegemonism in Asia. "Chinese leaders have flirted with a proposal by Iran for a China-Iran-India alliance against U.S. 'hegemonism' in Asia," by participating in the foreign ministers' meeting in Teheran in 1994.[487] Second, China would be willing to sign a comprehensive test-ban treaty later 1996, but "still want the right to conduct so-called 'peaceful' explosions after such a ban."[488] In fact, "Beijing has quietly sat on the fence on the question of North Korea's nuclear ambitions."[489] Third, China's attitudes toward Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and Tibet have still shown its ongoing "hard-line policy." Fourth, even though it is opening its market, Chinese economic choice was a "socialist market economy,"neither socialism nor capitalism. Despite its economic development, the domestic political and economic situation seems to be instable: authoritarian rule, violations of human rights, pirating, and anti-religion law. Regarding a harsh verdict on Wang Dan, a former student leader, the New York Times mentioned that "China's Communist Party leadership may have silenced the last of its prominent critics at home and ushered in an era of authoritarianism that leaves only commerce to occupy the Chinese."[490] As a result, despite the growing economic relations among the Northeast Asian states, Japan and Korea still keep an

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[487]Lincoln Kaye, "Don't Tread on US," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 24, 1994, p. 16.

[488]*Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 6, 1996, p. 16.

[489]Lincoln Kaye, "Don't Tread on US," p. 16.

[490]Patrick E. Tyler, "Chinese Verdict Points to an Era Of Harsh Rule," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1996.

eye on such moves by China based on neo-nationalism.

In summary, the historical background of Northeast Asia suggests the lack of positive identities among regional states. China and Korea still have the bitter memory of Japan's militarism. Korea and Japan have fought the invisible war with China during the Cold War era. Despite some of the benign phenomena in the post-Cold War era such as economic interdependency and normalization of foreign relations, there has been no real advance toward recovering their lost trust. Coupled with the conflictive security interests throughout modern history, which were reviewed in chapter IV, the negative identities among the Northeast Asian sates are the main reasons why the Northeast Asian states cannot cooperate with each other for regional security stability and further collective security.

2. Traditional Asian Beliefs and Culture

Collective security requires democratic principles for maintaining its institutions and for the interactions among member states within the institutions. The NATO Treaty shows three main principles based on democracy: equality of member states, legal principle, and publicized policy. In fact, "In Western liberal democracies it is a fundamental tenet that government involves highly differentiated functional institutions (executives or cabinets, parliaments, and the judiciary), with specified terms of references and responsibilities, codified in some form of constitutional law."[491] However, in Asian politics and cultural traditions of decision making, "there is little habit of the rule of law, highly personalized notions of power and legitimacy, ... and a strong predilection to the resolution of differences in private rather than in public fora."[492] Above all, China is a far less developed country than Japan and South Korea in terms of modern democracy and free economy. Compared to Japan and South Korea, it has a much stronger hierarchic social structure under communist rule. As a result, one dominant figure, such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, holds no office and is

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[491]Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Security Studies*, vol. 3, no. 1, Autumn 1993, p. 54.

[492]Ibid., p. 55.

responsible to no institutions, but he is indisputably the "paramount leader."[493] In this context, China will be the most difficult and reluctant partner in establishing institutions for collective security.

Neher indicates that "Asian democracy is characterized by respect for authority and hierarchy."[494] Their political culture is heavily imbued with Confucianist principles. While Confucianism emphasizes harmony, stability and consensus, it favors authoritarian rule and the duties of the lower to the higher: the ruled to the ruler, the son to the father, the pupil to the teacher, and even the wife to the husband. One dominant feature of such societies is "personalism" which puts emphasis on leaders rather than on laws.[495] When a leader dominates over laws or people with his absolute authority in a state, it would be impossible to make the state's policy publicized and to keep legal principle in international society. While Japan and Korea have become more democratic countries, China still maintains a highly authoritarian regime. Without any competing political party, the people's will has nothing to do with the political decision making, thus contributing to the uncertainty of Chinese politics. Yang Ping, editor of Strategy & Management, mentions that:

> If you ask me as a person, I would say I would like democracy. But if you go to the Chinese countryside and have a look and see the poverty of how people live, then you see that democracy wouldn't be appropriate or in the national interest. The people there aren't capable of exercising democracy.[496]

The difficulty of China's democratization, in terms of its historical background and political characteristics, suggests the difficulty of institutionalization of collective security. Even though China can recover trust with other regional states by renouncing its ideological line, China may remain as a highly dictatorial and authoritarian regime in the fear of

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[493]Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," p. 55.

[494]Clark D. Neher, "Asian Style Democracy," *Asian Survey*, vol. 34, no. 11, November, 1994, p. 953.

[495]Ibid., p. 951.

[496]Steven Mufson, "China's 'Neo-Cons' See a Long March to Chaos," *Washington Post Weekly*, 20-26 October, 1995.

democratization which can bring about disintegration of China. Such a regime tends to intensify "nationalism" to unify and justify its legitimacy. In this case, China will oppose the establishment of collective security because of two reasons. First, China's participation in a collective security system will force China to be democratic. There will be a lot of pressure for democratic principles such as freedom of press, freedom of speech, respect for human rights, and opening its society. In one aspect, it will cause severe chaos or "pollution" in the Chinese domestic political environment.

Second, the Chinese sinocentric world view also may be an obstacle in establishing institutions for collective security. International relations among Northeast Asian states in the premodern era were hierarchical, not equal. Until the nineteenth century, the advanced Chinese culture, philosophy, religion, art, and scholarship were disseminated to Korea and Japan. By the Chinese view, China was a center and Japan and Korea were the periphery. Of course, that kind of relationship does not exist in the current political environment. However, in that context, China may be reluctant to participate in any institution under the condition of equal status with the past peripheral countries. Considering current Chinese neo-nationalism which is aimed at the recovery of its past glory, China may strengthen its foreign relations based on bilateral relations rather than multilateral ones.

C. STEPS TOWARD A REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

Steps toward collective security in Northeast Asia will never be easy. However, as table 8 shows, there can be four steps toward a Northeast Asian collective security system. First of all, the Northeast Asian states should terminate historical enmities and recover trust with each other. Northeast Asian states have quite negative identities because of historical experience throughout modern history. Japan should make its attitude toward past history apparent, and China also should make its ideological lines clear. Without the settlement of historical and ideological matters, it would be difficult for them to improve their identities. Second, CBMs should be reinforced through multilateral security approaches and economic interactions using current Asia-Pacific institutions such as the ARF and the APEC. Third, there should be a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation which facilitates direct

cooperation among the Northeast Asian states. Based on positive identities through the first and second phase, this will serve to converge their diverse and conflictive security interests toward a single goal of regional stability. Finally, the Northeast Asian institution can be expanded to a collective security system like NATO. This will be a watershed from a balance of power system to a collective security system for regional stability. As a current power balancer, the U.S. role will be critical for establishing collective security and maintaining stability during this work.

Table 8. Steps toward Collective Security in Northeast Asia

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">Step</th><th>Purpose</th></tr>
<tr><td>1st</td><td rowspan="3">Before Korean Reunification</td><td rowspan="2">Confidence Building</td><td>Termination of Enmities</td><td>Settlement of historical and ideological enmities</td></tr>
<tr><td>2nd</td><td>Multilateral Security Approaches</td><td>Creating positive identities</td></tr>
<tr><td>3rd</td><td colspan="2">Establishment of a Northeast Asian Institution</td><td>Forming shared security interests</td></tr>
<tr><td>4th</td><td>After Korean Reunification</td><td colspan="2">Institutionalization of Collective Security</td><td>Establishment of a collective security system</td></tr>
</table>

From the first step to third step, there should be flexibility in building confidence and establishing a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation. That is, it does not mean that a complete termination of enmities, the first step, can necessarily cause multilateral security approaches, the second step. Rather, those two steps are somewhat complementary. Also, the third step, establishment of a Northeast Asian Institution, can contribute to confidence building among them. In this context, this thesis does not argue that the orders of the three steps are absolute. According to the nature of the political or security environment, any of the three steps can be practiced earlier than the other steps. Or, they can be practiced together at the same time.

1. Confidence Building: Termination of Historical Enmity

Despite the importance of trust -- in other words, we can say a basis for cooperation: positive identities and shared security interests -- in collective security, it is very difficult for Northeast Asian states to form trust because of their historical and cultural problems. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) should be practiced. Evans suggests multilateral dialogues as CBMs, which would discuss instruments for increasing transparency in defense doctrine, military capacities and intentions, and conflict prevention.[497] At the same time, however, the transparency of Japan's attitude toward history and Chinese foreign policy should be concluded for such dialogues among regional states. Without the settlement of historical and ideological matters, those series of dialogues as CBMs would not be a basis for improving their identities. Also, each Northeast Asian state also should be willing to welcome the others' new policies and attitudes.

Japan should apologize for its past history and make its attitude for the history apparent. Japan should keep Germany's example in mind. Even though both Germany and Japan played the role of aggressor during World War II, "50 years after the war, the two countries engender strikingly different responses from other countries in terms of their trustworthiness."[498] Germany considered reparations to victimized countries as a moral obligation and enacted the Law on Federal Reparations in 1956 to facilitate the payment. "The sincere reparation policy of Germany has served as momentum for regaining the trust of its neighbors and, at the same time, played a considerable internal role in changing the German people's way of thinking," forming a common feeling among the German people that an autocratic regime like Nazi Germany can never again be tolerated.[499] As we have already examined, the improvement of the Franco-German relationship, an apparent achievement in

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[497]Paul M. Evans, p. 207.

[498]Kim Kyong-min, "Why Is Japan Distrusted?" *Korea Focus*, vol. 3, no. 3, May-June 1995, p. 129. "West Germany fulfilled its compensatory obligations to Israel by 1965, but following Germany's unification it decided to pay an additional $630 million in indemnity to Israelis who lived in the former East Germany and other Eastern European countries." See p. 130.

[499]Ibid., p. 130.

NATO, was possible because of German endeavors to recover the trust from other neighbors.

Compared to Germany, Japan has taken quite different attitudes. It was beginning in 1995, on the 50th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II, that Japan announced its reparation plan at a cost of 100 billion yen over the next decade. Japan has tried to distort the history of its aggressive war and deny culpability in the issue of its sex slaves. "Japan has still not compensated the woman victims, nor has it taught its younger generations the true history of Japan's legacy of aggression and atrocity."[500] Under these circumstances, it would be impossible for China and Korea to form a trust in Japan.

In terms of current economic power and expanding security role, Japan will seek to be a major political power. The neighboring states are well aware of it as an inevitable reality. To a degree, they expect Japan's constructive role, especially in the field of economic cooperation. What they are anxious about is not simply Japan's expanding security and political role, but its intention. In this respect, Japan has to recover trust by resolving the historical problems, such as its attitude toward history, a sincere apology, reparation and so on.

China should make its policy transparent to the neighboring states. Many scholars indicate that China has an aspiration to be a regional hegemon power. In fact, by 2010 China will have Asia's largest economy and will be a strong power with considerable military capabilities. What others are concerned about is, however, not simply its military buildup, but the direction of China's policy. Even though China is opening its market, China's communist line has never been given up. Standing on a crossroad of modernization and an ideological line, China seems to take an ongoing hard-line policy based on neo-nationalism. Current economic development will bring about "pollution" of ideology and weaken the legitimacy of its regime. "One way of unifying the people and maintaining the party leadership is nationalism."[501] "Some sort of real or imagined enemy is necessary in order for nationalism

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[500]Kim Kyong-min, "Why Is Japan Distrusted?" p. 130, 131.

[501]Lee Mun-bong, "A Scenario for East Asia in the 2000s: Japan-China Rivalry," Korea Focus, vol. 2, no. 2, March-April 1994, p. 26.

to be effective."[502] China's continuing nuclear tests, escalation of the Taiwan issue in 1995, and a hard-line policy toward the Spratly Islands can be understood as policies based on Chinese neo-nationalism to unify its people and to legitimize its regime. Coupled with the characteristics of China, an absolutely closed society, China's "nationalistic" moves increase the others' concerns about the future uncertainty of China's policy. Without transparency of China's ideological line, Japan and Korea cannot improve their identities toward China.

In addition to Japan's clear apology for its history and China's apparent policy toward its ideological line, each country should strengthen education to the next generation focusing on the need for friendship and cooperation among regional states, rather than enmity and competition. Di Hua states that such education will be the best way to recover trust and to make them cooperate for co-prosperity in Northeast Asia in the future.[503] For Japan, instead of beautification of its past history, Japan should teach the younger generation the excellence of Chinese and Korean history. Korea should focus on the developmental relations with Japan and China in the future. China should focus on cooperation with Japan and Korea rather than on justifying its ideology. Education of the next generation will be the most meaningful investment for future relations among them. When they are grown up, the identities of the Northeast Asian states will become much more positive than at any time in the past.

In fact, it would be very difficult to expect Japan and China to take such "revolutionary" policies. As long as the Northeast Asian states feel that the others will keep the status quo, they will not change their attitudes. For example, as long as China thinks that Japan continues beautification of past wars, it would be difficult to expect China to educate its next generation to be more cooperative with Japan than competitive. Therefore, there should be more basic measures to facilitate the changes of policies toward history and ideology. In some part, the confidence building measures, such as multilateral approaches to security and economic cooperation, can contribute to the change of Japan's and China's policies. This thesis suggests following for terminating historical enmities and clearing ways

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[502]Ibid., p. 26.

[503]Interview with Di Hua, Stanford University, June 26, 1996.

to build confidence:

- Establishment of a joint research team for accurate history
- Exchange of conferences concerning history, culture, ideology, and security affairs
- Correction of distorted history in text books, and reinforcement of education for the next generation focusing on mutual cooperation
- Publication of historical issues
- Japan's apparent apology and reparation: China's clear ideological line
- Political consensus for historical and ideological issues among the Northeast Asian states through joint declaration or treaty

2. Confidence Building: Multilateral Approaches

Multilateral approaches toward security and economic cooperation should be reinforced to build confidence. Considering the current negative identities among regional states, it seems to be natural that the outcomes of ARF or CSCEA are not very productive. When they get improved identities through resolving historical enmities, multilateral security dialogues will provide tangible outcomes to them. Conversely, this confidence building will also be a basis for the settlement of historical enmities with more understanding among them. In this context, termination of historical enmities and multilateral approaches are not independent steps, but complimentary ones.

The Northeast Asian states should engage themselves in the current multilateral security frameworks, such as the ARF, the CSCEA and even the APEC, more actively. Through such institutional interactions, they can form a strong confidence that each state respects international law and norms within the institutions. Coupled with the decreasing historical enmities and mutual understanding through other CBMs, the Northeast Asian states will also be able to reach an agreement on regional security issues, such as a non-aggression pact or transparency of their policies. Of course, within the Asia-Pacific level of institutions, it would be difficult for all member states to make a conclusion on specific issues because of diverse and even conflictive security interests among them. For example, even though the Asia-Pacific countries can deal with the Spratly Islands issue in the ARF, it would not be

efficient and productive. Rather, it would be more desirable that the ASEAN states and China open talks in a sub-regional level. This is the reason why a Northeast Asian security framework is required in the third step.

The Northeast Asian states should strengthen economic relations each other, especially between China and the other states. As examined earlier in this chapter, economic interdependency tends to improve political relations as well as mutual understanding. One of the characteristics of the current market economy is the movement of people and workers over the borders between countries as joint corporations increase. This phenomenon will contribute to people's understanding of each other's culture and society, thus increasing interactions which will provide the means of containing and preventing the escalation of any economic conflicts as well as political conflicts.[504] Coupled with the improving political and economic relations between China and South Korea, Japan's more investment to China will be able to promote mutual understanding and more positive identities.[505]

Joint military exercises can improve security relations among the Northeast Asian states. So far, there has been no joint military exercise between the Cold War enemies. If the United States includes China and Russia in a joint military exercise, such as the Rim of the Pacific, it will contribute to increasing trust between them. While a military training without them can be "containment," a joint military exercise with China and Russia will be "security cooperation." As long as their identities are negative, such joint military exercise may be difficult. Even if so, they can activate military exchanges such as port visits, exchange of high-level military officers and military training. In fact, military exchanges among the Northeast Asian states have increased in the post-Cold War era and have contributed to confidence building.

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[504]Satoshi Morimoto, "A Security Framework for the Asia/Pacific Region," in *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 18, p. 218.

[505]This premises the liberalists' theory in political economy. Mercantilists will oppose this view. But, considering current economic environment which requires more cooperation among states, economic interdependency among Northeast Asian states will bring about benign effects to their political relations, rather than negative effects.

These multilateral approaches will contribute to the settlement of possible future regional conflicts, such as fishery area problems or trade problems. Edward Olsen states that a small regional crisis or conflict can be one of the best opportunities to recover trust among the Northeast Asian states.[506] For example, when there is a fishery area problem, tension will be increased between countries. Despite the escalation, if states can settle the problem, identity of each other will be improved. Faced with that kind of a small conflict, multilateral security talks and economic interdependency will provide more opportunities to settle the matter with cooperation than if there are no such "windows for contacts."

Such confidence building measures will contribute to the improvement of identities among the Northeast Asian states. This will be the process to change their understanding of others from competitors or threat of the Cold War to partners toward future co-prosperity. However, the CBMs cannot be an ultimate means for securing regional stability. Even multilateral security dialogues, such as the ARF, cannot be a security system that manages power among regional states. Rather they are a measure to supplement defects of the current balance of power system. That is the reason why an institution should be established in Northeast Asia. If the CBMs contribute to improvement of identities, an institution for Northeast Asia security cooperation will contribute to form shared security interests and facilitate more cooperation.

3. Institutionalization

Even if the Northeast Asian states create positive identities through CBMs, institutionalization of collective security cannot be achieved right after the confidence building. With only a positive identity, collective security may not be successful. Most of all, the Northeast Asian states should have common security interests in establishing a collective security system. Before institutionalization of collective security, regional states should establish a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation. This will contribute to converging their diverse security interests into a single goal toward regional stability. Also, the institution will be a headquarters for establishing a collective security system.

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[506]Interview with Edward A. Olsen, Naval Postgraduate School, October 28, 1996.

a. The role of the US: from a balancer to a participant

The role of the United States is critical in establishing a collective security system in Northeast Asia. Historically, the Northeast Asian states have had no experience with multilateral military or security cooperation. Even though they form a basis for security cooperation by improving their security relations, how to operate the system will be a practical problem. The United States can be an effective adviser as well as a participant. Of course, the United States can be an off-shore balancer or an isolationist. However, considering the fact that the importance of security stability in this region will be closely related to their national interests as the volume of trade and the importance of sea routes increases, it would be more probable that the United States will participate in a collective security system of any type.

First, the US should reinforce multilateral security cooperation through the ARF, or if possible, APEC. Defense Secretary William Perry accentuated the importance of multilateral security initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region to prevent an arms race and to build a cooperative security environment.[507] In the first ARF in July 1994, eighteen countries including China, Japan and South Korea participated, and they discussed the exchange of information including military data, the submission of them to the U.N. arms register, and peacekeeping activities.[508] Even though the United States has pursued such multilateral approaches as a supplement to the current bilateral security treaties, it will contribute to building confidence among the Northeast Asian states for future security cooperation.

Second, the United States should improve and strengthen its relations with China. The United States should not give an impression of containment to China. This does not mean "yielding," but "understanding." As China's traditional security policy shows, the Chinese have a strong national pride. By its traditional Confucian values, material gains such as economic interests are far less important for the Chinese than spiritual values, such as pride

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[507]Korea Research Institute for Strategy, "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," in *Strategic Studies*, vol. 2, 1995, p. 165.

[508]Ibid., p. 165-166.

and authority of a "great nation." One of the major reasons for China's intervention in the Korean War was the Chinese hostility about the U.S. interposing the Seventh Fleet between Formosa and mainland China.[509] The reason for the Chinese independent policy since 1982 was that China felt its pride was hurt from the ongoing U.S. arms sale to Taiwan. If China feels containment from the United States or the U.S.-Japan alliance, their nationalism will rise against "hegemonism" and keep national pride.

Hadar indicates that, "Hard-line U.S. policies based on the assumption that China poses a strategic, economic, and cultural threat could create a tragic, self-fulfilling prophecy," and instead of adopting a confrontational policy, they should intensify economic relations which have a liberalizing influence that increases the likelihood of additional economic and political reforms.[510] Expanding U.S. trade and investment ties with China and the rest of the emerging economies of Asia would not only benefit American economic interests, but help in the long run to increase their mutual understanding and cooperation and to transform mainland China into a free-market democratic country.[511]

Third, the United States should reconsider its role preparing for the future, from a protector to a conciliator. "Foreign policy editor Charles William Maynes suggests, in the post-Cold War era it is inevitable that strong regional powers will begin exercising authority in their spheres of influence."[512] Also, Hadar argues that:

> While the United States should continue to offer its services as an "honest broker" to help resolve various regional disputes diplomatically and be prepared (taking into consideration its own interests) to provide nations in the area with military equipment to defend themselves, it should begin to end its military commitments in the region and thereby create incentives for the main players to protect their own national interests and

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[509]Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24 December, 1980, p. 563-592.

[510]Leon T. Hadar, "The Sweet-and -Sour Sino-American Relationship," *Policy Analysis*, Cato Institute, no. 248, January 23, 1996, p 1.

[511]Ibid., p.30.

[512]Ibid., p. 30.

to form regional security arrangements. [513]

As this thesis argued in chapter 4, as the remnants of the Cold War end in the future, the role of the United States will be changed in terms of duty and justification. If the United States has to prepare for a future security environment in which their role would be decreased in military involvement, they will have to give the regional states more opportunities to deal with security matters actively. Current moves such as the return of command rights in peacetime to the Korean Army, the division of roles and missions between the United States and Japan can be understood as that kind of measure, though the latter case has caused a security concern in other countries. Also, the new U.S. role as a conciliator will not only promote the relationship with China by reducing tension if not pessimistic, but will also contribute to promoting the relationships among the Northeast Asian states. A policy of aiming for a greater regional self-reliance or cooperative security system does not mean an end to the U.S. role, but a transformation of its role from a balancer to a participant.

Most of all, the U.S. participation in regional collective security will justify its military presence in Northeast Asia. The United States will not want its political influence to be reduced in Northeast Asia by the reduction or withdrawal of its military after the Korean reunification. To maintain its political influence, such as prevention of nuclear expansion, military presence in this region will be required to a degree. Also, military presence will secure its sea lines of communication and free economic trade. In this context, the creation of a collective security system and its participation in the system will give the United States justification for its military presence in Northeast Asia. Consequently, collective security will be more beneficial to regional states and the United States than the extension of the current balance of power structure after the Korean reunification. Also, this seems to be the time for the United States to set up its security policy toward collective security in Northeast Asia in the long term.

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[513]Ibid., p. 29.

b. Establishment of an institution for security cooperation

A Northeast Asian security framework should be created by the Northeast Asian states and the United States. Current multilateral security frameworks, such as the ARF and the APEC, are not proper to produce any tangible outcomes because of the diverse security interests among divergent members. The ARF consists of ASEAN states, the European Community members, Northeast Asian states, the United States, Canada, Australia and India. While the ARF can facilitate security dialogues among its member states, "there is no consensus on what it should really focus on in the future, and hence it will be very difficult to proceed further."[514] If Northeast Asian states form positive identities, it will be more desirable to establish an institution for Northeast Asian security cooperation which is separate from the ARF or the APEC. Conversely, the Northeast Asian institution can also have an effect to improve their identities too.

The Northeast Asian security framework will serve to converge their diverse and conflictive security interests into a unified goal toward regional stability. With improved identities, states can focus on regional security issues such as territorial problems, disarmament, or nuclear issues. When it comes to territorial matters such as Diaoyu Island (the Senkaku) and Tokto Island (Takeshima), there may be a little room for compromise or settlement of those issues. However, even though there will be severe debates or conflicts, their dialogues within the Northeast Asian security framework will be more conducive to regional stability than no dialogues or no such framework. Also, there can be a consensus for disarmament as long as they feel free from the doubts over each other's bid for ideology, militarism, and hegemonism. There can be an agreement to maintain a certain level of military in each state which will not be a threat to the others. The regional states can make an "institution for information" that will facilitate information and make member states' policies transparent. Even though the Northeast Asian security framework cannot solve all security issues among member states, it will strongly provide opportunities for them to improve mutual understanding as security partners and no longer threats, and to adjust their conflictive

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[514]Satoshi Morimoto, "A Security Framework for the Asia/Pacific Region," p. 228.

security interests.

The Northeast Asian security framework can be established before Korean reunification, because whenever regional states recover trust they can create such an institution to prevent conflicts. Jo Myong-hyon insists that some of outcomes expected from the institution are:[515]

- Stabilizing regional security through political cooperation among the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and the two Koreas
- Co-prosperity and coexistence through economic cooperation, disarmament
- Securing the Korean peninsula by leading North Korea to opening and participation in international society
- Securing regional stability from power changes such as the withdrawal/reduction of the U.S. military or reduction of Russian influence
- Containment of Japan's rearmament and hegemonic rivalry.
- Prevention of nuclear expansion to Northeast Asia

As a Northeast Asian multilateral security approach mechanism, it will give the Northeast Asian states more confidence to expand it into a regional collective security system.

*c. **Institutionalization of collective security***

Institutionalization of collective security will be possible when states recover positive identities fully and share common security interests. In terms of positive identities, it seems to be difficult to form a collective security system before Korean reunification unless there occurs a big change in North Korea's policy. Instead, the current balance of power system will be maintained until Korean reunification, while the Northeast Asian security framework facilitates cooperation, improving relations among regional states. In some aspects, the first and the second steps may contribute to Korean reunification by defusing the threat of North Korea or conciliating the two Koreas.

Institutionalization of collective security will bring about the change in the security

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[515]Jo Myong-hyon, *Kukje Jeongchijukiro Bon Hankuki Unmyong* (Seoul: Gyohakyonkusa, 1996), p. 411-412.

system in Northeast Asia from the balance of power system to a collective security arrangement. The current bilateral security arrangements will be useless and refused by regional states because they will not consider each other as an enemy or threat. Instead of defending their territories from others' threat, they will concentrate their efforts on regional stability and world peace. To promote efficiency, the Northeast Asian security framework can be expanded into a collective security system. There should be proper institutions that take different roles and functions such as political consultation, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and military cooperation. Treaties will be made based on international law. In this context, NATO can be a model for building a framework for Northeast Asian collective security.

A Northeast Asian collective security system will benefit member states. As NATO improved identities between France and Germany, the Northeast Asian collective security can contribute to the promotion of positive identities with more contacts and interactions among member states. Institutions will also make information available to member states and provide transparency of each state's policy. Most of all, Northeast Asian collective security will give its member states economic benefits because of their decreased efforts on military buildup than ever before. Such incentives and benefits will strengthen cooperation of member states and institutional capability. Of course, the interactions between states' cooperation and benefits from the system will strengthen the member states' identities and institutional functions.

D. SUMMARY

Can collective security be a means for regional stability in Northeast Asia? The answer of this thesis is "yes, if the five conditions are satisfied by the security environment in Northeast Asia." The problem is that Northeast Asia does not satisfy the five conditions at present. Historical enmities among Northeast Asian states are too high to improve security relations. Security policies among them have been conflictive throughout modern history. The difficulty of China's democratization suggests the difficulty of institutionalization of collective security, which requires democratic principles. Northeast Asian states have no experience

with collective security or security cooperation through institutions. Such a security environment is the reason why the future security structure under balance of power will be so instable. And, this is the reason why Northeast Asia requires collective security in the future despite such difficulties.

To establish a collective security system, this chapter suggested four steps. First, the Northeast Asian states should form positive identities through confidence building. Historical issues should be settled by Japan's apology and apparent attitude. Ideological issues should be settled by China's transparent and moderate foreign and domestic policies. This will provide the basis for recovering trust among the Northeast Asian states. Second, CBMs should be strengthened through multilateral security dialogues, economic cooperation, education to the next generations, joint military exercise and military exchanges. The CBMs will promote mutual understanding and improve their relations. Third, a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation should be established. It will not only facilitate forming shared security interests among regional states, but it will also be a basis for institutionalization of a collective security system. Finally, the institutionalization of collective security can be modeled by NATO and will benefit regional states in terms of less costs for their security stability. Of course, in the process of confidence building and establishing a Northeast Asian security framework, order is not important because they tend to be complimentary.

The role of the United States will be critical in establishing a collective security system and maintaining regional stability until then. The United States should not contain China by strengthening current bilateral security alliances after the Korean reunification. It should change its role from a protector to a participant, and from a balancer to a conciliator. As far as the U.S. interests are concerned, it would be better for the United States not to be an off-shore balancer or an isolationist. Instead, the United States can take a role to guide regional states in establishing a new cooperative security system.

In the future when the Northeast Asian remnant of the Cold War ends, a collective security system can be applied as a means for security stability in this region more than any other kind of measure because of the following four reasons. First, even though the formation

of trust among Northeast Asian states seems to be difficult, the current CBMs, such as increasing economic relations and the multilateral security dialogues, have shown signs of a cooperative atmosphere rather than a competitive one. Second, the national interests of each state will tend to converge on security and economy rather than on military dominance or ideological revolution. Third, collective security will more beneficial than balance of power. If the Northeast Asian states create a collective security system, the system will provide more benefits such as reduced interaction costs, less defense costs, stable economic environment, and available information. This will tend to strengthen their commitment to the system and contribute to regional peace and stability.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. NATURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Balance of power itself has limits as a system for power management. As Hans Morgenthau admits, the difficulty of power calculation can lead states to a misjudgement. The tendency of states toward preponderance in a balance of power system may result in a power competition between powerful countries. Most of all, even though realists insist on the inevitability of the balance of power in an anarchic international environment, its better outcome might count on cooperation of states for peace rather than competition for power. If balance of power is not an inevitable one in international relations, and if cooperation among states is possible, there can be a more cooperative security system other than power competition.

As an alternative concept to balance of power, collective security has been criticized because of its overly ideal concept in a real world. The trust problem in a collective security system can be examined in terms of states' cooperation. Like in a prisoner's dilemma game, states will not cooperate. However, if information is available to the prisoners and the game is repeated again and again in the future, the prisoners can cooperate. Coupled with the changes in the international system, cooperation in the field of politics, economy and security among states tends to be reinforced especially in the post-Cold War era. If states can cooperate with each other for common security interests, collective security can work not as an ideal concept, but as a real one.

Of the five conditions for the success of collective security, positive identities and shared mutual security interests among member states are critical. They become a basis for cooperation and strengthen institutional capability in a collective security system. When we consider the fact that a state's behavior is dependent on its self-interest, the more shared interests there are, the more cooperation there will be; therefore, there will be a greater possibility for a collective security system to be successful. The shared self-interests among states are influenced by the identity that each state builds in a system. As far as security matters are concerned, the definition of others as a friend or enemy, or as "positive" or

"negative," is important for sharing their security interests.

Collective security requires proper institutions to control states' behavior, adjust their self-interests, and facilitate their cooperation. An institution cannot be an authority to govern its member states. Instead, institutional capability depends on its incentives to attract states' cooperation, providing the opportunities for states to adjust and conciliate with each other's different interests, policies, and strategies. As long as the system was beneficial, the member states will follow rules and norms based on international law. This voluntary behavior will strengthen institutional capability in a collective security system. As one of the most important functions, institutions should have information to provide transparency to the public. By the dissemination of information, a collective security system can not only make the policy of each state transparent, but also can get much stronger public support and strengthen trust among the states.

Collective security requires the reiteration of interaction between actors and the system. As long as the purpose of each state in a collective security system is security interest, a collective security system should reward its members with less transaction costs, security stability and economic benefits. The more gains that the system provides, the more cooperation the member states will commit. Such interactions between the cooperation of actors and benefits from the system will make the collective security system more stable as they are reiterated.

B. APPLICABILITY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

There will be two options for the future security system in Northeast Asia: balance of power and collective security. The balance of power structure, as this thesis examined, will not be desirable for the future security environment. Even though the balance of power is maintained under improved political relations and positive identities among regional states, it will also not be desirable because the balance of power structure itself implies the existing hostility and confrontation between "our interests" and "their interests". Instead of a balance of power, a collective security system will be able to not only prevent such a confrontational future security environment, but will also benefit regional states in terms of peace and co-

prosperity.

In applying collective security to Northeast Asia, the most urgent task for the Northeast Asian states is to form positive identities with each other. Still, negative identities among the Northeast Asian states will be the most problematic obstacle in establishing a regional collective security system. Japan does not seem to take an ultimate measure to settle historical matters with Korea and China. China will stick to socialism and maintain an authoritarian regime. As long as the Northeast Asian states watch each other with doubts over each other's hegemonic ambition, they will not be able to form positive identities. Their distrust and even hatred will impede them from sharing a common security goal toward regional stability. This is the reason why the CBMs should be strengthened not only to establish a collective security system, but also to improve their security relations. In fact, even though security cooperation among the Northeast Asian states seems to be difficult, it will never be an impossible task. Dietrich Fischer indicates that:

> Cooperation does not always have to begin with the most difficult and controversial issues, such as arms control. It may be much easier to reach some initial agreement in areas that are noncontroversial, where there is a very obvious joint interest, even if they may be less significant in themselves. But a series of easy agreements may pave the way for successful negotiations has been created. ... Such mutually beneficial relations and close people-to-people contacts have removed much of the fear and the danger of war"[516]

By initiating easy tasks first, such as joint research of historical matters or military exchanges, the Northeast Asian states will be able to improve their identities and promote cooperation.

National interest is a critical factor in determining states' behaviors. Even though security policies among the Northeast Asian states have been conflictive with each other, interests of each state from a collective security system suggest the strongest possibility of collective security in Northeast Asia. The United States can justify its military presence in this region and protect its national interests, such as free economic activities, security of sea lines of communication, and political influence. Also, the United States will be able to improve political and security relationships with China. Japan will be able to get a security guarantee

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[516]Fischer, Dietrich, Nolte, Wilhelm, and Oberg, Jan, *Winning Peace*, p. 21.

of the United States if there is a threat from China and secure its territory and sea lines of communication without high costs. China and reunified Korea will be satisfied with less concerns about Japan's rearmament. Most of all, the Northeast Asian states will be able to prevent further nuclear expansion and hegemonism in this region. Also, they get economic benefits from economic cooperation with less defense costs, free economic trade and technology transfers. In this context, a Northeast Asian security framework can take the role to converge their diverse security interests to such common and harmonious security interests.

If the Northeast Asian states can form positive identities and share common security interests, collective security will become closer to being a reality. For regional stability, a collective security system can be the most desirable measure because it will be able to prevent misunderstanding or conflicts. The cooperative security system will give regional states opportunities for mutual benefits from security, trade, and regional co-prosperity, reinforcing the trust among them. It will require a long time and painstaking efforts for the Northeast Asian states to establish a collective security system. This suggests that the Northeast Asian states begin confidence building now.

C. FUTURE POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN STATES

This thesis examined the conditions for the success of collective security and the applicability of collective security to Northeast Asia as a means for regional stability after Korean reunification. The current bilateral security arrangements will not fit in with the future security environment in Northeast Asia. The conspicuous reduction of the role of the United States in terms of military involvement will cause a change of power dynamics with the rearmament of Japan and Chinese nationalism geared toward regional hegemony, which will possibly result in a new confrontational structure in this region.

This thesis suggested the possibility of collective security in Northeast Asia in terms of the possibility of the improvement of identities and the formation of shared security interests. In this context, the Northeast Asian states should strengthen the CBMs such as multilateral security approaches, economic relations, military exchanges, education for the next generation, and joint military training. Coupled with the changes in the international

system toward cooperation, frequent contacts among regional states will be conducive to promote mutual understanding. To facilitate contacts and cooperation, an institution for Northeast Asia security cooperation should be established. Without positive identities, the institution will not able to work practically because their security interests will be conflictive. However, if they can form positive identities and establish such an institution, there will be tangible outcomes from their cooperation. Then they will also be able to form shared security interests and create a collective security system using the institution.

If a collective security system can be an alternative to a balance of power structure in the future, and if it would be desirable, there would be no reason why states cannot cooperate with each other. Toward future collective security, there are some policy implications for regional states.

First, the United States should change its role from a protector to a participant, and from a balancer to a conciliator. It should prevent Japan from being an "excessive" military power in the face of reduction of the U.S. security role. It should be careful not to show itself to China as a "hegemon power" in this region. At the same time, the United States can be an intermediator to conciliate Japan and China, adjusting their conflictive security interests and appeasing their concerns about each other's bid for regional domination. Also, the United States can take a role in guiding regional states to establish a new cooperative security system using its many experiences with international institutions.

Second, Japan and China should realize that the main reasons for negative identities among regional states are related to their historical and ideological problems. They should show apparent attitudes and policies toward their past history and ideology to neighboring states. In fact, this is one of the most difficult tasks. In particular, it would be unthinkable today for China to give up its communist ideology completely and adopt a democratic political system. However, China should at least make their security policy transparent and publicized. On the other hand, the regional states should strengthen the CBMs and improve their security relations. Even though it takes a long time, education of the next generation will contribute to promoting positive identities among regional states. Military exchanges and joint

military training will also "serve as a device to begin to break down secrecy."[517] Korea, the most victimized country in Asia throughout modern history, should pursue more progressive diplomacy with neighboring states. In some part, Korea can be a balancer between Japan and China and utilize the future security environment for its national interests. For historical matters, Korea has to keep in mind the saying that a one-step recession may bring about a two-step advance in the future.

Most of all, the United Sates, Japan, China, and Korea should realize the importance and necessity of security cooperation for the future security stability in Northeast Asia. As the Western European countries could form a collective identity and share security interests to counter the threat of the Soviet Union, they should make a consensus for more constructive and cooperative security cooperation to prepare for the upcoming security environment. Even though they do not reach an agreement on collective security, their endeavors toward collective security will contribute to a more stable security environment in this region . In fact, as constructivists assert, in the future, friendly anarchy will be better than hostile anarchy.

Consequently, the future security system in Northeast Asia should be changed from the current balance of power structure to a collective security system. This is because a collective security system will be not only an ideal but also a desirable security means for regional stability in Northeast Asia after Korean reunification. Of course, this does not mean that current bilateral security arrangements are not important. As long as the Northeast Asian states have negative identities, collective security cannot be applied as an alternative security mechanism to the balance of power structure in this region. However, as long as collective security is more desirable than balance of power in terms of maintaining regional stability, it would be better for the Northeast Asian states to gather their efforts toward more cooperative security framework.

In the future, when the security environment changes, a new security system in Northeast Asia should be a cooperative one, no longer a competitive or confrontational one like the current balance of power structure. The growing multilateralism and cooperative

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[517]Sheldon W. Simon, *Alternative Visions of Security in Northeast Asia*, p. 25.

atmosphere in the security and economic spheres strongly suggest the possibility of a cooperative security system in Northeast Asia. In this context, Northeast Asia today seems to be waiting for the upcoming "Northeast Asian co-prosperity regime" with assurances of collective security.

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